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VOLUME TWO: SECURITIES MARKETS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 
The previous chapters outlined the development of modem securities 
markets, covering their origins, functions and main participants. The rise of a truly 
global securities market came as a logical outcome of that development and was 
reinforced by other factors, external to the economic nature of the securities market 
itself. 
As has been pointed out, one of the distinctive features of the global 
securities market is a high level of systemic risk. Financial market operations 
spanned the globe and contributed greatly to an ever-growing integration and 
interdependence of national economies. Nevertheless, global financial transactions 
had not been perceived as a potential threat to stability of the system until the 1982 
debt crisis. Since then, perceptions of global linkages, international responsibilities 
and actions, as well as national policy, have been undergoing radical change. The 
evolution of conceptions concerning various economic and political issues was 
further supported by a number of incidents that followed the explosion of the debt- 
bomb. There was the 1987 stock crash and the mini-crash in 1989, as well as a 
number of widely publicized financial scandals. All this revealed a serious level of 
fragility of the global (as well as the national) financial structure. 
At the same time, these incidents drew attention to numerous loop-holes and 
inconsistencies that exist in financial regulation. It became obvious that finance is 
no longer just the concern of domestic economic policy. Today's level of 
internationalisation of banking actually "upgraded" finance issues on the political 
agenda. International financial problems have increasingly come under the scope of 
international relations, L e. foreign policy. 
"By becoming truly international actors, banks have entered as full 
participants into the realm of foreign policy. High finance and high politics 
are now closely interdependent. "I 
Rising awareness of major countries that an innovative, global approach to 
international finance should be taken laid the ground for a new stage in international 
cooperation and policy formulation. Policy choice between efficiency, profit and 
growth, on one hand, and system soundness, control and regulation, on the other 
hand, was not seen any more as involving contradictory (mutually opposed) 
alternatives. Also, perceptions of policy formation changed in the way that new and 
different actors, other than the governmental ones, became parts of the policy 
community. The global political debate evolved to include various actors, with 
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different motives, goals and values that they sought to achieve. Several stakes were 
brought onto the agenda, covering "problems" that have been perceived as the most 
urgent and serious in relation to the functioning of the global securities market. 
The purpose of the following chapters is to add a "political" dimension to the 
theoretical, economic analysis of the first part. In order to get a "full picture", the 
focus of the analysis has to be shifted from the theory, facts and figures, to the real 
world of actual banks, operating international organizations and (still) existing state 
boundaries. Global securities transactions do not take place in the ideal-type world 
of economic theory, but in the world consisting of different actors, decisions and 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: WARNINGS 
Financial markets today perform a wide range of functions in the process of 
social reproduction. Generally speaking, the most important function is to provide 
the best use of accumulation. Also, financial markets have to produce information 
about financial assets and flows, in a way that enables adequate signals to be 
transmitted to market participants. In addition, the securities market, together with 
other financial markets, has to be one of the information sources for governinent, 
in formulation and implementation of the national macroeconomic policy. This is 
clearly the argument in economic theory, but in reality the "communication 
channels" between the market and the government are often obstructed by various 
barriers and time gaps. These communication obstacles sometimes originate from 
the collision of interests between major market participants and the government (see 
Chapter 3, on the origins of Eurodollars). Sometimes, different actions taken by 
different government departments reflect conflicting goals and strategies, and 
simultaneously cut across different policy domains (e. g. the support of expansion 
abroad can enter into a collision with certain foreign policy goals). Under other 
circumstances, information produced in the market can be inadequate due to a lack 
of regulatory and legal attention being paid to certain market elements, products or 
participants. Finally, governments and other market participants can be misinformed 
due to speculation and fraud. However, it took billions and billions of dollars in 
bankruptcies, non-performing loans, thefts and frauds for financial markets' signals 
to be taken seriously into the consideration. This chapter is therefore focused on 
recent, most important warnings sent out by global financial markets 
- 
warnings 
concerning both an underdeveloped structure (of regulation) and overdeveloped 
processes. 
4.1. The debt crisis 
On August 12,1982 Mexico announced to the world that it was no longer 
capable of servicing its external debt, and the suit was soon followed by Brazil and 
Argentina. At that time Mexico's external liabilities (official and private long-term 
debt, short-term debt and IMF credits) amounted to 82 billion dollars. It represented 
almost 11 percent of the total foreign debt outstanding for all capital-importing 
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developing countries. Taken together, the share of these three biggest debtors in 
total developing countries' debt was over one-quarter when the crisis broke in 
1982.2 This came as a "shock" to all creditors, although there had been signs 
troubles were coming earlier in the year. In February 1982, the peso was devalued 
by 50 percent, followed by political and economic disturbances that encouraged a 
major capital flight from Mexico. The Falkland crisis in April 1982 resulted, inter 
alia, in freezing 1 billion dollars of Ar&ntinean assets in British banks, which in 
turn caused Argentina's default on debt-service payments. This also raised fears that 
it would declare a general debt moratorium, which could eventually spread across 
other Latin countries. 
However, the outbreak of the crisis was seen as a potential global 
catastrophe, and the efforts to contain it were seen as a pure "rearrangement of the 
deck chairs on the Titanic". ' That fear was based on the fact that the world 
community had never before been faced with a crisis of such a size, reach and 
complexity. Many commercial banks became so deeply involved in sovereign 
lending to developing countries that a potential default of any of the major ones 
would have severely endangered national financial structures and the international 
financial system as a whole. It was (finally) realized that the banks alone could not 
properly handle these problems. To the extent that potential defaults could affect 
domestic structures, the problem outgrew the sphere of monetary aggregates and 
economic relations. Perceived threats to national financial systems were not any 
more seen as just economic dangers, but also as political questions. They have 
become foreign policy concerns. The situation was particularly "delicate" for the US 
money centre banks, like Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, BankAmerica, etc. In 1982, 
the nine large money centre banks in the US had over 250 percent of their capital 
in loans to developing countries. ' 
"How could these presumably prudent institutions have made such a large 
number of apparently dubious loans? Much can be learned about the 
dynamics of international banking by examining some of the reasons why 
banks could have allowed themselves to become as deeply involved as they 
did. Explanations could also aid greatly in the framing of an appropriate 
public policy on international banking for the future. 115 
Although the origins of the debt crisis could not be solely located within the 
securities market, international responses to the crisis are instructive for this part of 
the analysis. Beforehand, it is necessary to outline the conditions under which the 
debt problem started to emerge. 
It is generally accepted that the crisis had three basic causes. On the debtor 
side, it was imprudent macroeconomic management. As it has resulted from a 
unique interplay of economic and political factors in the developing countries, it 
certainly deserves more clarification. 
Firstly, public expenditures were relatively high and not always directed to 
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the most productive uses (such as, stimulation of employment, human resource 
development and industrial consumption). They were also not used to smooth the 
imbalances resulting from extensive horizontal social migrations, neither they were 
used to alleviate the consequences of high population growth. 
Secondly, high public expenditures were coupled with relaxed fiscal and 
monetary policy, contrary to the basic economics but in line with domestic political 
developments in some of the debtors. The latter primarily concerns the rise of 
authoritarian regimes and of militarism. Although it may seem contradictory at first, 
relaxed fiscal and monetary policy were actually pursued at times of high military 
expenditures. Low taxes and easy access to the credit market were definitely 
effective ways to acquire public support and legitimation, at least in the short run. 
Thirdly, the heavy burden of public expenditures also originated from 
oversized, inefficient bureaucratic machineries. These were less often used to carry 
out macroeconomic policy, but were instead indispensable channels for political 
bargaining, bribery and corruption. 
Fourthly, even in the countries which were developing a sort of long-term 
industrial policy (mostly larger Latin American debtors), import-substitution 
industrialization was by far more popular than the promotion of export. It is 
accepted that the first approach to industrialization requires a longer period and a 
constant inflow of financial and technological resources. However, excessive 
borrowing that was practised by a great number of developing countries was just 
seldom used to support long-term industrialization. Far more often, inflow of 
foreign capital was directed to military expenditures. 
Fifthly, there was the problem of "capital flight" which incorporates many 
of economic and politicýl features of developing countries. While governments were 
heavily borrowing abroad, private investors from the same countries were acquiring 
foreign assets at a substantial rate. Capital flight is usually described as 
"... short-term outflows for speculative purposes or outflows resulting from 
economic or political uncertainties in the home country. In other words, it 
is money 'fleeing' from the country rather than external investment guided 
by long-term economic consideration. " I 
Due to different criteria used to quantify the extent of capital flight, estimates of its 
importance vary. In 1982, the ratio of cumulated capital flight to total external debt 
was between 15 and 30 percent. ' To put it simply, for every one dollar of credit 
that had been lent, between 15 and 30 cents "flew" out. Capital flight occurs most 
often in developing countries with relatively free payments systems, overvalued 
currencies, highly controlled interest rate and growing fiscal deficit. All this is 
combined with a relatively larger perceived investment risk, resulting from 
underelaborated legislative arrangements (e. g. inadequate private property protection, 
possibilities of expropriation, etc. ) and the instability of political and economic 
conditions. The advent of capital flight from developing countries have not just 
8 
diminished the availability of funds in the country, but have also affected the attitude 
of creditors. They have become less willing to finance future capital flight. 
The advent of the debt crisis is most often analyzed from the economic 
perspective, treating the political performance of Third World governments as a 
residual rather than an explicit variable. L. Snider has offered a model for assessing 
the relation between the political capacity of developing countries' governments and 
the probability of debt service suspensions. ' The concept of political capacity takes 
two dimensions in evaluating government performance: 1) a government's ability 
to penetrate society and exercise effective authority, and 2) a government's ability 
to extract human and material resources to support its objectives. ' Snider develops 
the concept further and adds two other variables: the existence of capital flight and 
the foreign creditors' judgement about the government's ability to manage economy. 
So, the political capacity of a country will be higher if: a) the government carries 
out prudent fiscal management, b) the level of local investors' confidence in the 
government's ability to manage the country's political and economic problems is 
high (i. e. if there is little capital flight), and c) the government is perceived as 
manipulating macroeconomic policy for structural adjustment, rather than for 
accommodating the demands of local political groups. The higher the political 
capacity, the lower the probability that the country would enter serious debt- 
servicing problems and suspend debt-service payments. Snider concludes that 
"the developing countries' suspension of payments on their external debt is 
as much a consequence of the political weakness of their governments and 
the excessive politicization of their economic policies as it is a result of 
unfavourable structural changes in the international economy. "" 
On the creditor side, the debt crisis was caused by imprudent lending of by 
commercial banks. The attribute "imprudent" relates primarily to their lending over- 
exposure in relation to capital and short-term strategy of profit maximization. The 
"over-stretching" was nothing new to commercial banks, but the extent of that was 
largely precedential. A highly profitable lending to sovereign clients was seen as an 
opportunity that had to be used immediately and intensively. Furthermore, loan-loss 
reserves were very low because of the wide-held illusion that sovereign borrowers 
could not go bankrupt. Low reserves could be also interpreted from the aspect of 
inadequate rating of potential borrowers' creditworthiness, due to the banks' own 
incapabilities and due to somewhat misleading financial information given by 
borrowers themselves. Imprudent lending also concerned declining spreads on loans, 
due to a fierce competition between the banks for sovereign clients (see Table 1, 
page 9). Finally, there was a general economic and political context that encouraged 
these developments. The abundant supply of funds (petro-dollars) logically flew into 
already internationalized commercial banks. Rising demand for capital, on part of 
the oil-importing developing countries, could easily be met through commercial 
banks' strategies that relied on the turnover increase and swift profit seizing. Real 
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interest rates during the seventies were exceptionally low and for a few years were 
even negative (lower than the rate of inflation) and the interest was fixed. 
"It will be recalled that the 1976-1979 period was characterized by largely 
unanticipated worldwide inflation; until at least 1978, most lending was at 
fixed interest rates, and the resultant ex post real rate of interest was 
negative. "I 
Under these conditions, the borrowing became increasingly attractive. Having in 
mind the experience of lending to East European countries, creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers seemed promising. In the 1970s, commercial banks took over 
the leading role in creation of international liquidity for balance-of-payments 
purposes. 
"Medium and long-term international bank commitments totalled some 225 
billion dollars in 1976-82. In 1982 alone, such commitments amounted to 42 
billion dollars, with Latin American borrowers accounting for 23 billion. "12 
Moreover, there was a range of widespread misconceptions concerning the 
lending to developing countries. At least until 1979, the shift from official to private 
flows had been seen as a "healthy" development that underscored flexible and 
efficient functioning of financial markets. Besides, the recycling was regarded as an 
efficient allocation of world accumulation. Capital flows were thought to be self- 
financing, due to high, expected, real rates of return on investments in the borrower 
countries. Furthermore, capital injections would greatly contribute to the 
development of market economies in recipient countries, this way improving their 
integration into the world economy. It was widely held that countries cannot go 
bankrupt, cannot fail to exist, so the inherent lending risk is not of a substantial 
height. In addition, it was thought that borrowers would not deliberately enter into 
default, for it would hurt only themselves and shut them out from the world 
financial markets. Another popular misconception at that time was related to banking 
strategic policy: any risk in international banking was considered as being safely 
limited through geographical diversification and shortening of maturities. So, the 
banks were already on the global scene when lucrative opportunities opened up and 
they were able (allowed) to use them extensively. 
The shift in worldwide economic conditions in 1979-1980 was dramatic: the 
worldwide inflation accelerated (in mid-1980, the G-7 average inflation rate was 
over 12 percend), oil-importing countries' current account swung sharply negative, 
and the recession set in. " Most importantly, there was a change in the policy of 
industrialized countries. Anti-inflationary action became the highest priority, 
monetary policy tightened and interest rates rose to over 15 percent in 1982. 
Worldwide recession and rising protectionism in the industrialized world caused a 
reduction in developing countries' exports and seriously lowered their growth rates. 
The balance-of-payment crisis in the developing countries was inevitable. Their 
current-account deficits rose from about 30 billion dollars in 1978 to over 100 
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billion dollars in 1982. The outstanding long-term debt rose from 360 billion dollars 
(1979) to 552 billion dollars (1982). " As their export earnings were falling and the 
interest rates were rising, the burden of the debt became too heavy. The following 
table summarizes main features of the debt crisis. 
Table 1: THE DEBT BURDEN 1979-1989 
1979 1982 1984 1986 1989 
Total outstanding long-term debt 359 551 673 753 1000 
(billions of US$) 
Spontaneous lending as % of na. 88% 42% 49% Of 617o
total financing * 
Average spreads (in % over 
LIBOR) 
-developing c. 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.7 
-industrialized c. 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Average maturities (in years) 
-developing c. 8.5 6.8 7.0 8.1 8.0 
-industrialized c. 9.0 8.3 8.5 6.3 5.9 
Total debt/exports ratio (in %) 110 152.4 157.9 194.9 146.5 
Ratio of debt service to GNP na. 4.6 4.9 5.5 na 
(in %) 
Restructured debt 
- 
105 60.5 52 
(billions of US $) 
Debt conversions 0.7 1.6 5.8 
(billions of US $) ** I I I 
- 'rotai tinancing inciuaes an cross-t)oraer commerciai t)anK ciaims on 
developing countries: facilities, spontaneous lending, concerted lending and 
bonds. 
** Face value of debt converted under various schemes, but not including 
cash buy-backs and debt exchanges. 
(Sources: IMF [April 1990]: "International Capital Markets", UNITED 
NATIONS, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs: 
"World Economic Survey 1990") 
What is of great interest for the course of the study is the evolution of 
responses to the debt crisis. It is held that the debt-crisis management passed 
through several phases. It seems this path greatly resembles changes in perceptions 
about actors responsible for the crisis management, as well as about ways and means 
to carry it out. 
In the first phase, in 1982-1983, commercial banks assembled short-term 
emergency packages because it was thought that liquidity problems were temporary. 
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Loan maturities were prolonged and new financing disbursed, at spreads of over 2 
percent above LIBOR. 
The second phase was in 1984-85, during which debtor countries took time 
to prepare and implement required reforms, and creditor banks engaged in building 
capital and reserves. It was the period when certain important changes were 
introduced. Multiyear rescheduling agreements (MYRAs) replaced single-year 
rescheduling. Longer grace periods were allowed, and longer maturities agreed 
upon. It was also the period when the spreads over LIBOR were very low (1 to 2 
percent). Most importantly, there was a significant change in perception of the 
problem: it was not seen any more as a temporary liquidity problem, but rather as 
a longer-term solvency problem. 
The third phase began with the IMF/World Bank meeting in October 1985, 
when the so-called "Baker Plan" was announced. Growth-oriented structural reforms 
in debtor countries were emphasized, as well as the need for the banks' home 
countries to become involved in the crisis management. The planned target of 20 
billion dollars in new financing by the US banks was never achieved, but it became 
clear that without additional capital inflows debtors would not be able to carry out 
reforms. Another multilateral financial agency, the World Bank, was brought into 
the fray. 
"It was suggested that annual disbursement from the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank to principal debtor countries should, over 
the period 1986-88, rise by about 50 percent from the projected rate of 6 
billion dollars a year. "" 
The role of the World Bank should also be enhanced by the operations of both the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Finance 
Corporation. These operations would assist in attracting non-debt-creating capital 
flows to developing countries. It was realized that the adjustment (reforms) and 
growth should reinforce, not conflict, each other. By the same token, more 
cooperation was needed between the US government, the international lending 
institutions and the banks. 
Another important development in the perception of the crisis management 
occurred in this phase. It was recognized that a substantial portion of the 
responsibility rests upon the industrialized countries. Enlargement of the "economic 
pie", through economic growth, involves 
"... not only a concerted effort by the debtor countries to increase their 
exports, but also continued access to markets in the industrialized countries. 
This latter condition is absolutely essential... "" 
In other words, the misconception regarding the functioning of the world economy 
(as consisting of separated national economies) was brought to an end. It was finally 
realized that, besides enhanced multilateral action and improved macro-economic 
management in the developing countries, the management of the debt crisis required 
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new forms of international cooperation. This implies coordination in a way that 
would enable countries to take full account of the international repercussions of their 
own policies (mostly fiscal and monetary policy). 
During the fourth phase, the crisis management relied on an increased role 
of the market and the list of restructuring options has been substantially expanded. 
It was necessary for the banks to write down the balance sheet (face) value of the 
loans in order to rationalize their portfolios. Operations on the secondary market 
initially took form of loan swaps and cash buy-backs (the retirement of debt at a 
discount through a cash prepayment). Available indicators point to steady growth 
of the market: from an average turnover of 5 billion dollars (1985-86), it rose to 
around 30-40 billion dollars in 1988. However, secondary market prices fell from 
around 70 percent of the face value in 1986, to around 30-35 percent in 1990.17 
During the fifth phase debt conversions became an ever important 
component, and initially included a change in the nature of the claims: debt-equity 
swaps and exit bonds. " Management options later included cofinancing facilities 
with the World Bank and trade financing facilities. The application of the broadened 
menu of options has been facilitated by, and contributed to, the expansion of the 
secondary market for the developing countries' debt. 
Other types of debt conversion have also attracted interest of both creditors 
and borrowers. For example, debt-for-exports transactions involve the exchange of 
claims for local currency that is then used for the settlement of payments to 
exporters in the debtor country. Debt-for-nature swaps imply that the debt is bought, 
at a discount, by conservation organizations and later converted into local funds for 
environmental protection. Debt-for-good-causes operations rely on the creditor 
bank's donation of claims to charitable organizations which will use them in the 
debtor country. 
This phase in the crisis management came with a wide-spread recognition 
that voluntary debt-reduction and new financing are not mutually exclusive, and that 
creditor banks should greatly enhance their defensive strategies (loan-loss 
provisions). In March 1989, the so-called "Brady Plan" was announced. The 
proposed voluntary debt-reduction should be accompanied by additional commercial 
banks' financing, and by the support debt-reduction programmes provided by the 
World Bank and other institutions. Of course, this was aimed to solve (to ease) debt 
problems of developing countries which had prepared viable (acceptable) economic 
reforms. The 1990 package for Mexico included almost all of the developed 
techniques and instruments for the debt management. " 
The debt-management techniques were accompanied by a reduction in 
exposure of large commercial banks. The US banks were the most "enthusiastic" in 
this sense: their total claims on the developing countries were reduced from 145 
billion dollars in 1983, to 85 billion in 1989. During the same time, bank capital 
was gradually built up and the ratio of their external claims to total assets was 
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lowered by almost 50 percent. " This balance-sheet improvement recorded by large. 
commercial banks was not just the choice of their changed strategy, but it came 
more as a result of government pressures imposed on them in order to prevent 
systemic failure. The so-called "public umbrella" to cover over-exposed banks, or 
precisely the safety net which should prevent large-scale bank failures, proved to be 
neither cheap nor easy to open. Governments agreed to back-up the debt- 
management arrangements, but under the condition that banks strengthen their 
capital base and provide additional (although limited) new financing. On part of the 
banks, their strategic policy was aimed to correct the "disaster myopia"" that 
characterized their attitude towards lending to the developing countries in the 1970s 
and in the beginning of thý 1980s. After 1982, a more cautious and defensive 
approach was taken, so that new financing to developing countries almost 
disappeared. This was exactly the reason why the Baker plan failed. 
Since mid-1989, some developing countries (mainly Latin American ones) 
have regained access to voluntary sources of private capital. This took the form of 
international bond issues on the main capital markets, of trade and project financing 
and short-term interbank facilities. These flows were mostly encouraged by 
substantial privatization programmes in Latin America. However, the large 
syndicated bank credits did not resurface. 
On the side of the official financing (developing countries' debt to 
governments and officially guaranteed export credits), the Paris Club actions have 
to be mentioned. The Paris Club is a multilateral forum created for the purpose of 
assisting the developing countries in rescheduling their debt to foreign governments. 
This assistance was traditionally related to temporary international liquidity 
problems, but later was extended to more substantial debt restructuring. Some 
actions of the Paris Club in 1988 ("Toronto Terms") and 1990 ("Trinidad Terms", 
implemented unilaterally by the UK and Canada) clearly demonstrated that the 
creditor governments had accepted the fact that a more flexible and longer-term 
approach was necessary. This included more substantial debt-cancellations and 
restructuring on concessional. terms (longer maturities, longer grace periods, lower 
interest rates, etc. ). The actions aimed at more extensive debt relief were taken 
almost simultaneously by the G-7 at the 1991 London summit, and by the IMF and 
the World Bank at their 1991 Bangkok meeting. It was concluded that a more 
extensive debt relief was needed, particularly for low-income countries. More 
important, some arrangements of the Paris Club with Nicaragua and Benin (in 
1991), as well as with Bolivia and Tanzania (in 1992) included a "good will" clause. 
Under that term, the Paris Club agreed to consider further debt relief after the 
consolidation period, and committed itself to reconsider the debt problem in three 
to four-years time. It was concluded that the debt strategy should be strengthened 
by expanding the number of support channels. This should include the provision of 
new financing, various forms of debt restructuring and aid on highly concessional. 
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terms. 
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So, the evolution of the debt strategy underscores several points that have 
been taken in consideration. Alongside with the development of financial techniques 
for debt relief, it was realized that the strategy should be a long-term and 
comprehensive one. The main causes of the crisis are of a structural, not temporary, 
nature. These structural imbalances concern not only economies of the developing 
countries, but also the world economy as a whole. It was a threat to the stability of 
the global financial system that pointed out a high level of world economic 
integration. For that reason, responses to the crisis should rely on new forms of 
multilateral action. The debt crisis management should involve different kinds of 
participants: governmental actors (from both creditor and debtor countries), private 
financial institutions (commercial and investment banks, institutional investors), 
international governmental actors (G-7, IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club, the 
Non-aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, etc. ) and international 
non-governmental actors (e. g. professional financial associations, conservation 
organizations, charitable organizations). 
It was perceived that the approach to the problem should focus more on 
economic conditions and performances. It has to be more linked to the real economy 
and not limited within the "financial world". This shift is already evident in the 
scope of restructuring options. Several menus include debt-conversion schemes 
which are based on economic performances of the debtor country, such as debt-for- 
exports swaps, value-recovery clause, etc. Also, the improvement of the economic 
environment requires certain actions of the creditor countries (dismantling 
protectionist barriers, government loan guarantees, etc. ). Creditors have realized 
that the global approach must not bring adjustment efforts and the economic growth 
of the debtor countries into a collision. This demonstrates that a closer collaboration 
between commercial banks and debtors, on the one hand, and the international 
financial organizations, on the other, is a necessity. 
Responses to the debt crisis also emphasise that a new approach towards 
financial markets is essential if some of the causes are to be eliminated. Some of the 
basic financial market functions have to be re-examined, from the aspect of both 
national and international regulation. This primarily concerns the allocative function 
of the market, L e. to what degree financial markets should be autonomous in order 
to provide the best allocation of accumulation. In addition to that, the informative 
function of the market has to be used for controlling the level of systemic risk. 
Also, it has to be analyzed what forms and modalities of regulation are 
complementary to the global level of financial market functioning. A new approach 
should take into account the changing nature of the role of government in balancing 
different "national" interests and goals. Financial links created the underlying 
structure of global interdependence wherein almost each and every issue cuts across 
finance. "High finance" outgrew the limits. of so-called low politics (economic and 
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social issues) and increasingly became the auspices of "high politics" (in this case 
foreign policy). This clearly demonstrated how demarcation lines between different 
policies are becoming more and more blurred. Under these conditions, the 
government should rely more on active communications with the banking (financial) 
community, but also on improved contacts within the community itself. A new 
approach should not seek to over-regulate the market, because many historical 
examples deny the efficiency of stringent regulation in banking. Artificial functional 
or geographical barriers, contradictory to fundamental business motives, have often 
been overcome with more or less difficulties. The purpose of a new regulatory 
approach should be to allow "entrepreneurship" in banking, but at the same time it 
should condition the safety of the public umbrella with a sound and prudent banking 
policy. Namely, banks should be safe within the national financial system but the 
price that has to be paid is an improved capital base, adequate information 
disclosure and a vigilant lending policy. 
The debt crisis management is the most illustrative example of how the world 
community (more precisely, major industrialized countries) responded to the global 
financial threat. On the whole, the actions taken from 1982 to 1989 can be described 
as a continual interplay of various actors and of various goals. In the first and the 
second phase, main actors included debtor countries' governments and the IMF. The 
third phase was marked by the US government initiative, after a more active 
approach was taken by a great number of developing countries. The latter was 
certainly a new development, concerning a very limited number of actors 
participating in the previous phases. A wider scope of the debt-crisis politicisation 
underscored a number of dimensions from which the problem could be analyzed. 
The period from October 1987 to March 1988 saw a number of initiatives, 
conferences and summit meetings, all concerned with the debt crisis. The IMF 
introduced the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) in October 1987. The 
Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver, in October 1987, welcomed ODA-debt 
write-offs by Canada for African Commonwealth countries. In December 1987, The 
Paris Club agreed to provide new, fresh aid to low-income African countries. 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico formed the "Group of Three" in September 1987. A 
summit meeting of eight Latin American debtor countries was held in November 
1987, in order to discuss possibilities of a joint response to the US banks. The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) held a special conference on African 
indebtedness in November 1987. Following the 1987 Harare summit of the Non- 
aligned Movement, the South-South Commission was set up to facilitate cooperation 
between debtor countries themselves. These were just few among many other 
activities initiated by debtor countries 
. 
2' However, this phase is significant for the 
course of this study as it clearly points out a diveirsity of channels in international 
relations. 
The fourth phase in crisis management featured an intensification of banks' 
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initiatives. Finally, in the fifth phase, the US government initiative involved creditor 
banks, international institutions and debtor countries governments. The final phase 
also underscored a shift in perception of the debt crisis: it was not seen (and dealt 
with) just as an economic threat, but as a political threat as well. The latter 
dimension was particularly emphasized by the need for "delicate" balancing between 
two overreaching aims: systemic efficiency and systemic stability. An episode that 
is described in the following section provides another dimension to this efficiency- 
stability balancing. 
4.2. The 1987 stock market crash 
Ever since the Wall Street collapse in October 1929, both financial market 
regulators and participants have been aware of the danger involved in a sudden 
market collapse. However, as the decades were passing, the lessons from that 
turbulent period were put more and more behind. The so-called disaster myopia 
(already mentioned in the former section) was progressively developing, enforced 
by every major economic upswing. Then, suddenly, within just four working days, 
general perceptions of the global financial structure was enriched by a new and 
dramatic experience. This does not imply that financial fundamentals (operations, 
participants, strategies) underwent radical changes, but since October 1987 many 
beliefs concerning the securities market have been altered. 
It is generally accepted that the 1987 Crash happened on the Black Monday, 
October 19th. During that Monday and the next day, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) collapsed over 22 percent, or 508 points. Just for the comparison, 
on October 28th, 1929, Dow Jones declined almost 13 percent. Another indicator, 
Standard & Poor's 500 share index, declined almost 20 percent on October 19th 
1987. The FT-SE in London was down 12.2 percent, the DAX index in Germany 
went down 7.1 percent, and all other major markets were seriously affected. The 
Honk Kong market was down almost 35 percent, which induced its closure. The 
Australian market received the hardest hit: a 44.7 percentage decline 
. 
2' According 
to some estimates, the crash wiped out almost 1 trillion dollars of financial wealth 
in the US. It drastically lowered the volume and ftequency of share-related activities 
on all the main markets, including the Euromarket as well. Major national markets 
experienced decline to various degrees (see graph 1 in the second chapter). The 
value of new issues of Euroequities, for example, went down almost 60 percent in 
1988 comparing to 1987. 
Although it was the first financial shock with a global reach,. the 1987 crash 
occurred under very different economic conditions in major countries. Table 2 
makes a comparison of the conditions prevailing in the crash. As evident, the crash 
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occurred under very different national circumstances, which could suggest that the 
breakdown had very little to do with economic fundamentals of the countries 
concerned and of the world economy as a whole. This was the conclusion about 
causes of the crash officially expressed in the US. ' As the analysis will point out, 
exactly these indicators could serve to reach a completely different conclusion about 
the causes of the crash. 
Table 2: OCTOBER 1987 
- 
underlying economic conditions 
us Japan Germany UK 
October price decline (in 
percent) 22.6 7.5 17.7 21.7 
Price/earnings ratio 18.9 61.7 15.4 16.0 
Long-term gov. interest rate 9.42 4.44 6.20 9.92 
Inflation rate 4.1 0.2 0.6 4.0 
Current account (in billions 
of $) 
-143 87 45.5 -6.4 
Current balance (percent of 
GNP) 3.3 4.4. 5.8 0.1 
Net household savings 
(percent of income) 5.4 16.8 12.5 4.2 
Business profitability (profit 
as % of capital stock) 
22.6 21.6 17.5 13.2 
(Sources: Morgan Stanle-y-Intemational Statistics; IMF: " International Capital 
Markets", UN: "World Economic Outlook 1990") 
If the 1987 collapse is placed within a broader economic and political 
context, a different view of the crash can be obtained. In the period from 1982 to 
the mid-1987, investment in American stocks was gaining in attractiveness. The US 
corporations were praised as highly innovative and profitable. The price/earnings 
ratio of their shares was among the highest in the industrialized world, excluding 
Japan. The level of long-term interest rates offered on T-bonds was in decline from 
1984 to the crash, and this circumstance further improved the attractiveness of 
shares. For factors affecting prices of securities see the second section of the second 
chapter. In the period 1982-1987, the Standard and Poor's 500 share index rose 
from about 130 to 280. Institutional investors came to dominate the US stock 
market, in terms of stock-ownership and share trading. The most widely taken 
investment strategy became stock-index trading: computerized programmes followed 
the general "mood" of the market. If the prices were falling, there was a sell order, 
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and vice versa. This strategy relied on a highly sophisticated technological 
infrastructure, which could (it had been assumed) process large orders in a minimal 
time. 
In the case of the US, the analysis must encompass its international position 
at that time. The current-account deficit was rising and the saving rate was falling 
far below the investment rate. What was actually happening was the reversal of net 
international capital flows: the US became the largest net recipient of funds. 
"For the most of the 1980s the depth and liquidity of US financial markets 
acted as a powerful magnet for foreign capital... US accounted for almost 
one-quarter of the rest of the world's private foreign assets towards the end 
of the decade, compared with little more than one-eight at the beginning. "I' 
Foreign acquisitions in the US averaged 12.3 billion dollars annually in the 
first half of the 19%, in the second half they rose to over 41 billion annually. 27 
In relation to exchange rates, it has to be mentioned that the dollar was 
overvalued throughout the period and the appreciation certainly contributed to the 
increase in the US deficit. The dollar started to loose its value rapidly from 
February 1985, and during the two-year period (January 1986 to December 1987) 
it lost almost 35 percent of its value against the Deutsche mark and the yen. " In 
comparison to the average 1980 level (1980: 100), the effective exchange rate of the 
dollar declined from 124 (beginning of 1986) to 92 (last quarter of 1987)ý' 
Market fever reached the highest level in the mid-August 1987: the DJIA 
was around 2700 points. After that came a 50-day period of market oscillations 
occurring every day, but that was not taken as something serious. The crash was 
actually set in motion on October 14th. At 13.30 GMT, the information on the US 
trade deficit of 15.7 billion dollars for August was released. Fears among 
international investors about the actual strength of the US economy culminated with 
the release of the information. 
"In particular, concern was expressed about the apparent unwillingness of the 
administration of President Reagan to take decisive action over the mounting 
US budget deficit, whose expansion in recent years had started to deter 
private investors and had thus depressed the value of the US dollar... 
notwithstanding the maintenance of relatively high bank interest rates, a 
factor which would normally have counterbalanced these uncertainties. "I' 
This was the trigger that activated global arbitrage mechanisms and a series of chain 
reactions followed. 
Already during that summer, there were rising concerns that the American 
deficit would not shrink and that eventual restrictive measures implemented by the 
US Government could severely damage relations in the triangle (US, Japan and 
Germany). On the last working day before the Black Monday, it was clear that 
many investors were taking defensive strategies as the market volatility had 
increased. Nervousness was spreading, together with rumours about the NYSE 
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closing down, and volatility of the market was further amplified by portfolio- 
insurance techniques (stock index trading). Suddenly, a wide-spread belief that the 
market was overvalued pushed investors to sell large blocks of shares. The market 
was closed down on Friday, October 16th, with an overhang of unfilled sell orders 
going into Monday. The performance of the market further deteriorated because a 
number of delayed openings on Monday had created uncertainties among investors. 
A trade delay in the market arises when a specialist faces an imbalance of buy and 
sell orders that he cannot resolve without a trading halt. During that period, he 
displays price indications in an attempt to reduce the imbalance. Many NYSE 
specialists overestimated the opening prices on Monday, and as the prices were 
constantly changing, investors could not know at what level their "at market" orders 
would be executed. As the sell orders were executed (a part of was bought by the 
specialists themselves and by certain aggressive trading-oriented institutions), the 
computer programmes of other investors then triggered further sales causing further 
decline. This in turn generated other sell orders and the market experienced the 
computer-driven "meltdown". 
One particular financial development has to be mentioned here. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, stock index futures contracts were created, linking 
effectively the NYSE and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). In this way, 
large institutional investors could hedge their portfolios (of common stocks listed on 
NYSE) by trading in stock index futures contracts listed on CME. The rules 
governing this kind of operation require a margin to be set, i. e. the percentage of 
the market value of securities a customer can purchase with the use of credit. In 
1974, the Federal Reserve Board set the margin at 50 percent. In contrast, in 
commodities and futures markets, a margin is partial surety that a contract will be 
fulfilled. The margin requirement may necessitate further payments by the client if 
prices move against him. Accordingly, a margin call is a requirement for an 
increase in the original deposit, placed on a contract, when: 1) the buyer has 
increased the size of the contract, or 2) when market prices have become heavily 
adverse. " So, a decrease in S&P's stock index futures on Monday triggered the 
chain of margin calls. The CME clearing house (which administers margin calls and 
settlement procedure) made margin calls on 13 brokerage firms to raise 1.5 billion 
dollars. When the market opened on Tuesday, brokerage firms extended credit on 
behalf of customers to meet these calls. But the clearing and settlement process was 
running several hours behind schedule. So, brokerage firms were in a huge deficit 
and they - turned to money-centre banks for additional loans. As the banks were 
reluctant to expand loans, the Federal Reserve Board intervened and the position of 
brokerage firms were "covered". On Tuesday, October 20th, the clearing and 
settlement system was on the brink of a collapse that would endanger the whole 
financial structure. 
So, it was not just the loss of value that marked the Black Monday as the 
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crash. It was more the danger of a system., collapse due to an inefficient 
(disorganized) infrastructure, i. e. the inability of the clearing and settlement system 
to "follow" the depth and volatility of the market. 
Five years after the crash analysts did not come to agree on its causes. " 
Some of them underscore the speculative role of the specialists, others put blame on 
the "madness of the herd" (referring to the panic among investors) or the absence 
of any economic leadership (referring to the Administration's neglect of the trade 
deficit). Some analysts point to an overdevelopment of financial techniques (e. g. 
computer-driven portfolio-insurance) and yet others to the malfunctioning of the 
market itself (see the efficiency market hypothesis, in the second chapter). However, 
each of the causes had its "part" in provoking the crash, but they must not be 
perceived as alternative reasons. Each of them was being fed by the others and only 
their cumulative effect can serve as a logical explanation of the collapse. The Task 
Force Report summarized it as follows: 
"Trading under these circumstances has three unfortunate economic 
consequences. First, investors cannot know with any precision at what prices 
their orders will be executed. Second, the information conveyed by prices 
may be confusing or actively misleading. Third, the absence of reliable price 
data worsens uncertainties and can lead to unnecessarily large reductions in 
the credit, without which market-making activities must be curtailed. "" 
Regardless of different explanations of the causes of the crash, October 1987 
came as a striking and unpleasant surprise to all market participants and regulators 
as well. It was a sudden and unexpected shock, for it occurred in the period when 
all major stock markets were in expansion. The DJIA had recorded an uninterrupted 
rise over the previous five-year period. 
It was a shock because it hit the most "representative" segment of the 
securities market 
- 
the stock market. The market for shares, it was thought, 
produces the most reliable / adequate information about the state of economy and 
its prospects. It was found out, in a very dramatic way, that signals from the market 
can often be insufficient, confusing or they can come just too late. 
It was a shock because it spread swiftly across major stock markets, due to 
a high level of market internationalization and global integration. It had been 
thought that the high level of financial diversification (different market segments, 
different national markets, different instruments) was actually reducing the market 
risk and hence the overall level of systemic risk. In addition, the increasing 
globalisation of securities transactions had been considered as beneficial: the best 
allocation of surplus funds must not be bounded by geographical frontiers. 
Computerization of securities transactions was seen as a great achievement that is 
cost- and time-saving. So, these features of the global securities system, highly 
praised in times of a "bull" market, turned against the system itself. 
The 1987 crash sent out several important messages concerning the nature 
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and functions of the securities market. Firstly, it should be born in mind that the 
financial mechanism, and particularly the securities market, is highly sensitive both 
to its economic and political environment. The stock market in October 1987 had 
accumulated a substantial amount of national (American) and international economic 
imbalances. This precisely exemplifies the market function of shock-absorbing, but 
it cannot be performed for an extensively long period of time. The critical moment 
in October 1987 was actually the market absorption of the political news. As it 
became evident that major countries had not come to a consensus how to resolve the 
US deficit-problem, arbitrage mechanisms (capital outflows from the US securities 
market, both to other currencies and other securities) triggered the market collapse. 
Secondly, the crash pointed out to what extent a lack of communication and 
cooperation between major market participants, including the regulators as well, 
could induce a series of chain reactions on the market. It also emphasised that those 
reactions were almost impossible to control, on both a national and a global level. 
In the words of a "Business Week" commentator, the US had evolved into the 
11casino society": 
"The casino society is the offspring of two parents 
- 
Washington and Wall 
Street 
- 
who perennially misunderstand how the other works. Their 
miscalculations helped lay the groundwork for the Crash of 87. " 
Thirdly, it became clear that although financial markets have "a life of their 
own", their link to the real economy must not be underestimated. Moreover, the 
crash clearly highlighted a significant level of overall (economic, trade, financial) 
interdependence. The course of the event could have probably been different, if 
there had not been the over valued dollar, low savings and the import of capital to 
the US. All this could certainly not have been "achieved" without the abundance of 
capital in Japan and Germany, and this yet could not have been attained without 
their economic upswing which hag been "supported" by deficit financing in the US, 
etc. 
Fourthly, the crash emphasized the importance of the development of an 
adequate infrastructure for market operations. In this case the attention was focused 
on clearing and settlement mechanisms. 
Finally, it became apparent that the strategy "let the markets alone" could 
not be applied any more. In a number of countries market safeguards have been 
imposed in order to reduce the degree of risk stemining from erratic market 
fluctuations. In the US, "circuit breakers" were approved, to interrupt trading in 
stocks in the event of sharp market swings. All trading stops for one-half hour on 
the NYSE, if the DJIA falls by 250 points, or it stops for two hours, if there is a 
fall of 400 points. If the S&P 500 futures contract falls by 12 percent, all trading 
can only take place at a limit price or above, for one-half hour. In addition, another 
type of safeguard was developed, to limit the use of certain computer-driven trading 
strategies. However, it is argued that the efficiency of these measures depends on 
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the level of coordination between markets. If the circuit-breakers are not used in 
coordination, they will not halt trading simultaneously on all markets. In that case, 
uncertainty, about expected decline in equity prices, might increase and generate 
cross-market selling pressures, thus making the situation even worse. 
Finally, the crash drew attention also to a number of political questions, 
usually left aside by the economic analysis. The most important of them concerns 
the applicability of the Reagan-model in many industrialized countries. This strategy 
of deregulation, tax cuts, less intervention and permissive deficit spending came 
under a serious re-thinking and criticism. The Thatcher-model of macro economics, 
mostly resembling the US one but adding further reliance on the financial-sector 
growth, have also been questioned. Accordingly, the crash came to threaten one of 
the significant political shifts of the 1980s 
- 
the privatization of state industries. This 
was particularly the case in the UK, Japan, France and Germany, where the large- 
scale privatization programmes were endangered by the global market collapse. 
Another important political question raised by the crash tackled the relations 
between major industrialized countries, especially the modes and purposes of policy- 
coordination and collaboration in general. On the one hand, post-crash fall of the 
dollar was heavily undermining the Louvre Accord. On the other hand, actions 
agreed by the US creditors to prevent a serious dollar fall became significantly 
conditioned by the US trade policy. If Congress would persist on protectionist trade 
measures, the Louvre-agreed interventions to save the dollar would be 
"reconsidered" by Japan and Germany. The situation was complicated even more 
because the US government could not carry out the policy towards deficit reducing 
without the collaboration of the US creditors. Namely, a deficit cut could not be 
achieved without the production expansion. The growth of production, and exports 
eventually, required lowering of the interest rate and a devaluation of the dollar. 
However, this could not be realised if Japan and Germany were not willing: 1) to 
allow the dollar to drop, and 2) to "fortify" their commitments to promote a greater 
growth. So, actions on both sides became increasingly interdependent and subjected 
to the top-level bargaining. 
Another important political question was raised in relation to the nature of 
economic leadership in the US. It was not just the "competition" between the White 
House and Congress (for example, between the House Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate Finance Committee). It was also the intra-bureaucratic struggle 
between different government departments and agencies (for example, the Treasury, 
the FED, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the General Accounting Office, etc). This competition resulted in 
fierce debates over questions of responsibility for the regulation of financial 
markets. Inadequate communication and cooperation between these bodies had 
definitely contributed to an erosion of confidence in the US economic leadership, 
both at home and abroad. It became evident that the (Republican) Government was 
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neither speaking "with one voice", nor it could send reliable signals to domestic and 
foreign investors due a continuing "battle" with (Democratic) Congress. 
As the crash underscored, the US debt-financing and a "living beyond 
means" had to come to an end. However, the conclusion of this credit era did not 
involve only a reduction in standard of living and a slower per capita income 
growth. The pressures to reduce the deficit put forward the sensitive question of 
cutting defence spending, with its inevitable effects on the position of the US as the 
military hegemon. 
A huge amount of wealth was lost during those days in October 1987, but 
there was at least one indisputably positive outcome. The global securities market 
has attracted an ever-growing share of attention. The market exploded due to both 
internal and external disturbing forces. However, a special analytical weight attached 
to the 1987 crash originates not merely from the extent of the DJIA decline, but far 
more from the issue-linkages that became ever-explicit. The issues such as macro 
economic management, trade patterns, exchange rates, financial techniques, military 
spending, and international cooperation, were all impinged upon when the DJIA fell 
508 points on Bloody Monday in October 1987. 
4.3. The Banco Ambrosiano and BCCI affairs 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) closure on July 5, 
1991 represented the beginning of a world-wide affair on a scale never witnessed 
before. The BCCI collapse was the world's biggest banking failure, concerning not 
just the amount of losses invoked but also the number of countries, organizations 
and individuals involved. The reaction to this scandal has been evolving as a truly 
international one, bringing together regulators, banks and investors from a number 
of countries. Though this was a much-publicized scandal, it was definitely neither 
the first nor the only banking scandal to point to numerous regulatory loopholes and 
to a variety of "non-banking" activities pursued by some international banks. 
Therefore, the failure of another bank, Banco Ambrosiano, will be used as a brief 
introduction to this aspect of modem finance. 
In July 1982, Banco Ambrosiano collapsed, incurring losses of about 1,2 
billion dollars and affecting the group of 119 foreign banks. " Banco Ambrosiano 
was founded before the Second World War, and in the late 1940s it hired the 
enigmatic Roberto Calvi. He worked his way up to become president in the mid- 
1970s, when he bought himself control over the bank. By that time Banco 
Ambrosiano had already been described as the 
"... cornerstone of the most powerful banking and financial group in private 
hands in Italy, and a baffling miýture of orthodox banking success and 
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unorthodox associations of scandals. "36 
Due to its long-held and extensive links with the Vatican bank, l'Istituto per le 
Opere di Religione (IOR), it became known as the priests' bank. One of the most 
"active" parts of Banco Ambrosiano was its Luxembourg subsidiary (a non-bank, 
holding company), which used to borrow on the Euromarkets; to meet the needs of 
other Ambrosiano foreign subsidiaries in Lima and Managua. The IOR has always 
been particularly well placed at international financial markets because it is a unique 
institution: it is an "institutional compromise" between a bank and a trust fund. In 
addition, as it is subject solely to Vatican jurisdiction (as it has no branch or 
representative office in any country), the IOR has none of the usual regulatory 
limitations that hamper ordinary banks (e. g. publishing financial statements). It also 
owned a dozen of Panamanian-front companies, and on their behalf the IOR was 
issuing letters of patronage (support) to guarantee loans for Ambrosiano group 
companies. 
In summer 1981, Calvi was convicted for currency irregularities related to 
share dealings in the Credito Varesino Bank and the Toro Insurance Company. Both 
companies were controlled by La Centrale, a financial company effectively owned 
by Arnbrosiano. After this episode, the Euromarkets dried up as a source of funds 
for Ambrosiano subsidiaries. In June 1982, Calvi again had to turn to the IOR but 
it refused to renew the guarantees, and he unsuccessfully attempted to sell the block 
of Ambrosiano shares in order to meet financial obligations of the foreign 
subsidiaries. On June 18th 1982, Roberto Calvi committed suicide in London. The 
deposits dropped by 25 percent and the bank's business shrunk by 50 percene', so 
the compulsory liquidation was ordered on August 6th 1982. A new bank, the 
Nuovo Banco Arnbrosiano, was formed in just three days. 
Although a final agreement with the bank creditors was reached in 1984, the 
investigation did not shed more light on the connections between the bank, on the 
one hand, and the Vatican, the Rizzoli publishing group (which owns "Corriere 
della Serra"), the Panamanian companies, the P-2 Freemasons lodge (of which Calvi 
was a member) and certain Swiss banks, on the other hand. However, it clearly 
highlighted communication "difficulties" in banking regulatory and supervisory 
structures 
- 
both in Italy and among supervisors from different countries. " This 
episode also led to the 1983 revision of the original Basle Concordat: it was realised 
that a divided supervisory responsibility should be extended to include the lender-of- 
last-resort functions. On these grounds, a consolidated supervision of risk-exposure 
and capital adequacy for a whole banking group was introduced. In spite of such 
regulatory improvements, there were still many loopholes that created conditions 
favourable for banking scandals, 
-such as the BCCI affair, to erupt. 31 
BCCI was established in 1972 by a Pakistan entrepreneur, Agha Hassan 
Abedi, who wanted to create a bank that would help and assist Third World 
countries in their economic development. His efforts were backed by the biggest US 
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private bank, Bank of America (with a 30 percent stake in BCCI), and by Arab 
investors. Over almost two decades, BCCI grew rapidly: from being a 2.5 million 
dollars enterprise in 1972, BCCI developed to a 20 billion dollars bank in 1991.11 
It had over 400 branches in the network that spanned across 69 countries. Of a 
particular importance was its structure: it was registered in Luxembourg (for the lax 
regulatory environment therein), but it effectively ran international operations from 
London. Another vital element was BCCI Overseas, based in the Cayman Islands. 
More than two-thirds of the ownership was concentrated in the hands of Sheik Zaid 
bin Sultan al-Nahayan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab 
Emirates. 
The bank's business evolved mainly in the field of international trade 
finance, where it effectively combined the principles of Islamic banking and 
international speculative opportunities. Islamic banking refers to a financial system 
used throughout the Muslim world that forbids interest charges. According to the 
Koran rules, surplus capital must not just earn bank interest, but it has to be 
invested in industry or trade. So, the banks are there to collect the accumulation and 
then to invest it in productive uses. Under Islamic banking, deposits do not bear a 
fixed interest and their nature is more similar to shares for they bring interest 
according to the profit of business in which they are invested. ', In the case of 
BCCI, deposits were used to finance buying and selling commodities on spot and 
futures markets. Unlike other Islamic banks, BCCI was not "covering" itself for 
losses in those transactions by taking guarantees (e. g. a letter of credit) for the 
payment of commodities. In this way, the bank was exposing itself as a principal to 
serious risks on some of the most volatile financial markets. 
The bank was particularly active in developing its retail business and at the 
time of the collapse, it had around 800000 depositors. It was not just individual 
depositors (mostly Asians) who trusted BCCI. Its creditors were, among others, 
charities (Oxfain, Save the Children), governments (Nigeria, Cameroon, Jamaica 
and Peru) and local authorities (councils in the UK), as well as some international 
organizations (e. g. African Development Bank). 
In the late 1970s, BCCI started to tap the US market more aggressively. 
After the first unsuccessful attempt in 1978, Mr Abedi managed to buy a leading 
Washington bank, First General Bankshares, in 1981. It was said that the bank was 
independent of BCCI and C. Clifford, the former US Defence Secretary, became 
its chairman. From 1982 onwards, things were going worse and worse. In 1985, 
BCCI lost at least 150 million dollars in the Treasury-options market. In 1988, ten 
BCCI executives were charged in Florida with laundering 32 million dollars in drug 
money. In the following year, BCCI revealed the 498 million dollars loss and 
pleaded guilty to the charge of money laundering. Mr Abedi resigned as the 
president, the Abu Dhabi Ruler took control and injected I billion dollars into the 
bank. In 1991, BCCI was ordered by theFederal Reserve to sell First American 
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shares (previously, First General Bankshares), as it was found out that the 
acquisition had been improper. After certain unidentified BCCI officials had warned 
the Bank of England of illegal transactions, Price Waterhouse (BCCI auditor in the 
UK) was ordered to investigate. Upon the finding of a widespread fraud, 
simultaneous action was taken in Britain, the US and in some other countries to 
seize most of BCCI's assets and close its branches on July 5,1991. This co- 
ordinated action resulted after several months of preparations, although it was said 
that the clear signs of troubles in BCCI had appeared a year and a half before. 
However, BCCI business came under the attention of regulators soon after its 
foundation. 
In 1978, a US court affidavit showed that BCCI capital was insufficient for 
its operations and that its lending was crucially dependent on Bank of America's 
capital. This was one of the earliest documented signs about the problem of BCCI's 
creditworthiness. In 1980, the Bank of England turned down BCCI's request for a 
full UK banking licence. In 1983, when a new arrangement for sharing the 
supervisory responsibility had already been initiated, international banking 
supervisors became seriously concerned with BCCI. In 1985, the Bank of England 
approved BCCI's decision to transfer its treasury from London to Abu Dhabi. In 
1986, the auditors Ernst & Young warned about excessive management power and 
weakness of the BCCI's system of internal control. 
One of the most important steps in this direction was taken in 1987 when the 
"college of regulators" was formed in Basle, in order to organize an in-depth 
analysis of BCCI operations. The college consisted of regulators from Luxembourg, 
the UK, France, Spain, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. Although BCCI was 
operating in 69 countries, no single country was ready to take full responsibility for 
it and "... BCC1 became like a giant game of pass-the-parcel". " The college was 
thought to be an adequate "institution" for centralizing information and action 
regarding the supervision of such a large bank as BCCI. Regardless of the 
intentions, the college did not prove particularly effective, for it mainly concentrated 
on technical issues and never got the grasp of the whole entity of BCCI. Apart from 
the lack of power to enforce compliance with its conclusions, the college did not 
want to take direct responsibility for handling BCCI 
- 
the then-known irregularities 
were left to be settled by national regulators. 
Two important but highly neglected signals of coming troubles were sent out 
by the banking community itself in 1988. When BCCI decided to expand its 
corresponding relationships, many large banks (e. g. Citibank, Bankers Trust) 
reftised to have anything to do with it. They rejected the BCCI's proposals because 
of the dubious ownership structure of BCCI, suspicious financial transactions it 
carried out, and its relations to drug money. Then, in October 1988,72 major banks 
suspended credit lines for BCCI, cutting it off from vital flows of cash. 
In 1990, Price Waterhouse discovered false and deceitful practices by BCCI. 
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At the same time, a bail-out by Abu Dhabi was approved by the Bank of England. 
The Bank was later much criticized for its unwillingness to close BCCI and for the 
inability to react promptly. "The climate of opinion" in the Bank favoured BCCFs 
reconstruction for the uncovered irregularities were thought to be "isolated events" 
and not of a systematic nature. Later in 1990, the Bank of England was told that 
BCCI held accounts for Abu Nidal, the Palestinian terrorist organization. In 
November 1990, auditors discovered private files of top BCCI's executives 
containing many details of fraud. The Price Waterhouse report was commissioned 
by the Bank in March 1991 and it led to the BCCI closure in July 1991. 
So, it took the regulators 13 years to reach the conclusion at last that BCCI 
grew to "an elaborate corporate spider-web", which facilitated fraudulent operations 
to be carried out on the world scale. Two independent inquiries were initiated, in 
the US, under Senator John Kerry, and in the UK, under the Lord Justice Bingham. 
The findings were astonishing and the presented list of irregularities in relation to 
BCCI operations is huge. 
"You name it, and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International Probably 
has been accused of doing it. Yet for almost 20 years, BCCI nearly always 
managed to stay ahead of the law. "" 
Although it is not certain if the list is complete, it can be summarized as follows. " 
BCCI was keeping relations with Colombian drug cartels and was laundering drug 
money. It was producing falsified accounting records. It used external vehicles to 
channel transfers of funds and created a network of 70 companies to facilitate and 
disguise its lending operations. BCCI illegally acquired the bank in the US, hiding 
behind "independent" investors. It handled flight-capital from throughout South 
America: it was transferring deposits among branches so as to hide cash from the 
IMF in these countries. BCCI was charged with tax conspiracy and fraud in the sale 
of securities. It was discovered that it extended "bad" loans of about 2 billion dollars 
to rich Gulf families. These loans were granted without adequate collateral, and 
sometimes without any legal documents or agreements. It was found out that some 
of these payments were made to fictitious accounts and were actually "covering" 
business losses. Even in the cases when "real" credits were granted, interest 
payments were late or non-existent. 
It was unveiled that BCCI kept close relations with high politicians in many 
countries. BCC1 used "influence-peddling" as a powerful means to achieve 
concessions and a better position in the country concerned. It was found out that 
BCCI made payments to Zimbabwean politicians in London during the 1979 
Lancaster House negotiations on Zimbabwe's independence. Soon after 
independence, BCCI became the first foreign bank to obtain a licence in Zimbabwe. 
It is assumed that BCCI acted similarly in a number of Third World countries, 
including payments and favours to the Gandhi family in India and to General Zia of 
Pakistan. The bank maintained "special" rqlations with influential politicians in the 
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US and UK, among others with Jimmy Carter and James Callaghan, as well as with 
some other influential figures like Panama's dictator, General Noriega. BCCI had 
also special "agreements" with leading Washington law firms which acted as 
lobbyists. Its relations within the US were further strengthened when C. Clifford 
was appointed the chairman of First American, having in mind his connections 
dating from times when he was the Defence Secretary. BCCI's public relations 
departments were very active in creating the bank's image as an institution deeply 
concerned with problems of developing countries in Latin America, Far East and 
Africa. Its Charity Third World Foundation was registered in the UK, and it had 
been presenting the Third World annual prize in the period from 1980 to 1988. The 
prize was being awarded for remarkable achievements in economics and politics 
concerning developing countries' problems. " 
In short, BCCI was conducting a vast range of criminal activities and this 
scale of "business diversification" was made possible by two basic causes. One of 
them is undoubtedly the speculative and fraud sýills of BCCI's head. Nevertheless, 
this global network of manipulation could not have become so efficient if there had 
not been the other cause 
- 
the lack of any comprehensive and consistent supervision 
of its activities. Whether this lack can be attributed to negligence or to lack of 
authority and resources, it stands clear that regulators failed to react adequately. 
One of the most extensive critiques of the role of the Bank of England in the 
BCCI affair came from the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee 
. 
4' The 
opposition MPs on the Committee used stronger language than in the official 1992 
Report, implying that the Bank was well aware of the difficulties in relation to BCCI 
even before March 1990. 
"We believe the Bank was not anxious to expose corruption in Abu Dhabi 
or the part that Saudi Arabia's biggest bank, the National Commercial 
Bank 
.... 
played in hiding huge frauds in BCCI. If this did happen, then it 
constitutes a clear fraud on the depositors by the Bank of England. 141 
Such a strong criticism was accompanied by several proposals from the Committee 
about the system for regulating international banks. The Bank of England should 
lobby for an amendment of the 1983 Basle Concordat. It should be agreed among 
the regulators that every single international bank must come under proper 
supervision of a single regulator, so that the whole bank's entity can be supervised. 
More details about the efforts to coordinate international supervision through the 
Bank for International Settlements will be presented in the sixth chapter. 
The Committee suggested that an independent international body should be 
established to monitor the imposed supervisory standards, i. e. to supervise the 
supervisors. Through sharing the supervisory responsibility for international banks, 
the Bank should receive reports on branches of foreign banks operating in the UK. 
A bank's accountants should be "obliged to ignore" their duty of client 
confidentiality and report to the Bank any discovered irregularity. Furthermore, the 
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Bank should expand its "on site" inspection of banks, in a way similar to 
investigations carried out in the US. 
In addition, the Bingham report suggests that the Bank of England's internal 
communications should be improved and additional powers should be conferred 
upon it. The latter primarily concerns the explicit power of the Bank to refuse or 
revoke banking authorization, if a bank cannot be properly supervised. In the case 
of BCCI, it was the complex structure of the banking group that inhibited a clear 
supervisory view over the whole organisation. The report also calls for more 
uniformity and harmonization of supervisory standards within the EC in order to 
eliminate opportunities for "supervisory arbitrage". In the case of BCCI, the 
"arbitrage" pointed out Luxembourg as the most favourite (most lax) environment 
for the BCCI's registration. In the field of international supervision, the Basle 
Committee' should continue to perform the leading role. As to the geographical 
distribution of a bank's operations, it was suggested that certain financial centres 
offer "impenetrable secrecy" as a competition weapon. Therefore, the involvement 
of such a centre should sometimes be the sufficient ground for refusing or revoking 
authorization. 
The Bingham Report has had a profound impact on debates about the role, 
capabilities and powers of the Bank of England, as well as about the financial 
regulation in general. On the day when the Bingham report was published (October 
22,1992), the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the Government and the 
Bank of England had accepted all of the recommendations from the Report. The 
Bank of England undertook specific steps in order to improve its supervisory and 
regulatory functions. It was announced that a Special Investigation Unit would be 
established and that the Banking Supervision Division's Legal Unit would be 
strengthened. " However, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. R. Leigh- 
Pemberton, rejected the "accusations" that the Bank was reluctant to use its powers. 
"The Bank had to consider very carefully whether its powers were 
exercisable and whether if they were it was in the interests of the depositors 
that they should be exercised. "I' 
In the beginning of 1993, a conclusion was still not reached what were the interests 
of the BCCI depositors: closing of the bank when the first signals of fraud appeared, 
or insisting on its restructuring and on the maintenance of business. Moreover, it 
was not apparent what were the interests of BCCI regulators, nor those of the home 
country and host countries. If one excludes the case of an intentional "negligence" 
of the regulators, the problem may originate from the intersection of different values 
and stakes pursued. For example, there was a value of freedom to operate (i. e. 
freedom to deposit money with a particular bank), on the one hand, and a value of 
security (economic security of the depositors), on the other hand. The values of 
I The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is analyzed in the Chapter 6, section 2.4. 
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order and honesty were also cut across, particularly in respect of a delicate question 
on who should "police" that order. 
The BCCI affair presents not only the biggest banking failure but also the 
"incident" that launched some of the most comprehensive and substantial analysis 
of modem banking. Almost every aspect of international banking has come under 
scrutiny: banking structures and financial techniques, accounting practice, auditing 
and supervision, legal aspects, and, most notably, international regulation. 
"The focus of attention in the aftermath of this debacle should not simply be 
to prevent a second BCCI (although the aim must. of course be to achieve 
that at least). But the aim must also and more importantly be to ensure that 
supervisory law, principles and practice generally create conditions hostile 
to the growth of fraud and friendly towards its early detection and 
eradication. "I' 
For that purpose, it is essential to overcome the inter-national approach to modem 
banking. That approach was probably adequate and useful in times when banking 
across borders included controllable transactions between well defined regulatory 
areas. Today, international banking accounts for a smaller part of the overall 
financial flows. Instead of the international approach, a global strategy should be 
developed, to encompass not only a great number of financial regulators, but also 
to include cooperation with global banking community. It should also provide links 
with the regulators dealing with other issues such as terrorisni and drugs. 
So, all three mentioned large "financial threats" 
- 
the Third World debt 
crisis, the 1987 stock market crash and the BCCI affair 
- 
add another component to 
the on-going evolution of perceptions concerning modem financial markets. It has 
been realized that financial markets are by no means separated from the "real" 
economy. Furthermore, every country's "real" economy is an integrative element 
of the world economy. It has become obvious that protectionism and regulative 
barriers are no longer obstacles which cannot be surmounted. The so-called over- 
development of financial markets during the 1980s produced financial excesses of 
the scale never seen before. However, the 1987 crash underscored that such 
sophisticated financial markets do require new attitudes towards them. The BCCI 
affair illustrates what can happen in the absence of a comprehensive system of 
international regulation. Having in mind the scope, size and reach of these markets, 
many of their classical (theoretical) functions need a critical re-examination. 
The three "incidents" described above were chosen on the grounds that all 
three were actually "allowed" to happen by the system itself. 
Particular financial scandals erupted during the late 1980s and in the 
beginning of the 1990s. The Drexel Burnham Lambert case in 1990 revealed losses 
of about 8 billion dollars, with tens of thousands of investors ruined. " There was 
a series of stock-for-favours scandals in Tokyo between 1988 and 1991, involving 
the top securities firms, large industrial corporations and high politicians. " In 
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April 1991, Salomon Brothers, one of the leading US securities firms, "cornered" 
the Treasury securities market by acquiring, in an illegal manner, more than 35 
percent of the outstanding bonds. The Maxwell affair in the UK broke out in 
November 1991, followed by discoveries of massive fraud, transfer of funds 
53 between public and private interests and various financial irregularities. Without 
any intention to underestimate the reach and consequences of these scandals, they 
could not be perceived as global financial threats. 
Specific regulatory ruptures persist in the world financial system and the 
climate created therein has always been more than favourable for various 
speculative, fraudulent and, in general, uncontrollable activities to be undertaken. 
The task conferred upon the world community is to create a regulatory framework, 
within which the global financial system would operate. One purpose of such a 
framework would be to provide the most efficient allocation of world capital. 
Another, complementary purpose would be the exercise of regulation and 
supervision on a truly global basis. It is the field of international relations theory 
that could probably offer some of the explanations how such frameworks are built. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FINANCE 
- 
THE 
GLOBALIST APPROACH 
The analysis presented in the previous chapters was basically done within the 
framework of economic theory. That was necessary in order to understand the very 
essence of the subject itself 
- 
the global securities market. For that purpose, the 
global market has been defined and explained from various aspects and upon 
different criteria, as much as it was possible within the current state of economic 
theory. The length and extent of the economic analysis in this work can be justified 
on the grounds that the critical approach was taken, in contrast to the problem- 
solving approach. 
"Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions 
and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the 
process of changing. Critical theory is directed to the social and political 
complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts. "" 
However, certain developments in the sphere of global banking seem not to have 
been properly examined. This has always been the case for economic developments 
that are difficult, or impossible, to quantify or determine by "classical" tools of 
economic theory. 
All of the previous chapters have clearly underscored that the global 
securities market has outgrown the state and its national economic policy domain. 
It has happened so not just according to the "technical" side (e. g. by using financial 
techniques that allow the world-wide allocation of funds), but also in respect to the 
issue position on the international relations agenda. A market of such reach and 
complexity could not be either supervised or "managed" by any single state actor. 
Moreover, as the following example will illustrate, it has reached a stage in its 
development where it could not be separated or isolated from developments in other 
fields of relations in the world community. Furthermore, as the previous chapter on 
the latest financial threats has emphasized, cross-border capital flows can exercise 
significant influence in many other spheres of global politics. This is a new 
distinctive characteristic of modem finance: it has become so interwirid with the 
whole of international relations that the theoretical framework for its analysis must 
be widened, to become a multidisciplinary one. In this particular analysis, the 
analytical framework is going to be enlarged by adding the International Relations 
perspectives on today's world. Then one of the four paradigms, the globalist 
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approach, including regime theories, is going to be presented in more detail. It will 
be useftil to illustrate with a short case study the development of the relationship 
between high politics and high finance, before displaying a brief comparative survey 
of the four main approaches to international relations 
5.1. Petrodollars and hostages 
Two historical examples of the early stage in the evolution of the relationship 
between politics and finance were presented in the first chapter. One of the best 
recent examples of this kind relates to the inflow of OPEC surplus funds to 
international capital markets in the 1970s, most notably to the US market. The 
concerns that were raised, in relation to "Arab money" in the US, have marked the 
beginning of a new stage in the interplay between high politics and high finance. 
Following the first oil-shock in 1973, OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates increasingly turned to the US capital market. 
The quantitative side of that development is summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: ARAB MONEY IN THE US, 1974-1983 (billions of dollars) 
1974 1981 stock market 
end share 
1983 
US gov. securities 3.2 14,0 39.9 17%* 
-T bills 2.1 1.1 6.3 na 
-T bonds 0.2 11.2 27.9 na 
Corporate securities 0.2 2.8 13.7 1%* 
Bank deposits 2.0 
-2.5 6.8 2%* 
Direct investment 0.07 2.7 4.0 
Total funds 6.0 1 16.3 72.9 
Funds in US badnks' na na 13.5 
foreign braýches 
- percent or an ioreign nomings oi securities or aeposits 
(Source: COHEN B. [1986] "In Whose Interest" [New Haven and London: 
Yale Univ. Press]) 
When the money started to flow into the US market, the Government appeared to 
be pleased with the amount of extra-accumulation provided from abroad. At the end 
of 1983, the stock of inflowing capital amounted to nearly 100 billion dollars. It was 
said that an inflow of that amount would definitely be beneficial for the US 
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economy. The supply of funds for US enterprises would be improved and this would 
eventually invoke further investment, create new jobs and positively effect domestic 
growth. The improved supply of funds would prevent any serious increase in 
interest rates. Furthermore, it was said (whatever was really thought by the 
Government) that this extra-accumulation would be beneficial for the budget deficit, 
the balance of payments the and exchange rate of the dollar. Nevertheless, as the 
ftinds were flowing in and the stock of OPEC holdings was piling up, critics were 
becoming more and more concerned with the significance of this development. 
Suddenly, there appeared to exist a wide-spread fear about the leverage 
OPEC countries had gained by "buying-out" America. Warnings came that a sudden 
run on these holdings could severely damage the US financial institutions involved 
in taking petrodollar deposits. It was said that certain acquisitions made by the 
OPEC countries in the US, in the so-called hi-tech sector, could uncover precious 
technological achievements. In this way, the OPEC countries could obtained an easy 
access to hi-tech laboratories, patents, know-how or even classified information. 
Even worse, there was consternation that the withdrawal of ftinds and their "switch" 
into other currencies could seriously effect the exchange rate of the dollar. Both 
aspects, the positive and the negative, of the OPEC financial inflows were greatly 
exaggerated, as Table 1 shows. The funds just could not be of the importance 
publicly attached to them, whether by those praising or by those criticizing the 
situation. 
What has to be mentioned here is that, for the first time, the US government 
publicly admitted the existence of possible linkage strategies that could be employed 
by the net-creditors of the US, such as OPEC countries. An equally important point 
is that the Government had set certain standards in dealing with Arab money (e. g. 
a high level of confidentiality and secrecy concerning petrodollars) that came to 
please both the investors and the recipient US banks. By deliberately reducing 
market transparency for these particular assets, the Governinent impro ved the 
competitive position of the market, relative to markets abroad. At the same time, 
it was a direct manifestation of politicizing high finance. 
"In the middle 1970s, the maintenance of amicable relations with Arab 
governments, and in particular with Saudi Arabia, was deemed an overriding 
foreign policy objective for a variety of reasons, political as well as 
economic. 1155 
Apart from the economic benefits mentioned above, it was thought that "amicable" 
relations would enable the US government to influence OPEC countries in relation 
to several matters. A moderation of oil prices was hoped for, as well as the 
retention of market share already achieved there by US corporations. A continuous 
and substantial inflow of OPEC funds would prevent serious disruption of 
government-business relations at home, which would certainly occur if monetary 
policy had to- be tightened due to inadequate supply of capital. Away from these 
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national economic goals, friendly relations were sought to support certain foreign- 
policy goals in the Middle East. A rising anti-Israeli tone that was spreading through 
the Arab world could adversely affect the US position in the region. Friendly 
relations with such influential countries as Saudi Arabia would eventually strengthen 
US initiatives in peace negotiations. 
However, the concerns that arose with regard to the OPEC funds drew 
attention to a number of other matters. The OPEC requirement for privacy and 
secrecy highlighted a very sensitive and somewhat contradictory relationship that 
existed in the triangle of the Senate, the FED and money centre banks. Actually, the 
Senate could not fully exercise powers conferred upon it: its Foreign Relations 
Committee could not get adequate data from commercial banks on the real 
significance of the Arab money in the US. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve 
was in fact acting as a foreign-policy maker: it would itself collect the "sensitive" 
data from banks, aggregate it and convey it to the Senate. All this would have to be 
done in accordance with the foreign-policy goals "of the day", as determined by the 
FED. Most importantly, the banks established themselves as active participants in 
the political process: they were vigorously lobbying for their Arab clients' 
requirements, fully aware of the potential foreign policy effects of their activities. 
Under these circumstances, the government had to resume a difficult role of 
balancing private interests of the banks and public interests 
- 
"national" goals of the 
country as a whole. Nevertheless, the OPEC funds in the US did not prove to be of 
any profound political value for the investors at the time. It was in 1979, when the 
role of petrodollars in the US was dramatically changed. From being a potential 
threat to US national goals, petrodollars became the most practicable weapon to 
achieve the goals. 
The American embassy in Teheran was seized on 4 November 1979, together 
with sixty-six hostages. Ten days later, all Iranian assets, totalling about 11 billion 
dollars, were frozen. This concerned not just the assets held in American banks in 
the US, but also Iranian funds in the foreign branches of US banks. The action was 
initiated and completed within 15 hours from the time the explicit wanung came 
from Iran. On 13 November, the then acting foreign and financeý Iran, 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, warned that Iran was going to withdraw all his funds from 
the States, because the US were carrying on economic war against his country. 
Although certain preparatory measures in this course had been carried out since 
February 1979, legal grounds for this action had actually been set sixty years 
before. 
In 1917, the Trading With the Enemy Act was passed, in order to confer 
extra powers upon the president. He was empowered to regulate various domestic 
and international transactions for an indej7nite period, in cases of war and peacetime 
national emergencies. This act had been the basis for freezing other countries' assets 
in the US on several occasions, as with China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and 
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Cambodia. In 1977, the president's power to regulate transactions were broadened 
and specified with the passage of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA). Thereafter, the president would be able to undertake 'special' actions, if 
the national security, foreign policy or economy of the US were to come under 
threat from any external event. 
After the embassy seizure in November 1979, Iranian assets were frozen 
under the ternis of the IEEPA and this was seen basically as a defensive strategy. 
The stability of the US financial system, as well as the dollar exchange rate, were 
perceived as being in jeopardy. Shortly after the freezing, it was the Iranians who 
actually built up the linkage between the frozen assets and the release of the 
hostages: they would not be freed before assets were returned to Iran. This gave the 
US additional bargaining strength: what was thought to be a potential weapon to be 
used against them (the Arab money weapon), turned out to be an effective 
instrument to be used against others. The need to act for a 'pure' economic 
emergency (the stability of the system and the dollar) was successfully used as a link 
to foreign policy goals. 
Another important aspect of this linkage has to be pointed out. In spite of the 
linkage effectiveness, in the eyes of the public (especially foreign public) the 
economic danger had to be kept clearly apart from the foreign policy disturbance in 
relation to Iran. 
"All that talk about the dollar and US financial institutions was really just a 
smokescreen 
- 
propaganda designed for the consumption of other 
governments, particularly the oil-rich Arab states, who might worry that if 
the money weapon could be turned on the Iranians it could be turned on 
them too. "" 
There was no desire to endanger amicable relations with the Gulf countries, partly 
because of a highly beneficial inflow of their funds at a time when the dollar was 
still weak, and because of a continuous US interest in the Middle East. The 
government realized that a political explanation for the asset freeze could provoke 
chain reactions on the part of other countries depositing with US banks. That could 
really have threatened the system and the exchange rate. 
At home, there were additional problems in relation to the freeze. Banks that 
had extended credits to Iran wanted to have their claims offset against Iranian 
deposits. There were also a number of non-bank claimants, who could not 
compensate themselves for eventual Iranian defaults with the deposits. Concerning 
the relation between the banks at home and their foreign branches, the situation was 
even more delicate. What actually happened was that only bank branches operating 
abroad obtained Treasury authorization to use Iranian deposits to off set outstanding 
Iranian loans. Apart from the problems that arose due to different treatment of US 
banks at home and abroad, there was the major problem of the extraterritorial reach 
of the freeze order. Years after the affair, it was still difficult to explain upon what 
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grounds tacit approval of other countries (that hosted branches of US banks) was 
granted for this unprecedent action. 
Another sensitive matter that had to be resolved concerned non-performing 
Iranian loans and a possible use of a cross-default clause on part of the banks. 
Application of this clause would enable other banks to require immediate repayment 
of the loans they had extended, if any one loan (granted by another bank) would be 
declared in default. If, for example, Iran would declare his loan granted by Citibank 
in default, other Iranian creditors could call on their loans as well. Eventually, this 
did not happen, as a number of banks perceived some investment opportunities still 
to be open in Iran. In relation to this, there was the problem for the FED 
concerning adequate information about Iranian assets held in US banks. On the 
grounds of maintaining the principle of secrecy and confidentiality for Arab clients, 
banks were not willing to disclose data on their holdings. What was originally 
introduced in order to "safeguard" inflow of funds from the Gulf, became a serious 
obstacle for the government in developing its strategy towards Iran. 
Regardless of the various problems, a negotiation process started after some 
time. What is of a great interest for the purpose of this discussion is the structure 
of the negotiations. There were actually two parallel tracks: one between Iran and 
the banks, and the other between the two governments. The banks were approached 
first by the Iranians, but they could enter negotiations only after they had obtained 
the government permission. Intermediated by the government of Algeria, there were 
parallel inter-governmental talks that took place in highest secrecy. 
"The strategic interaction between the US government and Iran was 
considerably complicated by the actions and influences of private financial 
institutions, whose interpretations of their commercial interests in this affair 
did not always coincide with the public interest... As the two tracks [of 
negotiations] gradually merged, administration officials spent as much time 
bargaining with the banks as they did with the Iranians. "" 
Additional problems arose in relation to the interest to be paid on the Iranian 
assets held "on freeze". The banks that were actually using those funds for free 
were not willing to accrue interest. On the other side, a sort of a "coalition" was 
building up between the Iranians, the US banks that did not have Iran's deposits, 
non-bank claimants in the US, and a number of foreign banks that criticized this 
highly advantageous position of the US banks. Each of the coalition members had 
its own genuine perspectives and motives, but they all shared the same goal. 
At the end, unfrozen assets were returned to Iran but only partially 
- 
almost 
50% was used to offset Iran's non-performing loans and to meet obligations to non- 
bank institutions in the US. The hostages were released and the sanctions lifted. 
This whole episode was much more complex, but for the purpose of this 
study even a brief presentation clearly underscores several important points. The 
affair was among the most obvious examples of complex interdependence that exists 
38 
in the contemporary world. Very sensitive and mutually limiting relations between 
high politics and high finance were explicitly highlighted. Secondly, all actors 
seemed to become aware of the dialectic between their mutual interests and mutual 
aversions. They realized that their goals and interests may vary across time and 
space, but they are inseparably linked and mutually influencing in that process of 
changing. It was perceived that the same dialectic characterizes the complexity of 
actors' goals and motives within one state. Certain parallelism (certain broad 
similarities) do exist in their strategy, but there is also a significant degree of 
collision in relation to the pursuit of their interests. What is even more interesting, 
certain goals were widely shared among different types of actors (e. g. the matter of 
interest to be paid), regardless of their basic motives. 
Thirdly, it became apparent that such an affair necessarily involves all sorts 
of actors in international relations. Apart from the conventional governmental actors 
directly concerned, such as the US State Department, it developed to include a 
number of other governmental, such as the US Federal Reserve, and non- 
governmental actors. 
Fourthly, different sectors of the US government in this case had to resume 
a role of balancing "national" goals between themselves (e. g. the foreign policy 
threat v. the economic need for foreign accumulation). They also had to act in a 
way to achieve a "compromise" between national, public goals (as interpreted by 
themselves) and private goals expressed on part of the banks. In this particular case, 
the "list" of national priorities seemed to have been turned upside down: it was the 
economic emergency that became the top priority. A dialectical nature of public 
interests in different fields was openly accepted and that made the linkage even more 
effective. 
As the fifth point, it has to be mentioned that the hostage affair brought to 
the forefront the importance of intra-governmental structures and relations. It was 
the unity of the governmental "voice" on part of the US that certainly improved its 
position in negotiations with both the banks and Iran. On the Iranian side it was not 
the case, for rival political factions in Teheran used the affair for their own 
immediate goals. Although the FED acted as a foreign-policy maker, no mixed or 
conftising signals were sent out from the government. This was a clear illustration 
of the Globalist assumption that a government is not a single body: it consists of 
various segments, levels and departments which can separately pursue their own 
strategies and interests. 
The purpose of this example was to illustrate the choice of theoretical 
framework among the four main paradigms of international relations. Albeit this was 
not an example directly related to the global securities market, it can enrich the 
comprehension of the global environment wherein this market has been developed. 
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5.2. International relations 
- 
main perspectives 
The first question regarding the extension of this analysis is why should one 
study basically an economic phenomenon from the aspect of another discipline, 
namely that of international relations. As has been noted, the underlying aim is to 
offer new, critical insights for understanding the rise, the structure and the processes 
of the global securities market. This can be done only if the particular phenomenon 
is located within a broader social and political context, so that the complexity of the 
whole and of its parts can be comprehended. The scientific field of International 
Relations provides one dimension for the extension of this analysis because it is 
concerned with 
"... relationships between individuals or groups, who are members of 
different states, or between the states themselves. "" 
Moreover, as the kind of relationship concerning capital flows has developed 
to the extent outlined in the third chapter, the International Relations' approach to 
the global environment seems particularly useful. J. Rosenau identifies the main 
scope of International Relations as 
"... encompassing all general and specific analyses of the international social 
system and its various subsystems. The international social system may be 
thought of as a series of interdependent, functional subsystems; the 
international political system is the most important of these subsystems... 
Among the other constituent functional subsystems are an economic system, 
a legal system, an ethnic system, and a scientific system... "I' 
From this point of view, it is clear that contemporary phenomena emerging on the 
world scale are functionally interrelated and "just" parts of the complex whole. 
Rosenau goes on and underscores a multidisciplinary approach that has to be taken, 
including political but also military, economic and technological stu dies. Although 
his views later underwent certain changes (more attention to his work will be paid 
later in this chapter), Rosenau's early conclusions about different and definable 
sectors 
- 
areas 
- 
within the global system have had a profound impact upon 
theoretical progress. According to this perspective, International Relations should 
cover all "instrumentalities and forms" (Rosenau, 1976) of interactions between 
political actors that transcend state borders, covering diplomatic, military, economic, 
psychological, legal, ethical, technical, scientific and/or cultural interactions. These 
interactions may occur within or between different sectors, and may involve 
different types of actors, each of them pursuing their own values, interests and 
strategies. Multiplicity and a high interrelatedness of these political relations and 
links (within and across sectors) actually determine effects and outcomes at all 
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levels: at the general (systemic) level, at different subsystemic levels, and at the 
micro-level of each single actor. Apart from states, as the most obvious actors in 
international relations, all sorts of different actors have also to be taken into 
consideration. For the course of this analysis, Rosenau's conclusions about other- 
than-governmental actors are specially instructive. 
"The importance of non-govemmental actors is a function of their power 
base, their independence from governmental power, and the ways in which 
their acts and goals are related to those of governments. "' 
In short, International Relations should study political actors, structures and 
processes being developed within and between different sectors of the world polity, 
i. e. of the global environment. This resembles the wider concept of international 
organization, used by P. Willetts, to describe 
regular patterns of interactions between interdependent sets of 
government bureaucracies, transnational corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, international non-governmental organizations, iquangos and 
international governmental organizations, utilizing differential abilities to 
gain access to communications structures, in order to pursue contention over 
an issue. "" 
In respect of both basic assumptions and theoretical findings, four main 
approaches to the study of international relations can be identified. They are 
conventionally labelled as Realism, Structuralism, Functionalism and Globalism, but 
they can be also discovered under other names, for example Power politics, 
Dominance and Dependence, World Society and the Issue-paradigm, respectively. ' 
The first three of them will be presented only briefly, except for some parts of the 
Realist approach. The Global Politics approach will be introduced in more detail, 
as it will serve as the theoretical framework for analyzing the politics of the global 
securities market. 
5.2.1. The Realist perspective 
One of the most widely held perspectives on international relations is 
certainly the Realist approach, alternatively labelled as the state-centric or power- 
and-security approach. The literature on this approach is vast and diversified", but 
some common, basic assumptions and findings can be identified. The key words 
(concepts) in this paradigm are: the state, power the national interest, conflict and 
struggle, international anarchy. 
Sometimes described as the most "elegant" approach, it is also portrayed as 
simply consisting of beliefs in the wisdom of certain "eternal verities" about 
politics. ' These verities concern the dominance of the state in the global 
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environment. They also point to the state's constant pursuit of the national interest 
by rational decision-making, in a continuing struggle and conflict with other states. 
Realism takes the systemic level of analysis, and is basically conservative and 
dogmatic in nature. 
The state is in focus, for it is the only actor that features legitimate use of 
force, within and beyond its jurisdictional boundaries. The state is a unified political 
actor due to a high level of cohesion in its structure. Cohesive components are 
assumed to include the attribute of sovereignty, nationalism, a geographical base, 
economic resources and links, a common language, and social and cultural patterns. 
Its highest objective is to define and pursue various national goals and the 
overreaching national interest of security. The pursuit of unified objectives is carried 
out through domestic and foreign policy, with the ultimate task of displaying a high 
level of military strength and economic capacity to other states. In doing so, the 
state enjoys full autonomy, as the consensus over national priorities legitimates its 
actions. 
The most important characteristic of the state, but also the most important 
weapon in international relations, is a real and perceived power. 
"Power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible 
and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other 
nations. "' 
These sources of power include geography, natural resources, population and the 
nature of a country's government (tangible resources), as well as national character, 
morale, ideology and the quality of a country's leadership (intangible resources). Of 
all the "powers", military power is the indispensable instrument of national survival, 
in times of both internal and external jeopardies and threats. K. Knorr distinguishes 
power as a means that could be accumulated (primarily on a basis of a country's 
economic strength) and eventually used, from power 
-isas an effect and influence 
that is actually produced and enjoyed. ' 
The pursuit, preservation and improvement of the national interest is the 
state's most significant task. There is no common explanation of the notion "the 
national interest". Sometimes it is referred to as the overall common good of the 
entire society (nation), and yet sometimes it covers concrete stakes (objects) which 
the state bargains over in international relations. However, "the national interest" 
is frequently mixed up with "the state interest" for the separation of the nation (the 
society) from the state does not exist within the Realist framework. 
"The national interest is itself an objective reality that does not depend on 
the aims selected by policyrnakers. It is the end of maintaining the capacity 
of the state... to protect the society while it continues its search for its 
shared good. "I 
The environment which this state system operates within is a dangerous 
anarchy, created by the actors' pursuit of their own, particular interests. Each Actor 
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faces a constant security dilemma from its own perspective, and actions resulting 
therefrom (e. g. arms race) cause further deterioration in the actor's environment. 
As a country's position within the hierarchical world structure can only be improved 
with the relative decline of other states, struggles and conflicts are inevitable. 
Although a country's status can be improved or worsen, there is very little 
possibility of a radical change of the order itself. 
Neorealism accepts basic assumptions but adds much more of a "realistic 
dimension of realism". Namely, dissatisfied with both descriptive and explanatory 
capabilities of classical Realism, writers have increasingly turned their analysis to 
the existing world. The power-and-security tradition seems to have been loosing its 
strength. " Neorealists accept the basic structure of the state system, but allow the 
appearance (though less significant) of relations other than that of states, and admit 
the rise of different types of actors in the world of politics. The umbilical cord with 
the core of Realism is the assertion that other-than-state relations are possible only 
if the state actors allow them to develop. Transnational processes may become 
parallel or contradictory to inter-state relations, but they can by no means surpass 
or rival them. 
An important additional assumption, brought forward by R. Keohane, 
concerns the possibility of cooperation in international relations. Interests are still 
conflicting, but even so, direct confrontation can be avoided if cooperative 
management, negotiations and policy coordination are introduced. 
"Intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating 
realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coordination. "I' 
Different issues that arise on the world scale are seen as being interrelated (H. 
1jull"), and a concept of relative power is developed. This concerns a state's 
power available and exercisable in a given sector, or power in relation to a 
particular salient issue. The power of Switzerland, or more precisely of its banks, 
to attract and manipulate foreign capital is a classical example of issue-specific 
power, as being very distant from the Realist understanding of power. However, the 
state is still the condition sine qua non for the preservation of the system as a whole 
and of its parts. 
"The structure of international trade changes in fits and starts... 
Nevertheless, it is the power and policies of states that create order where 
there would otherwise be chaos or at best a Lockian state of nature. The 
existence of various transnational, multinational, transgovernmental, and 
other nonstate actors... can only be understood within the context of a 
broader structure that ultimately rests upon the power and interests of 
states... "" 
Another distinguishing feature of Neorealism is a significant attention they pay to 
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economic issues. "It was exactly within Neorealism that an attempt was made to 
introduce a new theory, International Regimes, into the main paradigm. Theoretical 
approaches to international regimes will be presented in depth in the concluding 
section of this chapter. 
5.2.2. The Structuralist perspective 
This paradigm presents a "left-oriented" theoretical response and although 
it seems, at first, to contradict the Realist approach, it actually upholds basically 
similar assumptions. Writings on this perspective can be found as categorized under 
the labels such as Dominance and Dependence, Marxism, Global social class, the 
Global centric approach, and the World System perspective. This literature is even 
more diversified than the Realist one, with respect to the level of analysis as well 
as the subjects and relations under examination. " The key words are: the class 
structure, the state, economic determinism, uneven development and exploitation. 
Its theoretical root is undoubtedly Marxism, even though this has not been 
recognized (accepted) by some of the writers. The main heritage therefrom covers 
the systemic approach to analysis, without disaggregation from the top down, and 
a rigid form of determinism on economic (class) grounds. 
There are two main types of actors in international relations: classes and 
governments (state apparatus). The latter type essentially provides "building blocks" 
for the global system, which is held to be very state-centric. Classes enter 
international relations either through actions of their governments, or directly 
through linking with corresponding social strata abroad. This disaggregation of the 
"state-as-country" (Willetts) on the government and the society is certainly among 
the most significant achievements of the paradigm. Resulting from the separation, 
there is a constant, inherent conflict of interest among and between these two 
components of the state. At the system level, it is supposed that there is a unity of 
interests among classes that are in the same position in the economy, regardless of 
their national location. Recent writings on the expansion of multinational 
corporations and in the Dependencia school have somewhat modified these 
oversimplified assumptions. 
0. Sunkel and E. Fuenzalida pointed to the emergence of a new type of 
actors 
- 
transnational communities. These transnational communities are formed on 
the basis of the same characteristics shared by groups of professionals. 
"The stratum of society that we have called the transnational community is 
made up of people that belong to different nations, but have similar values, 
beliefs, ideas (and a lingua franca 
- 
English), as well as remarkably similar 
patterns of behaviour as regards career, family structures 
. ..... 
11 
The focus of interaction in international relations is on contradictory but 
interdependent economic interests of different classes, with the interests of the 
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dominant capitalist class being protected and pursued by actions of their 
governments. Effectiveness of that pursuit relies on the position of the country 
within the hierarchical world structure. 
"The functioning of a capitalist world-economy requires that groups pursue 
their economic interests within a single world-market, while seeking to 
distort this market for their benefit by organizing to exert influence on states, 
some of which are far more powerful than others but none of which controls 
the world-market in its entirety. "" 
The global environment for international relations is marked by inequality 
among states, uneven and centralized development, and by exploitation and 
dependency as main processes. There is only one global, world system, made up of 
states. Accordingly, there is a single, global capitalist economy (market), through 
which the separation between the centre (developed states) and the periphery 
(underdeveloped, dependent, backward states) is fortified. Power in international 
relations is perceived to be primarily economic in nature, but it can be "supported" 
or enhanced by military force or threats if necessary. From this perspective, conflict 
is by far the most dominant form of international relations, where bargaining and 
compromising that significantly alters outcomes rarely occurs. So, there is a very 
narrow possibility of change, if the extremely revolutionary pace (destruction of the 
system) is excluded. 
Apart from the already mentioned disaggregation of the state, this perspective 
accurately points to the fact that the government is not an independent body which 
organizes and exercises its functions autonomously. Moreover, various questions 
that arise in international relations are increasingly treated as being interrelated. 
However, as the theoretical foundation (Marxism) of this perspective does not offer 
a coherent set of ideas concerning international relations, contemporary writings in 
this tradition appear to have been declining in significance. 
5.2.3. The Functionalist perspective 
The Functionalist Paradigm has evolved as an expression of dissatisfaction 
with growing nationalism and totalitarian ideologies most obvious in the 1930s and 
1940s. On those grounds, the functionalist paradigm was being developed as 
predominantly a normative (idealistic) approach that outlines what the base and 
forms of international relations should be. Contemporary writings in this approach 
originate from David Mitrany's work in the beginning of 1940s, and from the work 
of K. Deutsch on international integration. " The key concepts are economic and 
social groups, task-oriented organization, common welfare, interdependence, 
cooperation, knowledge and skills. 
45 
In its early stage, the Functionalist paradigm rejected the state as the main 
and legitimate actor in international relations. It was the use of force and the abuse 
of ideologies that had delegitimized the state as the representative of the national 
interest. Moreover, the state was not even in the condition to pursue national goals 
effectively, as economic integration and interdependence had made state borders 
futile. An ideal world would be structured according to functions that have to be 
performed in order to achieve common welfare. This structure would be organized 
with respect to functional efficiency but regardless of geographical (state) borders. 
Main actors would, hence, be certain socio-economic groups that would cooperate 
for common benefit. 
The idea of over-reaching cooperation, on a voluntary basis, was further 
developed in the concept of "World Society" (J. Burton). The global system presents 
a complex of networks, interactions, built through various contacts and 
communications in the field of economic, cultural and social exchanges. This is 
exactly the most important finding in the realm of the Functionalist perspective: the 
origins of cross-border cooperation were accurately located in functional 
interdependence developed between modem societies. In addition, by highlighting 
the significance of "separate" functions, this perspective has paved the way for 
developing a sectoral approach to international relations. By the same token, the 
importance of non-govemmental actors was accurately valued, as well as other-than- 
military national priorities. 
Neo-Functionalism accepts the basic assumptions of the Functionalist 
perspective, but also adds some new elements to the paradigm. Most importantly, 
it adds the possibility of conflicts that may arise on the international scene, and 
accepts the existence of states as actors in international relations. The state 
behaviour, however, is not autonomous but under a significant influence of socio- 
economic groups that posses highly specialized knowledge. E. Haas is among the 
most prominent authors that has been developing this idea through the concept of 
Ifepistemic communities". The term was actually introduced by J. G. Ruggie in 
1975, who described epistemic communities as 
"... consisting of interrelated roles which grow up around an episteme, as 
a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and 
" 77 references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention. 
P. Haas describes epistemic communities as follows: 
"An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. "78 
A basis for their action has to be found in the so-called consensual knowledge, 
which E. Haas defines as "a body of beliefs... that is widely accepted by the 
relevant actors, irrespective of the absolute or final 'truth' of these beliefs 1171 
Neo-Functionalists see the international setting as being complex, with a high 
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level of uncertainty and a range of internationalized issues. In order to comprehend 
issue-linkages and to formulate adequate polices, the state (as one among the main 
type of actors) must turn to groups of professionals 
- 
epistemic communities. The 
distinguishing features of these groups include: a shared set of causal and principled 
beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a common policy enterprise. E. Kapstein 
exemplifies this by the 1987 bilateral agreement between the US and Britain, 
regarding capital adequacy standards. " Shared causal beliefs relate to 
understanding that confidence in international banking was eroded by the debt crisis, 
and a global run on the banks could require significant central bank interventions. 
Shared principled beliefs were that, as the international trade and payments systems 
were a collective good, central banks must ensure the safety and soundness of the 
systems. A common policy enterprise, that combined both these beliefs and the 
banks' interests, concerned the development of a single capital adequacy standard 
that would strengthen the system and restore confidence. In this way, the bankers' 
community would provide adequate knowledge and the course for state action. 
However, this perspective was criticised as being too idealistic and 
normative. It is said that Functionalists neglect existing modes of international 
organization, and bring back in the high-politics / low-politics distinction. 
Furthermore, they seem to underestimate the significance of sectoral spillover. On 
the other side, this perspective seems to overestimate an "apolitical" will and desire 
of social groups to avoid conflict and pursue cooperation. " 
5.2.4. The Globalist perspective 
The last among the main perspectives on international relations is the so- 
called Global Politics approach, although it is also often termed "Pluralism", 
"Transnationalism. and Interdependence", "Issue-paradigm", etc. It is widely 
accepted that this perspective offers a more general approach for it tends to combine 
certain assumptions and conclusions from each of the three perspectives described 
above. It has been developed as a main challenge to Realism, presenting the other 
ideal type of the global system. In doing so, it has successfully incorporated some 
of the findings of Structuralism and of Functionalism as well, for the purpose of 
constructing a more appropriate and reliable framework for analyzing world reality. 
Although the perspective was being most actively developed during the 1970s, it still 
attracts numerous writers. " Key words are interdependence, tfansnationalism, 
issues, linkages, multicentric world and global management. 
The Global Politics approach is seen as a way of better comprehending the 
reality that cannot "fit" into the three conventional perspectives described before. 
D. Puchala calls for a new conceptualization in the theory of international relations. 
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"No model describes the integration phenomenon with complete accuracy 
because all the models present images of what integration could be or should 
be rather than what is here and now... Clearly, to surmount the conceptual 
confusion we must set aside the old models, and 
... 
we must create a new, 
more appropriate, more productive analytical framework. "" 
ýo, in order to examine and study reality properly, one must not insist on the 
conservation of existing theoretical "tools", but must develop alternative (new) 
frameworks when necessary. The Globalist approach aims exactly at that. 
Recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes in all aspects of social life: 
communications and contacts within and between societies have been improved, 
market operations have become globalized, integration tendencies strengthened but 
on the basis of simultaneous centripetal and centrifugal forces. A more detailed 
survey of transformations in the financial sphere was presented in the first part of 
this analysis. Moreover, demarcation lines between various political problems 
(domestic / foreign / global; economic / military / social), as well as between 
various political actors (governments / private actors; domestic / international / 
global) have become blurred. All this has led to a polyarchical (or multicentric) 
global structure, with numerous and different participants, issues and processes 
closely intertwined. Oversimplified, this kind of the world environment is the 
foundation from which the Global Politics analysis originates. 
Basic conceptual blocks in this approach are complex interdependence (as 
opposed to state independence), transnationalism (as opposed to internationalism, or 
inter-state relations), and transgovernmental relations (as opposed to the coherence 
and unity of the state apparatus). 
Keohane and Nye have offered the concept of complex interdependence, as 
the most suitable analytical device to explain changes and processes in the world of 
today. 
"In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or 
significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence in world politics 
refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or 
among actors in different countries. "I 
Moreover, when these effects emerge in an environment wherein the connecting 
channels are multiplied and diversified, where political questions are not 
hierarchically arranged, and where military force is of a lesser importance and 
usage, the world is characterized by complex interdependence. 
The second conceptualizing block is the expansion and proliferation of 
transnational relations, as exchanges that are carried out across state boundaries and 
usually away from the government control. Keohane and Nye define transnational 
relations as including cross-border interactions, in the fields of communication, 
transportation, production and finance, and travel, as well as transnational 
organizations. The latter is described by ý. Rosenau (1990) as sovereignty-free 
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actors (multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies, political 
parties, religious organizations, associations, etc. ), in contrast to sovereignty-bound 
actors (states). The emergence of transnational actors in world politics have had a 
profound effect in many aspects: in interstate politics, in perceptions of power, 
loyalty, national and private goals, in international organization, and so forth. K. 
Skjelsback" describes transnational organizations as institutionalized cross-border 
interactions, where there is a high intensity of interactions and central coordination 
is needed. "Institutionalization tends to follow multilateralization" (Skjelsback) when 
there is a shared belief that potential emergencies (crises) might require joint 
operation. 
Developed in this way, a global organization would result in a particular non- 
governmental (NGO) world as a counterpart to the existing, but declining world of 
states. The advent of the multi-centric world is the result of global processes, 
including the emergence of new political issues and new institutions, an authority 
and legitimacy crisis of state-actors; and growth of subgroupism and 
transnationalism. 
"The universe of global politics had come to consist of two interactive 
worlds with overlapping memberships: a multi-centric world of diverse, 
relatively equal actors, and a state-centric world in which national actors are 
still primary. The norms governing the conduct of politics in the multi- 
centric world have evolved so as to diminish the utility of force... An 
autonomy dilemma serves as the driving force of the multi-centric world. "" 
Rosenaull develops further this concept of the two, mutually not exclusive, worlds 
by comparing their basic structures and processes. The principal goals of actors in 
the state-centric world relate to the preservation of territorial security and integrity, 
while those of the multi-centric world are the increase of the world market share and 
the integration of subsystems. If a conflict arises, actors in the state-centric world 
resort to armed force, while actors in the other world withhold (withdraw) from 
cooperation and compliance processes. According to the modes of collaboration, the 
state-centric world relies on formal alliances, whereas actors in the multi-centric 
world usually form temporary coalitions. The hierarchical order in the state-centric 
world is contrasted to a relative equality among actors in the multi-centric world. 
The state-centric world is less inclined to changes, while the other is highly flexible 
and adaptable, with diffused control over outcomes. Finally, these two global orders 
are not mutually exclusive, and each seek to exercise influence on the other. For the 
time being, the autonomy of the state-centric world has not been seriously 
undermined. Furthermore, the sovereignty-bound actors increasingly turn to develop 
active relations with the multi-centric world. 
"Sovereignty-bound actors (SBAs) yield jurisdiction, fully or partially, to 
transnational sovereignty-free actors when [inter alial an issue has acquired 
such momentum in a particular direction that to attempt to curb the 
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involvement of sovereignty-free actors is to risk unacceptable consequences 
in other policy areas. SBAs coordinate with other states as a means of 
moving freely in the multi-centric world when [inter alia] transnational 
interactions among sovereignty-free actors begin to impinge upon the 
stability of two or more governments. "' 
Finally, the third conceptual block in Global Politics is the existence of 
particular relations between government agencies and departments with similar 
entities in other countries. In 1973, S. Huntington wrote about the rising importance 
of transnational organizations in world politics", but Keohane and Nye were the 
first to use the term "transgovermnental relations". 
"We define transgovemmental relations as sets of direct interactions among 
subunits of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided 
by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. "I 
This is the most important contrast developed in relation to the Realist perspective, 
which regards the state as a homogeneous actor that rationally pursuits a coherent 
set of national goals. Originating from the work of G. T. Allisolp', Keohane and 
Nye developed the idea that the state is not a coherent entity speaking with one 
voice. On the contrary, as the state consists of different bureaucracies with their 
own goals, policy analysis must focus on bureaucratic contacts below the top levels. 
As it is often the case, each of them may have a different perspective and calculus 
on a particular political question. From the outside, this may lead to a confusion, 
as different signals are sent out to other participants in the political process. In order 
to reach their own goals, bureaucratic structures often create relations and links to 
corresponding structures abroad. 
Transgoverninental behaviour can take the form of policy coordination or 
transgovermuental coalition building. The former occurs when transgovernmental 
relations are designed to facilitate policy implementation or adjustment. The latter 
is built when bureaucratic structures from different countries come to share similar 
goals and join efforts to influence the governments concerned. Such 
transgovernmental relations are most easily developed through direct, but rather 
informal, contacts among working level officials in various international 
organizations. 
As it is obvious, Global Politics derives certain theoretical postulates from 
the other three paradigms. From Realism, it accepts the existence of states and 
boundaries, as well as the predominance of hierarchical structuring of the world 
order (from the top to bottom). 
The influence of Structuralism relates to the treatment of the state as not 
being an independent actor (decision-maker), but being affected by other actors. The 
emphasis laid upon economic issues and upon growing transnational relations is also 
shared with Structuralism, as well as the inclusion of conflict and interlinking of 
different political questions. Also, the analysis of the notion of power partially 
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resembles Structuralists' conclusions: power is not a fixed attribute exclusively 
based upon military strength of the state. It is neither a universal sort of "might" 
that can be an equally successful weapon in all political matters. Globalists see 
power from two aspects: it can be viewed as actual capabilities, but it can be also 
perceived as the influence over outcomes. It is exactly the political process that 
intermediates between the two aspects. Moreover, power resources specific to 
certain issues (matters) have to be considered as the most important. 
From Functionalism, it accepts the group-based approach and the existence 
of cooperation (not just conflicts). From both Neo-Realism and Functionalism, it 
accepts the assumption that the sectoral approach is the most applicable to current 
world politics. Simplified, the global political system is not a single phenomenon, 
but it rather incorporates a number of systems (subsystems) formed around certain 
sets of political questions (issues) seen as being interrelated. Participating actors 
vary in regard to their nature and type, but they all engage in contention over stakes 
they perceive important for their own values and interests. This particular feature 
of the Global Politics perspective has invoked the use of an alternative label 
- 
"the 
issue-based paradigm". As it is related to the regime theory (which will be 
overviewed in the following section), this concept needs more clarification. 
5.2.5. The concept of issues 
Particular historical events and developments attract intense "political" 
attention from a great number of actors on the world scene, sometimes due to the 
wide impact invoked, 
- 
sometimes for the radical structural changes resulting 
therefrom. The Cold-War is often seen as the predominant historical development 
in the post-war era that was embracing a number of interrelated questions, and 
which was paid an attention incomparable to other developments occurring at the 
same time. The same applies to the decolonisation process, and more recently, to 
environmental problems, development, debt crisis, etc. From the theoretical point 
of view, it is still not clear what the nature of the process has been, that has allowed 
a particular clustering of political questions, or specific arrangements (groupings) 
among and between political actors to emerge. By the same token, theoretical 
dilemmae still exist in relation to motivation underlying political actions, in relation 
to the nature of political processes initiated, in relation to the existence and 
development of linkages between political actors and political choices, etc. 
Simultaneously, it is still a matter of theoretical dispute how those sets of political 
questions invoke (translate into) concrete policy responses and actions. 
"All research questions in the study of international relations can be 
formulated in terms of the researcher's desire to understand the inputs to 
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political processes, the structures within which politics occurs or the outputs 
from political processes. The inputs are the attempts by political actors to 
mobilise support... The structures are the political actors, the groups they 
form and the communication channels between them. The outputs are 
collective policy decisions. "' 
The concept of issues aims at surmounting: 1) concrete, power-related 
simplifications of Realism; 2) idealistic, conflict-ignoring simplifications of 
Functionalism, and 3) deterministic, polarizing simplifications on economic grounds, 
of Structuralism. 
As the example of the petrodollars and Iranians from the first section of this 
chapter has demonstrated, these simplifications cannot contribute to a better 
comprehending of reality. In that particular case, it was not the military power of 
the US vis-a-vis Iran that brought the crisis to the end. Far more, it was not a 
cooperation of major financial groups and experts (primarily from the US, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran) that sat together and joined the efforts to avoid (resolve) the crisis 
for the welfare benefit of the countries concerned. Finally, it is not clear who was 
the exploiter and where was the demarcation line between the centre and the 
periphery, keeping in mind that the money from the Middle East was actually 
fuelling the US economy. 
Although that example does not represent "an issue" from the theoretical 
stand (it was too specific, concrete and temporary), it was chosen to point out how 
a particular pattern of events (political choices) may cut across several broad sets 
of questions 
- 
issues, such as security, human rights and efficiency. It was the 
perceived threat to the security of the US (firstly, as an economic threat) that 
actually put in force the Trade with the Enemy Act. At the same time, the issue of 
human rights was also "tackled", regarding the hostage seizure and financial 
sanctions imposed on Iran. Simultaneously, the issue of efficiency (benefits from 
foreign accumulation) and the issue of freedom (unrestricted but safe cross-border 
capital flows) were impinged upon. All this could be also regarded from a different 
perspective, as these issues combine into more general, "hyper-issues" of security, 
justice, equality, welfare, peace, etc. The involvement of so many different actors 
in the concrete example (the US State department, the Treasury, the Senate, major 
US banks, the Iranian government, government-mediators, governments hosting 
foreign branches of US banks, the Gulf families, foreign banks, etc. ) brought in a 
range of different and sometimes conflicting interests. 
For example, foreign banks, US banks with no Arab deposits and the Iranian 
government took the same position regarding a particular stake of interest on frozen 
Iranian assets. They were pressing for large US banks to pay the interest, for they 
were actually using these resources for free (during the freeze). Foreign banks saw 
this as a matter of equality on the global capital market, but also as a matter of 
efficiency because of the eventual continuation of business with Iran. The US banks 
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regarded the stake as underinining the equality of institutions within the US financial 
system. The Iranian government considered this as impinging on the issue of 
(economic) security and of freedom. Starting from these different perspectives, these 
actors actually made an informal alliance to reach the goal: payment of interest by 
the US banks that were using the assets. 
The issue-based approach to international relations emphasizes groups as 
political actors (versus states as major political actors) and the system of values (not 
power) as underlying grounds for political actions. A group of people enters a 
political process when it perceives certain questions as being relevant for the 
realization of its goals and values underlying them (Willetts, 1990 and 1992). They 
interact with other groups in order to mobilise support that would uphold their 
position (view, attitude, approach) in relation to the questions. In order to facilitate 
communication between the actors, specific organizational structures are created. 
This brief explanation of the issue-based paradigm can be further decomposed into 
a few important elements. 
Concerning the actors that enter political processes, they can be of different 
types: governmental, non-governmental (both domestic and international), quasi non- 
governmental, etc. " They are also considered to be interdependent actors, for the 
actions of each of them would eventually affect (to a lower or higher degree) other 
actors' behaviour. If one assumes that states are just one type of actor in global 
politics, more consideration has to be given to the emergence of political actors in 
general. Mansbach and Vasquez studied the process of development and decay of 
political actors and have subsequently offered a particular actor-emergence model. 
"The formation of a political actor occurs as a two-step process. The first is 
the decision among the deprived (potential members) to communicate with 
one another about the prospects of forming a group, and the second is the 
actual formation of an actor from among potential members. "91 
The status of an actor is A result of the actor's size, development, available 
resources and needs. Mansbach and Vasquez arguell that, concerning potential 
members of an actor, their status will condition the degree to which they feel value 
deprivation. The status will also shape their attitudes towards politics, those ranging 
from apolitical, antipolitical attitudes, to more active and participative attitudes. 
Finally, the status will define the availability of stakes that can be used to alleviate 
value deprivation. If communication occurs among potential group members, it can 
contribute to the growth of a sense of mutual relevance. This is exactly the political 
participation that can be eased or made more difficult depending on the 
organizational context. The actor's access to communication channels will crucially 
affect its position and the extent of possible support it can obtain. Finally, if the 
level of potential members' interdependence and similarity is adequately high, they 
will join to form a political actor. 
"Actor formation will take place only among those who perceive that they 
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have something to 'offer' one another which 'links their fates', and only if 
it appears that their joint contribution will aggregate sufficient resources so 
that there is a possibility of ameliorating their joint condition. "I 
So, what is actually in focus in the issue-based paradigm is how and why political 
actors perceive certain questions as being of a high importance for the realization 
(preservation) of their values. Usually, these final ends are considered to be highly 
abstract, because they symbolize general aspirations and are subjectively 
constructed. Therefore, the contention among political actors occurs over stakes, 
regarded as being instrumental for achieving abstract values. Sometimes, however, 
stakes can be abstract as well, if they relate to the actor's status or a general, 
desirable behaviour. 
P. Willetts offers a four-level analysis of this concept. For a single actor, 
perceived relatedness of political stakes forms an issue. 
"A political stake is a specific item of material or abstract value that has to 
be allocated by choice between two or more alternatives for social action. An 
issue consists of a set of political stakes that are perceived to be related to 
each other, by their each being salient for the realisation of the same value, 
in a specific situation. "' 
At a higher level of analysis, a group of actors forms an issue-system when they 
engage in 
"... contention over proposals for the disposition of stakes that each actor 
perceives as being salient to the same issue. 1,98 
Different issues can be aggregated to form an issue-dimension, if they are relevant 
for achieving the same value. If two or more dimensions seem related, for the 
underlying values belong within the same ideological framework that makes them 
interdependent 
-a hyper issue can be outlined. Accordingly, a wider issue-system 
encompasses a number of issues from the same dimension and a number of actors 
contending for the simultaneous disposition of stakes from these issues. Finally, 
contention among actors over proposals to sustain (back) a particular ideological 
framework (necessary for linking the values from different dimensions) forms a 
hyper-issue system. However, these analytical levels are theoretical constructs 
, 
that 
are not easily recognized and "justified" in reality. Perceptions, ideas and actions, 
as well as the actors themselves, cannot be divided by clear demarcation lines. 
Actors often engage in political processes regarding numerous and different issues 
and stakes, and a position and attitude taken towards one of them may well affect 
their stand on the rest of the matters. In the multi-centric world of today, these 
aggregations and interactions occur in a way rather different from those in the state- 
centric world. J. Rosenau underscores reciprocity as the central mode of the 
processes in the state-centric world, which is not the case in the multi-centric world. 
"In this world of complex issues, overlapping agendas, diffuse authority 
structures, and a shared right to initiate action, the actions of A directed to 
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B as often produce reactions by C directed to D as they do reactions by B. 
Thus, developments 
... 
move forward in an asymmetrical, crazy-quilt 
fashion, with the sequences of action being propelled from one system to 
another and from subsystems to other subsystems in the same and different 
whole systems. " I 
The aggregation of stakes and issues towards higher levels may be carried out 
in different ways. Sometimes, actors seek to achieve the same value, or at least 
perceive their goals as being based on a same single value. Sometimes, linkage of 
issues may be the result of the organizational context of a political process. As it 
was mentioned, the organization can facilitate the access to communication channels 
through which political actors express themselves and seek support. Many 
international organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) do not have 
a very limited agenda 
- 
they are concerned with a range of more or less related 
matters. Under these conditions, participating actors can link issues by bargaining, 
making concessions and compromising. Another type of linkage called "an actor 
linkage" can be developed if an actor's membership in the political system comes 
under question. The third type of linkage, a functional linkage, occurs when actions 
regarding different issues are interdependent: actions taken on one issue will 
necessarily affect actions on the others. The importance of these linkages will be 
highlighted later, when the analysis shifts to policy systems. 
So, the Issue-based paradigm should provide new analytical tools that differ 
(to a greater or lesser extent) from the frameworks offered by Realism, 
Functionalism and Structuralism. The Issue-based paradigm, with a permanent 
danger of oversimplification, could be exemplified as follows. 
Among other hyper-issues, such as human rights, conservation and 
development, a particular occurrence on the world-wide scale is the emergence of 
the global economy. Global integration was evident as early as the 1960s, but during 
the 1970s and 1980s this proved to be more than just a phase in world economic 
life. It has embraced a variety of developments, it has impinged upon almost all 
aspects of social life, it has created wide opportunities and even wider problems. So, 
the hyper-issue of global economy seems to consist of a number of issue- 
dimensions, like the dimension of honesty/justice, the dimension of welfare, the 
dimension of equality, etc. A range of different issues can be clustered within each 
of the dimensions, according to the same underlying value. The issues of (economic) 
security, fraud and money laundering are all relevant for the realization of the same 
abstract value 
- 
justice. From another dimension, the issue of efficiency and the 
issue of freedom v. order are both salient for achieving the value of welfare. Yet 
from another dimension, the issue of humanitarian warfare, the issue of aid and 
alike seem all interrelated for reaching the value of equality. Each of these issue- 
dimensions are also related to each other for the underlying values are perceived to 
be complementary and interdependent within the ideological framework of a global, 
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capitalist market economy. There can be no justice where there is no equality. To 
achieve the value of welfare it is necessary to provide security in all its aspects. 
Each of the mentioned issues consists of a set of political stakes that are 
under contention by groups of actors. For example, the issue of freedom v. order 
comprises a number of stakes such as: international/global economic coordination 
and cooperation, transborder supervision and control, information disclosure, 
harmonization of regulation, etc. Concrete stakes under contention within this issue- 
system are numerous and include, inter alia, consolidated supervision of 
multinational banks, reciprocal treatment of foreign banks, etc. The issue of 
efficiency might be considered to consist of political questions regarding the 
financial flows, global production, transfer of technology, etc. Again, there is a 
range of concrete stakes involved, like overexposure and capital adequacy of 
multinational banks, internationalization of domestic markets and its impact on 
national financial efficiency, etc. Some of these stakes will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
There are all sorts of political actors involved in dealing with these issues, 
some of which will be analyzed in the next chapter. Their attitudes and actions quite 
often overlap, due to existing linkages. For example, efforts to combat money 
laundering and to prevent fraud may be pursued by different actors, clearly linked 
for the realization of the same value 
- 
the value of justice. Debt-for-nature swaps, 
as a method of easing the debt burden of the Third World, are the examples of 
bargaining linkages. Outside the hyper-issue of global economy, an actor linkage is 
best exemplified by the "disputed" status of the PLO in international organizations 
such as the IMF. Finally, functional linkages are most widespread among the issues 
mentioned above. Debates around the issue of security (for example, the extent of 
financial safety nets for banks) haik a direct impact on political controversies about 
the efficiency of banks or their freedom to operate. 
The importance of issue-linkages is highlighted when it comes to the 
translation of aspirations (values) into more specific actions in the world of reality. 
As it was mentioned, issues are formed when political actors contend over the 
disposition of stakes, which are important for the realisation of the same single 
value. Actors enter communication channels to mobilise support for their position 
on issues, i. e. they enter organizational structures in order to influence the course 
of action (policy) regarding political alternatives under dispute. 
"A regular process within an organisation of taking decisions that are seen 
as being related is known as policy formulation. "" 
Functional issue-linkages contribute towards "grouping" two or more issues into the 
set of political questions that are going to be dealt with collectively. When these 
linkages are not direct or immediate (e. g. the link between a cut in national interest 
rates and a reform of the country's stock exchange system), they will eventually 
affect the outcome through the policy system which is 
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"... a group of actors in contention over proposals for the resolution of 
political questions that each actor perceives as being necessary for 
achievement of its own specific objective. ""' 
When two or more policies seem functionally related to each other, a policy-system 
expands and becomes a wider-policy system. If functional linkages are not created, 
bargaining or actor linkages may aggregate broad policies (functionally interrelated 
policies) into policy-packages. At this highest level, several sets of policies have to 
be negotiated simultaneously. Recalling the earlier example of the global economy, 
the highest level would present the policy-package for the global capital flows. On 
the one hand, a broad policy would aim at maintaining supervision and control over 
and beyond state borders. It would encompass a number of policies functionally 
interrelated: the policy towards risk-taking, the transparency policy, the policy for 
harmonization of regulatory supervision, the policy for money-laundering and fraud, 
etc. On the other hand, a second broad policy package would encompass all policy 
all'directed to efficiency promotion: the liberalization policy, the policy towards 
deregulation, the technology policy, etc. The policies from each of the broad aspects 
seem to be interrelated. For example, the policy towards harmonization of the 
regulation of capital flows can "confront" the policy towards financial deregulation, 
and only through bargaining and compromising between national regulators can this 
confrontation be surmounted. The policies within these two broad polims seem to 
be even more related, but on the functional basis: the policy to fight fraud and 
money-laundering heavily depends on the transparency policy (e. g. detailed 
information disclosure on a consolidated basis). Further down, the transparency 
policy embraces a number of functionally related political questions (choices), 
regarding how detailed the disclosure should be, how to structure organizations 
responsible for processing these disclosures, etc. All other policies also consist of 
numerous political choices for specific actions. 
For a group of actors, a policy-system includes actors and their contention 
to resolve political questions they perceive salient for their goals (objectives). A 
wider policy-system emerges when actors contend over the distribution of stakes 
from two or more different, but related, policies (Willetts, 1992). For example, the 
transparency policy-system includes banks, securities houses, financial funds, 
clearing and settlement organizations (on both the national and the international 
level), financial associations (on both the national and the international level), 
different national regulators (e. g. finance ministries and independent government 
agencies), regulatory commissions of international governmental organizations (like 
EC and OECD), and independent agencies and institutions (like the Group of Thirty 
and the Institute of International Finance). The transparency policy-system also 
includes, besides actors, all their relations and interactions, as well as policy 
outcomes of these processes. The transparency policy-system may be regarded as 
being a part of the wider policy-system of supervision and control. Banks, for 
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example, enter into contention over the concrete stake of the level of detail in 
information disclosure for several simultaneous purposes. This may be directed, 
among other purposes, towards risk-prevention, enhancement of market transparency 
and the fight against money-laundering. 
It is still a matter of theoretical uncertainty what is the mechanism that 
mediates between the ideological / perceptional sphere of "issues" and the 
teleological / behavioral sphere of "policy". One approach is offered by M. 
Bentham, in her work on the policy responses to drug-trafficking. " She develops 
the idea that the existence of norms provides the translation of issue-systems into 
policy-systems. Norms are described as durable patterns of behaviour, enforceable 
by authority but inferior to values. 
"Norms can be seen to come into existence because there is a high level of 
consensus over the values that the actors share. The conflict over values can 
be seen to form an issue-system of actors for whom the issue is salient, but 
no norm and therefore no regime is possible. But once we have elected to 
have our actions governed by recognized principles, we have abandoned 
values for norms. 11113 
It seems contradictory, at this stage of the analysis, that norms cannot emerge if the 
values are contested. For example, the priorities of banks and regulators can appear 
to be in collision to a significant degree, probably due to a different ordering of 
values to be achieved (preserved). Nevertheless, that was not the obstacle for certain 
arrangements to emerge in the field of banking regulation. More attention to this 
values 
- 
norms question will be paid in the following section. However, this points 
to the course of further analysis: there is a need to explain what intervenes between 
conceptions and actual behaviour (policy). 
5.3. Regime theory 
Academic interest in the concept and theories of "international regimes" 
began to rise in the mid 70s. At that time, it was obvious that the predominant 
theories and approaches to the study of international relations had already proved 
to be incapable of explaining undergoing changes. The Realist approach was unable 
to explain the increasingly complex and interdependent world. The Realist approach 
is based on the assumptions that states are coherent units and that they act 
independently in order to maximize their power, within an anarchic environment. 
Similarly, there was the inability of studies of formal international organizations to 
explain "new" forms of international cooperation. According to those studies, 
international organizations are established for the purpose of "making order" in an 
anarchic environment, membership in those organizations is limited, their structure 
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is highly institutionalized and formal. In addition, some particular disturbances that 
occurred in the first half of the 70s (oil shocks, the flood of petro-dollars, debt 
failures, attempts to coordinate monetary policy, etc. ) were clear signs that neither 
of the mentioned approaches was so useful any more. These limitations might be 
seen as the origins regime theories. 
5.3.1. General approaches 
Three main approaches can be identified, following S. Krasner's 
classification of writers'04, concerning the theories of international regimes. 
Firstly, under the label "conventional structuralism" (corresponding to 
classical realism) authors like Susan Strange do not accept the concept of regimes 
as being anything new or particularly useful and long lasting. 
"That concern with regime formation and breakdown is very much an 
America academic fashion 
... 
The current fashion for regimes arises 
... 
from 
certain somewhat subjective perceptions in many Amprican minds. One such 
perception was that a number of external shocks... had accelerated a serious 
decline in American power. A second subjective perception was that there 
was some sort of mystery about the uneven performance and predicament of 
international organizations. "" 
Theories of regimes are criticized as being too static and still state-centred, 
imprecise and value-biased, particularly underemphasizing domestic roots of 
international arrangements. They are seen as academic creations to show how, under 
declining-hegemony, arrangements could be made to minimize increasing damage 
and costs. 
Secondly, under the label "the Grotian approach", authors like D. Puchala, 
R. Hopkins and O. Young, point out that regimes have always existed in every 
important issue-area in international relations where a patterned behaviour can be 
identified. 
"Whenever there is a regularity in behaviour some kinds of principles, norms 
or rules must exist to account for it. Such patterned behaviour may reflect 
the dominance of a powerful actor or oligarchy rather than voluntary 
consensus among participants. But a regime is present. "" 
Thirdly, a sort of an academic "compromise" can be found under the label 
"modified structuralism" (corresponding to the neo-realist approach), that has been 
adopted by most authors. Here the basic assumptions of the realist approach are 
accepted but with some limitations. States are still the dominant actors, but under 
certain (restrictive) conditions independent state actions cannot provide optimal 
outcomes. So, regimes may arise (i. e. states have to give up, to a certain degree, 
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independent policies) when they have to cooperate for either of the two purposes: 
a) to ensure a particular outcome (pursuit of common interests, e. g. improvement 
of global trade flows), or b) to prevent a particular outcome (avoidance of common 
aversions, e. g. International Civil Aviation Organization, avoidance air-traffic 
collisions). 
"The dilemma of common interest occurs when there is only one 
equilibrium that is deficient for the involved actors 
... 
In order to solve such 
dilemmas and assure the Pareto-optimal outcome, the parties must 
collaborate 
... 
By contrast, regimes intended to deal with the dilemma of 
common aversions need only facilitate coordination. Such situations have 
multiple equilibria, and these regimes must assure neither a particular 
outcome nor a compliance with any particular course of action, for they are 
created only to ensure that particular outcomes to be avoided. ""' 
Although it has been perceived that these three general approaches differ in 
basic assumptions, it is clear that all the three have the "state" as a starting point 
and they analyze mainly inter-state relations. But if the classic Realist approach is 
left aside, regime theories can offer a broad range of variations, covering 
definitions, explanations for regime formation, basic characteristics and types of 
regimes. In order to illustrate various regime theories, this section will summarize 
the main ideas about regimes. 
5.3.2. Definitions 
Most of the authors that study regimes tend to offer their "own" definition 
of a regime, describing the nature and origins of regimes or just marking different 
accents onto existing definitions. The definitions can be broadly divided into two 
categories: more general descriptions of regime nature and origins, and rather 
elaborated definitions, including regime nature, purpose(s), basic variables, etc. 
Among the former, various authors identify regimes in various ways: with 
any regularity in behaviour (Puchala/Hopkins); with a set of principles and norms 
in a given area (Krasner); E. Haas describes regimes as artificial creations for 
making order; while Keohane and Nye refer to them as multilateral agreements 
among states. Some writers identify regimes as a mode of international governance 
in the absence of a supranational government in a given issue-system. For them, 
regimes are the most prominent manifestation of collective self-regulation, described 
as 
"the voluntary participation by states and other international actors in 
collective action to achieve joint gains or to avoid joint losses in conflictual 
or problematic social situations. ""' 
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Among the latter group of explanations, regimes are defined as mutually 
coherent sets of principles, rules and norms (accent on the regime's nature), or 
alternatively, as man-made arrangements for managing conflict in a setting of 
interdependence, to introduce particular orderings of values among parties (accent 
on the regime's origins and purposes). 
O. Young describes regimes as social institutions that govern the actions of 
those interested in specifiable activities. From the similar point of view, J. Ruggie 
explains regimes as a particular level of institutionalization, where a collective 
response is needed to a collective situation. '09 
From the complex interdependence "starting point", Keohane and Nye 
describe regimes as recognized patterns of practice that define the rules of the game. 
Keohane defines regimes as contracts that involve actors with longýterm objectives, 
who seek to structure their relationship in a stable and mutually beneficial way. 
Finally, one of the most frequently quoted definitions is Krasner's: 
"International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision- 
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
issue area. " "0 
He refers to principles as beliefs of fact and causation; norms as standards of 
behaviour, including rights and obligations; rules as specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for actions, and decision-making procedures as prevailing practices in 
achieving and implementing collective decisions. As much as this definition has 
provided inspiration, it has also provoked much dispute, particularly concerning the 
explanations of "principles" and "norms" and their relations to "values". This is 
especially important, because the linkage between issue-systems and policy-systems 
is crucially dependent on the values-norms relationship. 
The study of values is basically a philosophical one, and perhaps that is the 
reason why it has attracted so little attention among writers on international 
relations. The value, as a philosophical notion, belongs to the field of axiology or, 
more precisely, to axiological ethics. The latter is defined as the branch of 
philosophy (ethics) dealing primarily with the relative goodness or value of the 
motives and end of any action. "' An in-depth study of the philosophical writings 
on the notion of value goes far beyond the scope of this analysis, but certain 
theoretical findings are very instructive for regime theory. Theorizing about values 
in international relations cannot yield results unless it is based upon the original 
analytic roots. 
For 1. Kant, a value is a socio-cultural fact, which has its origin in the 
process of human self-reflection about the conditions of validity, conditions of 
authenticity of knowledge and legitimacy of action. "' F. Hegel goes further and 
develops the idea of the "objective mind", which relates to the process of making 
rationally-structured human communities. The rationality of life in a community is 
possible only after morality, based on general and necessary principles of the 
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subjective mind, is objectified as the mind system (order). So, all social institutions, 
such as the state, law, religion, are forms of this objective mind or mind order. "' 
These are the "classical" origins of many controversies about the nature of values. 
On one hand, values can be seen as deriving from social and psychological 
characteristics of human life (needs, interests, intentions, wishes, feelings, etc. ). 
These are the so-called heteronomous values. On the other hand, it is argued that 
values are independent, subjective expressions of the reality, derived from the 
content of the individual consciousness. These are the autonomous values, 
represented in an ever-lasting human struggle for freedom and self-determination. 
The two groups of values are seen as being in a constant conflict, for the 
heteronomous values accentuate the society (the community), and the autonomous 
values emphasise the individual. Accordingly, there are two types of choices: 
choices imposed by the social context, and autonomous choices. 114 
The heteronomous values are social norms that describe/prescribe what is 
desirable and what should be desired. The heteronomous values regulate satisfaction 
impulses in accordance with: 1) the order requirements of socio-cultural systems, 
and 2) the requirements for respecting other people's interests and the interests of 
the group (the society) as a whole. "' Understood in this way, values are needs, 
interests, feelings, preferences, motives and dispositions that originate from the 
motivational systems formed within the societies. So, values regulate desirable 
behaviour, to bring the individual's choice in accord with options that are useful to 
society. By the same token, values belong within the relational sphere and not to any 
object or subject. 
"Heteronomous values are social norms that regulate relations between the 
individual and production, nature, other individuals, 
... 
in a way that a 
widely-desired general behaviourial orientation is reached. ""' 
Even for K. Marx, the value is the relationship formed in the market 
between the seller and the buyer, in respect of the commodity that is traded. The 
two sides enter this relationship in order to come to an agreement upon the (quantity 
of the) value, each with their own system of valuation, preferences, motives, etc. 
Later in the 19th century, basically in the Neo-Kantian tradition, and in the 
20th century"', theories of value were further developed. It was argued that the 
whole (the world complexity) consisted of two parts: the factual part, and the part 
based on values that might be social values and universal values. C. S. Pierce and 
J. Dewey"' explain the essence of values in the pragmatic tradition, as making the 
choice between alternative goals, so that the most beneficial consequences are 
yielded. In this tradition, F. Kratochwill explains norms as bridges between ill- 
informed actors, in their search for common problem solution. 
"Interacting parties can often neither rely on a common history nor expect 
future gains through the use of tit-for-tat strategies. Precisely for that reason, 
it is the function of norms to fortify socially optimal solutions, against the 
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temptations of individually rational defections. ""' 
The analytical approach in axiology underscores the importance of linguistic 
structures, used to express preferences, decisions and choices of participants in the 
process of social communication. This intra-community communication leads to the 
development of universally-held values. 
A particular theoretical problem is how to relate values and facts to the world 
of reality, or how to derive "ought" from "is". According to J. R. Searle"', the 
link is the existence of "institutions" and "institutional facts". The latter is 
interpreted as basic facts that appear in a certain context (an institution), with 
constitutive rules concerning its functioning. From this perspective, the basic 
institutional fact is the language. This approach was recently further developed by 
F. Kratochwill, with his idea of the existence of three parallel worlds: the world of 
observational facts, the world of intentions and the world of institutional facts. "' 
This excursion into the field of philosophy was necessary in order to 
illustrate a variety of theoretical approaches and findings about values. However, 
it is evident that most of the writers neither strictly separate values and norms, nor 
confront them. It has to be mentioned, though, that axiological analysis very rarely 
enters the field of conflicting social choices and the practical efficiency of norms. 
It neither pays adequate attention to the difference between goals, interests and 
values, with respect to the different levels of abstraction and generalization. Related 
to this, axiological approaches do not offer an explanation how concrete stakes 
become instrumental for the realization of values. However, any theoretical analysis 
of values and its implementation within other scientific disciplines must at least 
"consult" philosophical theories. 
A particularly useful insight, that is often neglected, relates to the importance 
of communication and language for widely-shared values to emerge. Apart from 
pure philosophical theories, values and norms are also widely analyzed in sociology, 
psychology and theories of law. For the course of this study, it is very instructive 
how theories of law analyze values and norms, although this literature has hardly 
ever been consulted by International Relations' writers. 
Theories of values can be distinguished according to various criteria"', so 
values are sometimes ideas, independent of the social reality (Platonism, theology, 
phenomenology); values are also seen as the elements of the human nature 
(Aristotle, Kantianism, Naturalism), and values can be perceived as resulting from 
human activities (Nietzsche, pragmatism, Marxism, existentialism). A great number 
of particular values exists, such as: 1) socio-biological values (health, strength); 2) 
economic values (utility, profitability, economic stability); 3) scientific-educational 
values (truth, knowledge, objectivity); 4) religious values (sacredness, 
respectability); 5) political values (power, prestige, equality); 6) cultural values 
(beauty, creativity); 7) generic human values (freedom, love, rationality, dignity of 
life), and 8) values of social ordering. The last category is particularly important for 
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this study. Particular values of social ordering include morale, custom and legal 
values, and in their unity they provide disciplinary mechanisms for the society. 
Morale encompasses values of goodness, honesty, dignity, sincerity and loyalty. 
Custom values relate to different values, but usually cover sense of decency, respect 
for tradition, etc. Finally, legal values include values of justice, peace, safety and 
legality. Value of safety, as described by theories of law, is of a great importance 
for regime theories. Value of safety is described as the ideal of a total predictability 
of conditions and expectations related to social existence of individuals. 
From this aspect, norms are seen as basic techniques of social ordering or 
of exercising control. They are means of the compulsory qualification of behaviour 
and of its directing 
- 
by limiting, stimulating or preventing certain types of 
behaviour. The main purpose of norms is to provide maintenance of the system from 
which they originate. 12' From the aspect of law theories, there are three parallel 
social orders: custom order, moral order and legal order, so there are also three 
basic types of norms 
- 
custom norms, moral norms and legal norms 
- 
that forin. 
durable expressions of social consciousness. 
"Law does not perform a unique social function, nor is it a singular form of 
social control... Legal rules are only one of a number of systems of rules, 
often overlapping and entwined, which shape people's aspirations and 
actions. 11124 
Sometimes, these types of social norms are seen as forming normative social 
consciousness, i. e. the overall comprehension that there are certain values that 
should be protected by normative regulation of social behaviour. " Normative 
consciousness becomes particularly important when the existing norms (most often, 
legal norms) fail to follow the development of social needs, new problems and 
situations. For every norm, it is essential that the particular requirement (contained 
in the norm) is built in a wider/higher system of requirements. The latter is, in turn, 
dependent on: a) the actually accepted or assumed value, or b) the efficiency of the 
whole system of requirements. "' 
In contrast, rules consist of no requirements. They are prescriptive 
expressions/instructions about actions or behaviour that should be taken if a 
beneficial effect is to be achieved, or if a harmftil effect is to be avoided. 
Sometimes, however, law and legal order do not keep the pace with overall 
social and economic development. 
"Social processes including law seek to satisfy, above all, the psychological 
need for structure in people's lives... When society [state] fails to meet its 
members need for structure, law cannot achieve its immediate goal of 
promoting social cooperation. 11127 
When this kind of social situation occurs, other means and ways of structuring and 
organizing become dominant forces of social dynamics. Different social groups are 
formed, both within and across boundaries of existing legal orders, and dynamics 
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of these processes brings forward another type of norms called "group norms". 
Theoretical findings in the field of psychology of groups can significantly 
contribute to a better understanding how new forms of social organizing (including 
regimes as well) emerge and function. "' From this aspect, the group is defined 
as a social unit of participants whose status and roles are specified, which has its 
own system of values and norms that regulates participants' behaviour regarding the 
matters salient to the group. "' Factors underlying group formation include 
common goals, a feeling of group belongingness, the possibility of mutual 
influencing, and the existence of common norms. Group norms, often termed 
"group standards", regulate expected and typified behaviour of the group members. 
They also present a common acceptance of a prescription for perceiving, feeling, 
thinking and acting of the group members. "O Functions of group norms include, 
inter alia, guidance for action to achieve the group goals, provide orientation for 
evaluating members' behaviour and for the decision-making, and coordinate 
activities for conservation/preservation of the group. Group processes encompass the 
creation and acceptance of norms, cooperation and competition, coalition formation, 
settlement of intra-group conflicts, and decision-making process. The fundamental 
force in the creation of group norms, which is of a great importance also for regime 
theories, is a gradual convergence of the members' opinions, views and attitudes 
regarding group-salient matters. 
Having examined values and norms from such different aspects, the dispute 
in International Relations concerning the Krasner's categorization of the elements 
of regimes (principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedure), seems to be 
mostly exaggerated. It can be accepted that values can be viewed both as 
independent orientations and as socially-induced facts. Basic principles thus can be 
considered as forces (both autonomous and heteronomous) that "shape" values and 
norms. The relational nature of values is represented both through the existence of 
norms (in a broad, general context of a community or organization or a regime), 
and through rules and decision-making procedures (in a particular institutional 
context). Even more, the dispute over these four elements seems sometimes to be 
a form of over-theorizing ("Fart pour Fart"), for this approach has proved to be 
fairly instrumental and practically useftil in analyzing international organization in 
the real world. 
Defined either in a broad or in a more specific way, regimes have been 
criticized from the conventional structuralist approach. 
"At one extreme, regimes are defined so broadly as to constitute either all 
international relations or all interactions within a given issue-area. Such use 
of the term regime does no more than signify a disaggregated issue-area 
approach to the study of international relations, and so defined "regimes" 
have no conceptual status... 
At the other extreme, regimes are defined as international institutions. In this 
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sense, they equal the formal rules of behaviour specified by charters of such 
institutions 
... 
This formulation reduces the new international political 
economy to the old study of international organizations... ""' 
Just the contrary to this criticism, the usefulness of this broad range of definitions 
is directly derived from a Globalist "issue-area" approach (a multiplicity of actors, 
the relevance of norms, military power does not necessarily dominate, etc. ) and 
from the "international institution/response" approach (differs from formal analysis 
of international organizations). They have proved to be analytically useful, as they 
attempt to bridge the gap between the Realist concepts of anarchy and formal 
organizations. 
5.3.3. Regime formation 
Directly linked to this wide range of regime definitions, various explanations 
have been offered for regime formation. Generally, two basic approaches to the 
study of regime evolution (as well as to the study of any social phenomena) can be 
identified. First is the normative approach, usually recognized under the label 
"idealist". This kind of explanation mainly analyzes and specifies desirable regimes, 
i. e. how the world of international politics should be structured. For the purpose of 
this analysis it is more interesting to summarize the main achievements that belong 
to the second, empirical approach. 
1) Economic explanations link regime creation to two main factors: 
technological change and changes in supply and demand. Accelerated technological 
developments (particularly in the field of telecommunications and informatics) have 
formed the basis for different regimes to emerge (e. g. INTELSAT regime in the 
mid 70s). Related to that, surplus capacity or any other form of continuing market 
imbalance may be responsible for regime creation in a certain area (e. g. the "over- 
developed" electrical appliance industry in the EC gave way to intra-European 
specialization in this field). But, as such explanations can be useful only if one 
assumes that there is an ideal, perfect competition (market operates perfectly with 
no significant government/political interference), additional factors have to be 
included in the analysis of regime formation. 
2) Political explanations add to this more of the "state- reality" from the 
present world. If the model of perfect competition is a theoretical fiction (and it is), 
state policy, goals and instruments have also to be considered. Political explanations 
have been developed in two modes: the structural and the situational mode. 
The structural mode of political explanation refers to power as a crucial 
variable for regime creation. From the Realist perspective it is a global, overall 
power structure that influences a regime formation. Neo-Realists, on the other hand, 
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consider issue-specific power, i. e. power capabilities in a particular issue-area as the 
most important impetus for a regime creation. "' 
Situational mode explanations are usually labelled as functional theories of 
regime creation and change. According to them, regimes evolve in situations 
described as dilemmas: actors involved have to make choices between incompatible 
alternatives that have both desirable and undesirable consequences. 
"International politics scholars have pointed to the continual 'security 
dilemma' facing states in an anarchic international system: many of the 
means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of 
others. Economic theories of market failure and the 'free-rider' problem in 
the provision of collective goods analyze dilemma situations among economic 
actors. " "I 
Most of the mentioned explanations are essentially static: they take one or another 
factor as being crucial for regime formation, but without taking into the account 
changes of actors' goals 
-and changes in their learning. 
3) Cognitive explanations tend to overcome that static analytical framework. 
In addition to the factors already mentioned, they include the political process as a 
variable for regime creation. What is important is interaction between changing 
knowledge and perceptions and changing social goals. This particular kind of 
process is carried out through multilevel bargaining and on the basis of complex 
transnational and transgovernmental networks of relations among states. This kind 
of explanation is useful if the reality has been perceived as being one of "complex 
interdependence". 134 
To sum up, four different models can be marked out in explaining regime 
formation: an economic model, a structural model, a situational model and an 
international organization model. Accordingly, these explanations ask different 
questions for the study of regime evolution: a) what economic change leads to a 
regime's creation; b) what shifts in power create a new regime; c) which aspects of 
problem situations make governments choose collective action; and d) from what 
kinds of bargaining processes do agreements emerge? 
It is worth pointing out that only the last model puts more emphasis on the 
power as the command over outcomes rather than the command over resources. It 
does so by introducing dynamics through which initial causal variables are 
transformed into organizationally dependent variables, as the results from bargaining 
processes. 
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5.3.4. Purposes and functions 
Apart from the differences in regime definitions and in basic explanations 
about regime formation, it is clear that regimes are intervening structures (variables, 
in Krasner's words). This assertion needs to be clarified in more detail. Generally 
speaking, "intervening" relates to something occurring incidentally so as to modify 
or hinder the situation, or to something (legally) interposing and becoming a party 
to a suit pending between other parties. The attribute "intervening" may refer to the 
place that regimes occupy on the spectrum of international relations: they are 
created somewhere between the "sovereign-state" beginning and a "world-authority" 
end. The attribute also refers to the fact that regimes usually provide (if they are 
complied with) governance over the relations among participants in a given issue- 
system. The term "intervening" may also be related to the normative nature of 
regimes, which R. Keohane describes as being objectified by 
" 
... 
a persistent and connected set of rules that defines behaviourial roles, 
shapes activity and expectations, constrains the range of acceptable 
behaviour, and thus governs the relations among the participants. ""' 
Krasner's use of the term "variable" may have several explanations as well. 
Firstly, there is a need to stress the changeable (alterable) nature of regimes, as well 
as their adaptability. Secondly, the term may well point to the "dual" perspective 
that has to be taken in respect of a regime's functioning: it can be viewed both as 
an independent and dependent variable. A regime can be analyzed as emerging from 
basic constants (then it is the dependent variable), but also as a mode of organization 
with "a life of its own" (e. g. the impact of secretariats, or the durability and 
resistance to change even after some basic inputs have been altered). Thirdly, it can 
be argued that the use of the term "variable" aims at emphasizing the situation 
(international anarchy, absence of a global government) where a regime can induce 
a change: a common goal can be reached, or certain conflicts avoided. 131 
As regimes have been defined in so many various ways, so have essential 
purposes and functions as well. It has been suggested that regimes are created to 
provide a form of international authority, in the absence of any "world government" 
or a higher-than-state level of authority. There has been an ongoing process 
described as "the internationalization of domestic authority relations"Y' From 
another point of view, regimes are created for the purpose of managing conflicts 
that might arise under conditions of interdependence. Regimes can provide 
cooperative behaviour through building frameworks, institutions, norms, etc. 
In the same context, regimes are created for the purpose of achieving either 
collaboration or coordination. The main difference between these two types of 
cooperative behaviour is derived from the nature of the basic causal variable: the 
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collaboration requires joint efforts/work, while the coordination demands 
adaptation/synchronization of actions. If the actors have common interests they seek 
to realize, they need the collaboration with strict formalized behaviour (e. g. the 
SALT arrangements). If the actors have common aversions, the purpose of a regime 
might be to facilitate coordination where no international institutions are required 
(e. g. International Civil Aviation Organization). "' 
According to R. Keohane, regimes may be created (evolve) in order to 
facilitate important international agreements concerning particular problems. 
"Regimes may be thought of as intermediary normative frameworks which 
facilitate the making of substantial agreements in a given issue-area. "139 
It has also been suggested that regimes may be created in order to reduce 
infon-nation and transaction costs, or to enable involved actors to acquire new 
capabilities, technologies, skills, etc. "' Usually, the telecommunication and 
satellite regime under the INTELSAT is given as an illustration for these purposes. 
Under the leadership of the US, other countries have been given access to state-of- 
the-art telecommunication and satellite technologies; in turn, the US has been 
benefiting from the economies of scale, in using these expensive technologies. 
Furthermore, regimes may be formed in order to reduce risk and uncertainty. 
This is particularly the case if there are serious disruptions in basic functions that 
the market has to perform: interlocative, interpersonal and intertemporal functions. 
A classical example of this kind of market imperfection is when sudden cuts in 
supply occur (e. g. of raw materials). But apart from the examples in the field of 
international economics, plenty of evidence for the importance of inadequate 
information flows can be found in all other areas of international relations where 
negotiating and bargaining is crucial. 
"International regimes 
... 
perform the function of reducing uncertainty and 
risk by linking discrete issues to one another and by improving the quantity 
and quality of information available to participants... International policy 
coordination and the development of international regimes depend not merely 
on interests and power, or on negotiating skills of diplomats, but also on 
expectations and information... " I" 
Also, regimes may evolve in order to facilitate sharing of burden (costs) that 
may arise in relation to market disruptions. The International Energy Agency was 
established in 1974, after the lessons from the first oil shock, for a particular 
purpose: member countries would contribute to the Agency, which would in turn, 
in the case of oil supply disruptions, help countries to overcome related financial 
problems. 142 
So, if any general comments can be made, it is clear that regimes are created 
mainly for the purpose of framing and structuring actors' relations in a way that 
they can communicate and cooperate effectively. 
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5.3.5. Conditions for regime formation 
Throughout the literature, various (sets of) conditions have been suggested 
as being necessary, adequate or sufficient for a regime to be created. 
Globalists point out that regimes emerge when the interaction between the parties 
is not unconstrained or not based on 
-independent decision-making. If the 
assumptions of an interdependent world are accepted, decisions concerning 
international relations are made under various constraints. In order to achieve a 
certain level of command over the environment that influences those decisions, 
actors may decide to create or enter an existing regime. Although actors are not able 
to carry out absolutely independent policies, they can still benefit from the relations 
organized via regimes. 
On the other hand, Realists have been suggesting that the structure of power 
creates the conditions under which regimes will emerge. If the concentration of 
power (overall or issue-specific) is strong, the leader will tend to structure its 
envirom-nent through the creation of a regime according to its goals. The theory of 
hegemonic stability falls in this category: the stability and the maintenance of the 
Bretton Woods monetary regime until the 1970s was mainly related to an 
unquestionable hegemony of the US. 
Keohane and Nye offered several conditions that would lead to regime 
formation. Higher probability for emergence of a regime is derived from the 
absence of any authoritative governmental institution and the presence of high 
uncertainty in a particular area. If there is a lack of a clear legal framework for 
actions, combined with information imperfections and positive transaction costs, 
governments will incline towards making international agreements. The demand for 
regimes increases according to a high issue-density (a great number and importance 
of issues in a policy area), and to a strong need for high quality information. 143 
More in the Realist tradition, Krasner describes the conditi ons for regime 
creation as those preceding an essential restructuring in power relations. 
"Regime creation usually occurs at times of fundamental discontinuity in the 
international system, such as the conclusions of major wars... "'" 
From that point of view, the emergence of a new leader results from international 
conflict and this new leading state will push forward the creation of regimes (or 
transformation of existing ones) according to the new power structures. 
J. Ruggie has suggested that regimes are created when a collective response 
is needed to a collective situation. He outlined this by four analytical dimensions: 
the degree of politicization, the type of policy interdependence, the loci of policy 
interdependence and the distribution of interdependencies. "' So, when there is a 
high degree of politicization in particular issue-area, when there are various 
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contingencies and constraints, when the locus of interdependence is closer to 
domestic policy, then some sort of collective response will emerge, including 
regimes, epistemic communities and international organizations. 
5.3.6. Common theoretical questions 
Although regimes can be perceived in a number of different ways, it is 
possible to select a few characteristics that are more or less common to various 
regime theories. First of all, it has to be pointed out that regimes are, by their very 
nature, subjective, attitudinal phenomena. Puchala and Hopkins assign to them this 
feature because regimes "... exist primarily as participants' understandings, 
expectations or convictions about legitimate, appropriate or moral behaviour. " 146 
If regimes are described as intervening variables, their characteristics are derived 
from basic causal factors that had led to the regime's creation. Krasner identifies 
five basic causal variables: 1) egoistic self- interest (maximizing one's own utility), 
2) political power (either to secure optimal outcomes or to enhance values of 
specific actors), 3) norms and principles (indirectly linked to an issue, e. g. Calvinist 
religion and the rise of capitalism), 4) usage and custom (regular patterns of 
behaviour or long-standing practice) and 5) knowledge (consensual, widely accepted 
and shared). So, if regimes intervene between these variables (or any combination 
of them) and outcomes/behaviour, they must not be based solely on short-term 
interests and must incorporate some sense of a general obligation. 
M. Zum offers an another causal variable to this list 
-a regime-conducive 
foreign policy- 141 This variable is particularly instructive for the purpose of the 
analysis: therefore it will be examined more closely. (Although this discussion may 
belong to the section concerning the conditions for regime creation, this variable 
will also significantly affect the characteristics of a regime. ) Zurn. distinguishes 
between "positional properties" (an actor's characteristics relative to other actors), 
and "non-positional" properties of an actor. The latter refers to characteristics of the 
state concerning its society, economy, decision-making processes and its decision- 
makers, which may influence foreign policy. A particular mixture of these 
characteristics, in combination with a particular foreign-policy conduct (behaviour), 
will significantly affect regime creation. It is also true for preventing regimes being 
created. 
A country will be active in creating a regime, if a) it has a competitive 
economy, with a high dependence on foreign trade; b) it is strongly entangled in 
international institutions; c) if the state is moderately strong, with a strong social 
democratic electorate; d) a change in the domestic power constellation occurs, 
concerning both the governing coalition and public opinion, and e) when the degree 
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of institutionalization (commitments, resources) of the existing policy is not very 
high. These characteristics would have to be accompanied by the "faithful voice" 
policy type: the state should be inclined to use international institutions actively, 
with an orientation towards reciprocity and one-sided concessions. 
Regimes are, also, dynamic institutions, meaning that they are sensitive to 
changes from within and from the outside world. Changes may be of a different 
weight, in respect to which regime part is undergoing changes. Krasner argues that 
changes in the rules and decision-making procedures are the changes within the 
regime, compared to the changes of the principles and norms that present changes 
of the regime itself. 
Besides being dynamic creations, regimes can have a relative autonomy and 
a life of their own. Basic explanations for this regime feature are related to different 
degrees of sensitivity to changes for causal variables and for a regime itself. 
Namely, once a regime has been created, adjustment to changes in causal variables 
is usually made through changes in rules and decision-making procedures. Basic 
causal variables, that led to a regime's creation, are constantly changing; contrary 
to that, regime principles and norms are more durable. This relative autonomy of 
regimes is related to the existence of lags (regime components exercise their own 
impact on outcomes) and feedback (regime can even alter basic in-put variables 
- 
calculations of costs and gains, interests, etc. ). As Keohane and Nye have put it, 
what is important is not the initial distribution of capabilities and interests, but 
organizationally dependent capabilities (developed through the process of bargaining 
within a regime). "' 
Another important characteristic of regimes is related to their stability, 
usually analyzed through the degree of compliance with their rules. However, as 
regimes are intersubjective phenomena, more importance has to be attached to the 
ontological side of the problem. The characteristic of being more or less stable 
should be evaluated (measured) from the aspect of a regime's ability to create 
conditions for the continuation of expectation convergence. 
"The key theoretical issue for regime stability is not whether the form of co- 
operation 
- 
the particular mix of procedures and rules 
- 
continues, but 
whether the fact of norm-governed co-operation continues. " "I 
The continuation of expectation convergence, or regime stability, critically depends 
on the degree of institutionalization. This is the process by which norms and rules 
are evaluated and their legitimacy acquired. R. Smith'10 offers four measures of 
institutionalization: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and unity. So, a regime will 
be more stable 
- 
its underlying norms will be widely accepted and complied with 
- 
if 1) it is more adaptable to passage of time, new functions and new challeng es; 2) 
it has hierarchically and functionally related subunits to deal with particular issue- 
aspects or concrete stakes; 3) it can exercise control over the entry of new political 
actors and over the behaviour of the politically most active members, and 4) its 
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ultimate purposes do not reflect preferences of just one actor or a group of actors, 
but resemble the fundamental unity of members concerning the regime's ends and 
means. 
Another significant regime characteristic relates to the voluntary nature of 
this type of international organization. The compliance with rules does not stem 
from a hierarchical process that sets norms and rules, neither it is backed up by the 
threat or the use of force. The compliance with a regime originates from the 
legitimacy the norms and rules acquire, as described above. The rules become 
binding in the sense that they provide the convergence of expectations and the 
governance of behaviour. In the words of Parsons and Shils, a regime exists 
"... when each actor in the situation does, and believes he should do, what 
the other actors whom he confronts believe he should do. " "I 
So, regimes are intersubjective creations and their characteristic depend 
primarily upon basic causal factors, i. e. upon a particular mix of them. A regime 
that is essentially the exercise of a dominant state's power, pursuing its own self- 
interest, will certainly feature characteristics different from those of a regime 
created on the basis of widely accepted knowledge, or long-standing usage and 
custom. Nevertheless, regimes are far from being static arrangements: a prerequisite 
for their survival is constant adaptability. In addition, they are characterized by a 
significant (but not an absolute) degree of voluntariness that makes regime norms 
and rules legitimate. 
5.3.7. Types of regimes 
Different theorists stipulate different conditions and criteria for identifying 
types of regimes. According to functions, regimes can be specific or diffuse. In 
respect of monitoring surveillance, they can be formal or informal. Regimes can go 
through an evolutionary or revolutionary change, depending on changes in basic 
causal variables. Concerning the nature of their basic principles and norms, regimes 
can be more or less biased about the distributional effects. 
In order to illustrate these different types of regimes, Puchala and Hopkins 
give the comparison of the colonial regime (as being difftise, informal, value-biased 
regime that underwent revolutionary changes) and the present food regime (as being 
more specific in function, rather formal, more generally rewarding and undergoing 
evolutionary changes). 
O. Young argues that regimes may differ according to the role of conscious 
coordination among actors. From that point of view, regimes can be spontaneous, 
negotiated or imposed. Spontaneous regimes evolve through coordinated behaviour 
among actors but without any "social engineering" or design and-they even do not 
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require (a priori) explicit consent from the actors. Negotiated regimes are, on the 
other hand, based on a consciously coordinated behaviour and actors' efforts to 
reach an agreement on crucial matters. Therefore, they are characterized by formal 
structures and actors' explicit consent. Negotiated orders may occur in several types 
- 
constitutional (Antarctica regime), legislative bargains (UN plans for Palestine), 
comprehensive (the UN Law of the Sea Convention) or partial orders (some aspects 
or parts of an issue to be regulated according to practice and precedent). Finally, 
imposed regimes are created by dominant powers who possess adequate capabilities 
to compel subordinated actors to conform. Imposed regimes can also occur in 
different types, as "overt hegemony" (the dominant power creates institutional 
arrangements in an explicit way and forces subordinates to conform to them), or in 
a type of "de facto imposition" (the dominant actor promotes favourable 
arrangements using manipulation of incentives). 152 
As examples, it is possible to compare a) 1973-75 policy coordination among 
major central banks, in the absence of any "governing" regime (a spontaneous 
regime); b) 1976 formal agreements to amend IMF Articles of Agreement (a 
negotiated regime), and c) IMF structural adjustment in the 1980s (an imposed 
order). 
Keohane suggests that regimes can be broadly divided into two types, 
according to the nature of functions they perform: control oriented regimes (GATT) 
are created for the purpose of maintaining some degree of control over each other's 
behaviour; an insurance-type regime (International Energy Agency, STABEX, etc. ) 
is formed in order to share risks and to cope jointly with uncertainty, as well as 
sharing of related costs. 
Regimes may also vary according to the type of political actors that form a 
regime, so there are international regimes and transnational regimes. International 
regimes are usually considered as being created by or among state actors, including 
states and international governmental organizations. However, there are a -few 
examples of corporate actors (the sovereignty-free actors in Rosenau's words) 
entering the process of self-organization and successfully carrying it out. The Seven 
Sisters regime for oil in the 1970s, and the Lloyd's regime on war risk insurance 
for shipping in the 1930SI53 fall into this category. 
"All kinds of organizations with the purpose of defending or promoting 
functionally-defined interests in the international realm are in principle able 
to implement relatively stable forms of co-operation in the pursuit of their 
interests. If international non-governmental organizations interacting in an 
issue-area agree upon principles, nonns, rules and decision-making 
procedures in order to regulate their interactions, one can speak of 
transnational regimes. ""' 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to these non-state actors in 
International Relations, particularly bearing in mind a growing interdependence and 
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a high politicisation of economic issues. A prominent exception in this respect is S. 
Strange, who consistently puts forth the importance of the business sector for the 
development and conduct of modem economies. She argues that the world reality 
is based on four structures: the security structure, the production structure, the 
financial structure and the knowledge structure. Even though S. Strange takes the 
conventional structuralist approach to regimes, she explains the financial structure 
as 
the sum of all the arrangements governing the availability of credit plus 
all the factors determining the terms on which currencies are exchanged for 
one another. 11155 
It is clear that "the markets" (or other-than-state actors) are not just the background 
for state action, but they actively take part in "the sum of arrangements", and 
sometimes even significantly effect state policy (on both a national and international 
level). 
Although they might seem quite different and separable, international regimes 
and transnational regimes tend to overlap. If one assumes that the former belong to 
the state-centric world and the latter to the multi-centric world, the links between 
the two types of international organization may well indicate the ftiture course of 
international relations development. As Rosenau puts it 
"... this nexus of the two worlds is a prime arena wherein clashes occur 
between the past and the present, between the tendencies toward 
decentralization and those toward centralization, between the diminished 
relevance of force and the growing stress on increased shares of the global 
market. 11156 
To sum up, the most important regime feature, accounting for the 
differentiation among various types, is the level of institutionalization, explicitness 
and formalism. So, on one hand, regimes can be highly institutionalized, with 
explicit rules and widespread membership (Bretton Woods monetary regime). On 
the other hand, regimes may evolve as less institutionalized and less explicit orders 
that require no formal arrangements, written agreements or such like (the Seven 
Sisters oil arrangements). 
5.3.8. An example: balance-of-payments rinancing 
In order to summarize the main elements of regime theories, it is useful to 
conclude with a particular example, namely with the regime governing access to 
balance-of-payments financing. 
According to Keohane and Nye"', the post-war international monetary 
regime was based on fixed exchange rates, the dollar and gold as. the reserve assets 
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and on a moderate level of control over international capital movements. Among 
related issues, it was established that the international financial institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank) would create an adequate volume of international liquidity to 
support balance-of-payments financing and economic adjustment or investment for 
development, respectively. Or, to put it another way, 
"... the scope of the international monetary system concerns the terms on 
which national currencies are traded for each other (which influences the size 
of imbalances), the assets used to finance those imbalances and the 
arrangements governing when and how imbalances should be adjusted. ""' 
Referring to Krasner's definition, four defining elements can be outlined in 
this example. The basic regime principle would be that the nations should be assured 
of an adequate, non-automatic, supplementary financing for balance-of-payments 
deficits. Regime norms were formally articulated by the Articles of Agreement 
establishing the IMF and they covered both the rights and the obligations of the 
member states: they have the right to obtain additional resources within quota limits, 
but they also have the obligation to carry out national policies consistent with the 
IMF's orientation. Regime rules were derived from the IMF's prerogative of 
conditionality, especially concerning the upper credit tranches. Decision-making 
procedures included negotiating with visiting missions of IMF staff and review by 
the Executive Board, with provisions for voting in the Board, to determine amounts 
of resources available. 
Concerning the regime's creation, it was possible to identify some of basic 
causal variables that account for regime formation. The self-interest of actors was 
obviously present, for they all wanted to be assured of an adequate source of 
liquidity. Knowledge related to previous financial crashes was also present and 
shared: the "gold shortage" of the 1920s and the financial chaos of the 1930s were 
too well remembered. Among norms and principles that led to the regime creation 
the most important were need to avoid international economic rivalry, the desire to 
maintain full employment and, to a lesser extent, maintenance of the principle of 
sovereignty of states. Political power, as the causal variable, had a particular impact 
in the process of negotiating the regime's frame and structure: specific rules and 
institutional arrangements were developed according to the preferences of the United 
States (e. g. countries would not have an automatic access to financing, votes were 
directly related to quotas, etc. ). The variable "regime conducive foreign policy" 
could be also identified. The US was "eager" to establish the regime, for its 
economy was unquestionably the most competitive one, it heavily depended on 
international transactions, it was very active in the international organizations and 
public opinion (as well as the government) was certainly in favour of the creation 
of the regime. The only suggested variable that it is not possible to identify is 
"usage and custom", because the regime included an entirely new international 
economic organization. 
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The maintenance of the regime could be attributed to more or less stable 
demand/supply relations (in this particular area) during the 1950s and 1960s. Within 
this period, the need for balance-of-payments financing was generally within limits 
of the resources available, and there were no alternative ("competitive") sources of 
supplementary finance. The development of central bank swap lines and bank credits 
and the formation of the European Payments Union and the G-10 can be considered 
as modifications of the regime. 
With respect to the regime's purposes and functions, it is obvious that the 
regime governing access to balance-of-payments financing was created to provide 
cooperative behaviour, or to put it more precisely, to provide collaboration in order 
to achieve common goals (the stability of international monetary relations), but also 
for the purpose of regulating national actions (for economic policies to be in the line 
with the IMF's objectives). 
Regarding the conditions for regime formation, post-war international 
monetary problems could be analyzed as a collective situation. Bearing in mind the 
analytical dimensions of a collective situation (Ruggie, 1975), the conditions for this 
particular regime's creation could be described as being highly politicized; a type 
of policy interdependence was a combination of contingencies and deprivation 
(individual state's policies could raise uncertainties for the others or even deprive 
them of adequate liquidity resources); the locus of policy interdependence was very 
close to domestic monetary policies, as there was a great need for additional 
finance; finally, distribution of interdependencies emphasized existing asymmetries 
concerning the issue-specific power. As it has been suggested by J. Ruggie, the type 
and locus of policy interdependence taken together give a measure of the intensity 
of a collective situation. In this particular example, as it included close links with 
domestic policies and even deprivation, the post-war international monetary 
"envi ronment" can be described as having been a collective situation of a high 
intensity. So, the Bretton Woods monetary regime was created as a collective 
response to that situation. 
In addition, several other conditions existed that increased the demand for 
the regime's creation: there was no higher authoritative institution in that area; there 
was a growing uncertainty about international monetary "management" and a lack 
of a clear legal framework for actions. 
Finally, conditions for the regime's creation can be analyzed also from the 
hegemonic, stability "point of view": the conclusion of the Second World War 
resulted in an explicit acceptance, on behalf of the US, of a burden to provide a 
collective good (monetary stability). 
Concerning the meniioned regime characteristics, this regime has certainly 
proved to be more than an ad-hoc arrangement and not to be based solely on short- 
term interest. Long-term international monetary stability and predictability of 
monetary developments have been desired both by the creditors and by the 
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borrowers. It has also embodied a sense of general obligation, for the member 
countries had to conduct adequate policies. Finally, it has proved to be a dynamic 
institution, particularly since 1973. 
The last characteristic deserves special attention, because changes that have 
occurred in the regime induced different, opposed explanations, concerning the 
current situation in the international monetary system. 
As the oil prices began to rise in late 1973, serious disturbances developed, 
both on the demand side (an increased need for additional financing of oil-importing 
countries) and on the supply side (limited IMF resources, the abundance of petro- 
dollars, the explosion of private financial markets, etc. ). 
"The private banking system took over the functions proper to an official 
institution possessed of the power to finance balance-of-payments 
disequilibria through credit-granting and to create international 
liquidity. "I" 
Later on in the 1980s problems started to emerge when debtor countries 
faced serious difficulties in servicing external debt. So, private banks had to turn 
again to the IMF, to obtain the right to demand changes in the economic policy of 
11sovereign states": credit would be granted only after an adequate stabilization or 
adjustment programme for the country was accepted by the IMF. 
Regime theorists suggest that changes of the rules and decision-making 
procedures are changes within the (same) regime, contrary to the changes in the 
principles and norms that lead to change of the regime itself. Changes in the rules 
and decision-making procedures in this particular case have certainly occurred: 
bargaining had to include private banks as well; a new policy of conditionality was 
introduced in 1979; there have been increases in quotas and the repayment periods 
have been extended; several new facilities have been created (e. g. the Oil Facility, 
the Extended Fund Facility, the Supplementary Fund Facility, etc. ). Those changes 
are perceived as not changing the regime, as they are not related to basic principles 
and norms. 
Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that the basic principles are still the same 
(welfare benefits of the "managed" international economic relations), it is still 
doubtful if the basic norm remained unchanged. Namely, if it consists of the rights 
and obligations of the member countries related to the access to balance-of-payments 
financing, the regime itself could not provide the basis (i. e. required resources) for 
the right to be consummated. The regime (the IMF) could, at best, give an approval 
for the right to be exercised. 
To sum up, the regime governing access to balance-of-payments financing 
has existed, it has been of a specific type, very formal and highly institutionalized; 
it could be located somewhere between negotiated and "overt hegemony" orders 
because of the heavy specific weight of the US involvement in its creation. It has 
undergone changes, but one may dispute whether have they been of an evolutionary 
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or a revolutionary nature, i. e. whether the basic underlying principles and norms are 
still the same or a new regime has evolved. 
As this survey of regime theories has revealed, it is still not possible to draw 
any general conclusions about their validity and theoretical consistence. Neither it 
is possible to outline a general regime theory, for theoretical assumptions and 
conclusions both still vary to a significant extent. However, regime theories have 
certainly proved their usefulness in analyzing this complex and changing world of 
today. The insights offered concerning (inter alia) the co-existence of various actors, 
goals and policies, definitely put more light on international relations. Moreover, 
as new types of actors and new types of problems increasingly draw theoretical 
attention, regime theories may evolve as a framework for better understanding of 
world politics. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, regime theories still seemed vague and under- 
elaborated. Yet, their perspective is wide open because the gap between the 
extremes of the Realist view and of the idealist one is broader than ever. If the 
hierarchical power-based order is in a state of decomposition, and if there is still a 
long way to a world society, a theoretical challenge exists to explain why and how 
"the games" are played today. 
This lengthy theoretical introduction to the field of International Relations 
aimed at clarifying two aspects of the analysis. Firstly, in order to achieve 
analytical consistency and draw sustainable conclusions, a definable set of theoretical 
postulates has to be adopted. The assumptions brought forward by the Globalist 
perspective seem most adequate among the four paradigms of international relations. 
The whole first part of the analysis (Chapters 1 to 4) is actually the justification for 
taking this particular perspective. The first part portrayed the complex nature of the 
global securities market, in respect of its manifestations and functions, different 
types of participants and attitudes, etc. The global securities market has emerged as 
a new phenomenon in the world political economy. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the "classical" perspectives on international relations (primarily Realism and 
Structuralism) could not properly "embrace" it. The rigidity of their basic 
assumptions proved to be a theoretical obstacle that could not be surmounted, even 
with later modifications of the original models. It is exactly the "eclectic" nature of 
the Globalist perspective which makes it theoretically useful for analyzing issues 
such as the global securities market. 
Secondly, the concept of issues offers very important insights for establishing 
a proper methodological approach to current world phenomena. As the few 
examples from the fourth chapter have underscored, relations in the modem world 
are not quite straightforward 
- 
not even in the domain of basic economic processes 
and determinants. Concrete political decisions, on all levels of political reality, are 
just the outcome of ongoing processes of communication, negotiation and 
bargaining. They are derived from and they impinge upon various aspects of social 
79 
life. How and when the political agenda is going to be formulated, which issues and 
stakes are going to be perceived salient, why other-than-state actors are becoming 
important, and other questions like these cannot be neglected any more. Particularly 
this is the case if the theory has to explain governance networks that emerge in 
response to complex interdependence. So, the Globalist theoretical postulates and 
the issue-concept will be combined in the regime theory tradition. This will be done 
so, in order to examine the existence of structures, principles and norms, that is a 
regime, in the field of global capital flows. 
So far, it has been described from which perspective the analysis will start, 
how the analysis will examine the phenomenon, and which theoretical hypotheses 
are going to be tested. In this way, a sustainable analytical framework is outlined. 
The rest of the analysis will focus on the content of this structure. 
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CHAPTER SIX: POLICY COMMUNITY FORMATION 
One of the distinctive characteristics of modem economic phenomena is that 
they can be neither properly examined nor understood using analytical postulates and 
instruments strictly "confined" to economic theory. The current stage in the world 
economic development, as it has been outlined in the introduction to both second 
and third chapter of this study, necessarily requires a complex analytical approach 
to be taken. This implies, besides picturing the quantitative and qualitative "surface" 
of a phenomenon, bringing into the analysis some other aspects of the very same 
phenomenon 
- 
political, sociological, psychological, legal and other aspects. So far, 
the analysis has portrayed the global securities market as to its main roots and 
components, including the coverage of the major types of actors participating in the 
market. In addition, the previous two chapters have presented some of the 
theoretical and empirical justifications for taking this "extended" approach to the 
global securities market. 
Following the choice of Global Politics as the paradigm within which this 
phenomenon will be analyzed, the attention will now focus on concrete political 
actors. This part of the study does not aim at listing and analyzing all actors that 
have emerged on the scene. The effort will be made to point to several central 
actors whose activities predominantly shape the debate about the global securities 
market. 
As it has already been underscored, what distinguishes world phenomena of 
today is the multiplicity and great diversity of actors in political processes. Contrary 
to the previously held theoretical views, states (goverm-nents) are not the only actors 
in international politics. Furthermore, they are not fundamental in their influence to 
the extent they had been before. The world political scene of today features many 
changes in types of actors, their relations and structures, issues that are raised, etc. 
J. Rosenau has labelled this "post-international politics". 
"It is a shorthand for the changes wrought by global turbulence; for an ever 
more dynamic interdependence in which labour is increasingly specialized 
and the number of collective actors thereby proliferates; for the centralizing 
and decentralizing tendencies that are altering the identity and number of 
actors on the world stage; for the shifting orientations that are transforming 
authority relations among the actors;... "160 
In the case of the global securities market, many types of political actors take 
an active part in the process 
- 
national associations of bankers and securities dealers, 
international associations of stock exchanges, international governmental 
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organizations, and international non-govemmental organizations. For each of these 
actor categories a few concrete examples will be presented, in order to illustrate 
typical structures, attitudes and activities. Although a general framework for 
analyzing these different actors was presented in the previous chapter (see the 
subsections on the Globalist perspective and on the concept of issues, particularly 
pages 48-49 and 53), further theoretical refinements need to be made before 
particular types of actors are exemplified. 
6.1. Political actors in theory 
One of the crucial components of the Issue-Based paradigm is that, contrary 
to Realism, groups are seen as basic political actors. Mansbach and Vasquez define 
a political actor as 
"any individual or group that seeks to enhance its value satisfaction through 
making, or contending over, proposals for the authoritative allocation of 
values. " "I 
So, a group of individuals joins together on the basis of the feeling of value 
deprivation, and they organize their activities in order to use the political system to 
alleviate this deprivation. Nevertheless, the formation of a political actor is neither 
a simple nor a straightforward process. Before the actual actor formation, potential 
members must decide to communicate with other individuals or groups perceived 
as being in the same situation, or experiencing the same deprivation. Furthermore, 
even if they decide to enter the communication, they have to be able to do so 
-a set 
of conditions must be created to provide effective communication. 
As it has already been described, the most important factor in the first phase 
(i. e. for the decision to communicate) is the status -of an actor. It is itself the 
outcome of a particular interplay of three variables: 1) the perception of value 
deprivation; 2) attitudes towards politics (marginal interest in politics / more 
attention paid to politics /a sense of political efficacy); and 3) the availability of 
stakes for disposal. So, for example, a higher status actor would actively participate 
in the political system, it would feature higher skills and level of sophistication, it 
would be more aware of available stakes, but it would also have higher aspirations 
and eventually seek a greater value satisfaction. 
The next important factor in the formation of a political actor is the 
organizational context, which can be described as a complex of conditions that 
determines the levels and modes of communication between potential members, their 
participation and access to the agenda, as well as joint functioning. Two other 
factors are also significant for an actor to be created: the level of interdependence 
and of similarity between potential members. It is not just a feeling of the same 
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"fate" (or mutual suffering and affective bonds) that brings potential members 
together. It is also a state of interdependence between them, related to the situation 
when members need each other's resources to alleviate or prevent their joint value 
deprivation. 
What distinguishes a group of individuals from an organization is the 
emergence of the intra-group division of labour and roles, the development of rules 
of procedure and the definitions of rights and obligations. "' This can also be seen 
as a distinction between micro-political-actors (such as citizens, public officials, 
leaders of organizations and private individuals) and macro-actors 
- 
collectivities. 
"Collectivities are actors in the sense that they have authority structures and 
other mechanisms for sustaining the coherence and coordination of their 
members, and for maintaining the boundary distinction between themselves 
11163 and their environments... 
Among these collectivities, the most important types of political actors are states 
- 
governments, subgroups (economic groups, local governments, agencies, etc. ) and 
transnational organizations (transnational economic entities, international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations). 
Different typologies of political actors have been developed, emphasizing 
various sets of criteria. Some of them have already been mentioned in the previous 
chapter, but more elaboration is needed here. Among major actors in the global 
systems, Willetts includes: individual people, technical and professional groups, 
transnational industrial and financial companies, the government ministries and 
agencies, and various types of international organizations. The latter encompass: a) 
IGOs 
- 
intergovernmental organizations (with membership limited to governments, 
but with a varying type and scope of links to the environment); b) INGOs 
- 
international non-governmental organizations (with members other than the 
governmental ones, but with a varying degree of reliance on government funding), 
and c) Iquanqos 
- 
international quasi non-governmental organizations (with mixed 
membership of both governmental and non-governmental organizations). 164 
Mansbach and Vasquez underscore four basic types of political actors, 
according to the criterion of the group coalescence / fragmentation. These four basic 
types are unitary actor, coalition, faction and competing actors. "' Three essential 
variables that account for qualitative differences among the four types are members' 
psychological attitudes, group organization and the nature of intra-group 
communication. The first variable encompasses members' satisfaction / 
dissatisfaction with the group norms, group performance and internal interactions. 
So, a unitary actor would be characterized by a significant level of trust and long- 
term commitments, deriving from outstanding positive group achievements. On the 
other hand, a competing actor would feature feelings of hostility and distrust among 
members. 
The second variable for the actor differentiation relates to the group 
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organization. Some actors are more hierarchically organized (the elitist activity, 
strict lines of authority and division of roles among members, etc. ), while others are 
perceived as being more egalitarian. In the latter case, the whole membership is 
more active, affectivebonds are easily developed, and organization channels are 
more open for participation and flow of communication through all levels. 
The third variable that account for differences among actors is the nature of 
their communication. Certain groups display frequent or continuous communication 
that stimulates the development of understanding, common ideas and positions 
toward matters at stake. Furthermore, "positive" communication and frequent 
contacts activates the process of institutionalization of members' behaviour and 
roles. 
J. Rosenau goes further beyond the simple identification of actors on the. 
global scene, which requires the evaluation of an actor's effectiveness (the authority 
it exercises, andthe loyalty it receives) and its ability to initiate and sustain actions 
with repercussions beyond country boundaries. 
"While actors may act to preserve or promote particular values, we must 
often look beyond actors and their capabilities and values to the 
consequences of their actions for consensus formation, systemic structure, 
and a host of other analytic implications that are far removed from those 
who undertook the actions. " '16 
So, after identifying important actors on the scene, one must focus on a number of 
analytical aspects of the actors, such as their orientations, structures, hierarchies and 
processes. 
One of the most important characteristics that differentiates political actors 
is their ability to adapt to a constantly changing environment, but at the same time 
preserving the internal integrity. Rosenau highlights four basic modes of adaptation: 
1) acquiescent adaptation (a "status quo" adaptation); 2) intrasingent adaptation (an 
actor tries to shape the environment to itself); 3) promotive adaptation (an actor tries 
to create a new equilibrium between itself and the environment), and 4) preservative 
adaptation (to preserve the existing equilibrium between itself and the environment). 
These four modes of adaptation have been identified, inter alia, as to an actor's 
attitudes toward new policies, toward other actors and toward changes, toward 
norms and institutions of the state-centric world, toward making formal agreements 
and coalitions with other actors, etc. 167 
Typical actors featuring promotive adaptation are governments of 
superpowers", ideological political parties, transnational corporations and 
professional societies. Their scope of external concerns is global and they frequently 
adopt new policies toward other actors. They rarely enter into formal agreements 
with other actors, but very often make coalitions. Usually, they have developed a 
sense of political efficacy, i. e. th--y are inclined toward manipulating the political 
system. The promotive orientation also includes extensive efforts to develop new 
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markets and new allies. 
The preservative mode of adaptation is often an attribute of bureaucratic 
agencies, international organizations, subnational governments, pragmatic political 
parties and most governments. The scope of their concern with external events 
varies from case to case, as well as their attitude toward making coalitions. They 
do not change their policies very often, but try to accommodate to "superior" actors. 
As Rosenau sees it, the norms and institutions of the state-centric world (i. e. the 
intergovernmental world) predominate. These actors develop favourable attitudes 
toward formal agreements with other actors, but the quest for reciprocity underlies 
the development of new markets and allies. 
The acquiescent mode of adaptation is characteristic for weak "satellite" 
governments and refugee groups. The fourth mode, intrasingent, is most often a 
feature of ethnic groups, labour unions and pariah governments. As the involvement 
and the importance of these two groups of actors in global financial issues are rather 
limited, their characteristics will not be examined here. 
The purpose of this introduction was to emphasize a number of 
characteristics which has to be included in the analysis that follows. The analysis of 
each actor must be examined from different aspects. The first, most obvious 
criterion is undoubtedly its membership composition. Then, the historical context 
of the actor's foundation must be explored, in order to focus on its basic goals and 
functions. The organizational aspect is the next criterion by which an actor has to 
be examined, including the analysis of its hierarchies and degree of centralization, 
the division of roles, decision-making procedures and the existence of disciplinary 
mechanisms. This could display a picture of the internal processes carried out within 
an actor. In addition, an actor's past performance (activities, successes, failures) and 
interactions have to be taken into consideration. The latter primarily covers actor's 
attitudes toward developing formal agreements and/or coalitions, as well as attitudes 
toward participation in the political system. As much as will be possible, each of the 
actors will be analyzed bearing in mind these distinguishing characteristics. 
6.2. Political actors in reality 
A survey which follows aims at highlighting a great diversity of actors that 
have entered a world-wide debate about the global securities market. If the Issue- 
Paradigm methodology is applied, the rise of the global securities market can be 
perceived as a component of the global economy hyper-issue. ' The involvement of 
The concept of issues was introduced in Chapter Five, subsection 5.2.5., 
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each and every political actor in this global debate reflects its own feelings of issue- 
salience. Sometimes, an actor perceives that a concrete, technical stake is of the 
greatest importance to it. Other actors can discern more abstract stakes, or values, 
as being under the contention. Some actors may be inclined to contend over and 
concentrate on particular stakes, while others may take a wider approach and 
"extend" the debate over more general principles. In order to make this part of the 
analysis more understandable, the survey will start with the actors most directly 
"connected" to securities market (e. g. national associations of banks and securities 
dealers), on the assumption that they will experience the deepest feeling of value 
deprivation. The survey will conclude with the analysis of international fora such 
as the United Nations, of course in relation to the issue. 
6.2.1. Banks and dealers 
This group of political actors features the greatest diversity, as to each 
actor's origins, aims, structures and basic underlying values it seeks to promote. 
Various banking and other associations take very different attitudes to politics and 
the actors in the intergovernmental world, as well as to other actors. Their 
involvement in debates over technical and organizational stakes in relation to 
securities market also varies to a great degree. 
6.2.1.1. National Association of Securities Dealers (USA) 
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is the self-regulatory 
organization of the securities industry in the United States, formed in 1938. It was 
established by co-operative efforts of Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in order to 
"... promote the investment banking and securities business, to standardize 
its principles and practices, and to promote high standards of commercial 
honour and observance by its members of federal and states securities 
laws. ""I 
NASD is certainly among the most important actors in securities markets world- 
wide, as it comprises about 5 400 securities firms and about 10 million investors. 
Its basic ftinction of facilitating capital-raising serves investors, public companies 
and broker-dealers ftom the US. Apart from that', there are members from 48 other 
countries, operating in the US. In these terms NASD is the biggest secondary 
market in world-the world. In addition, NASD is certainly among the most active 
actors taking part in the global debate on securities markets. It has joined almost all 
relevant international organizations, as well as other associations in the sphere of 
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banking and securities business. Although more concerned with technical issues to 
promote efficiency of markets, NASD vigorously participates in many international 
fora to ensure that the views of its members are efficiently communicated and 
protected. 
The organization of NASD is very complex, and has been developed along 
three lines: specific business areas, regional areas and particular issues and 
problems. The Board of Governors is at. the top of the pyramid, and it determines 
policy both on a national scale and for international activities. Various standing 
committees (currently, 25 of them) work directly with the Board, each covering a 
specific area, such as arbitration, congressional/state liaisons, international business, 
national business conduct, etc. 
Another dimension of NASD's organization is the set of fourteen district 
committees, as agents of the Board in executing NASD policy. There are also 
special committees or task forces that are appointed to study current problems as the 
need arises. 
The NASD organization is a broad-based one, but rather hierarchical in its 
nature. However, frequent communication is encouraged, particularly by the work 
of the NASD staff. A highly developed sense of political efficacy is embodied in the 
Law and Regulatory Policy Division. There is, inter alia, a special office established 
to keep close contacts with regulators 
- 
the Office of Congressional and State 
Liaisons. Its main tasks include maintaining contacts with legislators and other 
officials at both the federal and state levels, monitoring legislative developments, 
and communicating views of its members and the investing public to regulators. 
In order to foster positive communication, special attention is paid to internal 
flows of information. Under the Marketing and Market Operations Division, there 
are two particularly important sub-divisions: Corporate Communications (to maintain 
liaisons with the media and the academic community) and Investment Banking and 
Institutional Relations (to maintain close liaisons with the corporate finance and 
syndicate departments of members, as well as with institutional investors). 
Basic purposes of NASD, as described in its By-Laws, are to develop, 
operate and regulate (as far as permitted by the top US regulator 
- 
the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) securities markets that are, first of all, efficient, fair and 
liquid. In addition to that, the NASD endeavours to promote high standards of 
behaviour, self-discipline of members, compliance with law, protection of investors, 
etc. This ordering of the basic aims has to be underscored, as it clearly presents 
ranking of the values that underlie the actions. The value of wealth is perceived as 
the most important one to be protected and promoted. Among the actors examined 
from this group, NASD most explicitly commits itself to the promotion of 
efficiency, before other objectives. 
However, it is recognized that the efficiency cannot be promoted without a 
close cooperation with other actors, such as stock exchanges, clearing corporations, 
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etc. It is particularly the case if fraudulent or other criminal practices, a low level 
of professionalism, and weaker market-oversight develop to threaten market 
efficiency. For that reason, NASD has developed extensive external relationships. 
In the US, it maintains close liaisons with the SEC, various Congressional 
committees, State governments and other government agencies. Recently, it has 
proposed amendments to some SEC rules, in order to increase market liquidity, and 
to enhance market surveillance and transparency. So, contrary to widely-held 
beliefs, the objective of efficiency and the one of order (safety) are not in conflict. 
As seen from the NASD aspect, they are complementary. The most sensitive 
political question, in relation to this, is how to balance the "weight" of each of the 
objectives in the regulatory process. 
Apart from that, NASD has joined different "national" and international 
associations, as well as certain governmental (as an associate member) and non- 
governmental organizations. NASD is a member of the International Securities 
Market Association, the British Merchant Banking Association, the International 
Federation of Stock Exchanges, etc. This highly active attitude of NASD assures its 
members that political boundaries will not limit their endeavours to promote efficient 
capital-raising. 
6.2.1.2. Federation of the German Stock Exchanges 
The Federation of the German Stock Exchanges comprises eight most 
important exchanges in Germany, and although small in relation to some other 
actors on the scene, the Federation features certain unique characteristics. 
Its organization is similar to most of the other federations. The Assembly of 
Members is at the top of the structure, consisting of Deputy Chairmen of the Board 
of Governors of each of the stock exchanjes. It relies on the work of the Advisory 
Council, whose membership composition reflects the rather-unequal position of the 
members. The two most important market places (Frankfurt and Dusseldorf) are 
represented on the Council by six seats, and all the other Federation members have 
just three representatives. Although not formally linked, the Federation operates 
closely with the Federal Association of Official Stockbrokers and the Federal 
Association of Unofficial Stockbrokers. Far more important, the Federation 
maintains very close liaisons with the regulators (Federal and Land governments) 
and the Gerinan central bank. Recently, it has even transferred its full membership 
in the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. IOSCO is an inter-governmental organization that includes 
securities regulators from more than 60 countries. This change clearly illustrates 
attitudes toward finance and banking in Germany: government regulation is the only 
mechanism that will ensure "proper" services being delivered from the financial 
markets. It is explicitly stated in the Introduction to the Annual Report of the 
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Federation that 
"... Germany's financial markets do not lead a life of their own. They form 
a part of the overall system of a social market economy the main element of 
which is conciliation and not confrontation. It is worth noting that the 
collaboration between the legislature, the Bundesbank and the financial 
markets in an atmosphere of mutual trust is more promising approach than 
if individual participants go it alone. " 169 
A surprisingly-high degree of submissiveness to the governmental world is also 
exemplified by the Federation' s attitude toward the regulation of financial markets. 
Contrary to a growing trend of self-regulation in other countries, the Federation 
stipulates a gradual shift in the opposite direction: from self-regulation to legal rules. 
"In the light of the progressive globalisation of securities trading and the 
growing number of market participants some rules that were observed in the 
past even without sanctions have to be extended and placed on a legislative 
basis (italics added). ov170 
Analyzing the Federation's approach to international regulation, two 
particular points have to be made. Although the concentration of supervision is 
desirable within the country boundaries, when it comes to the international level a 
sufficient scope of independence from intemationally-agreed rules must be 
preserved. Apart from this, another special interest has to be protected, namely the 
treatment of universal banks (which are by far the most predominant banking form 
in Germany) in international regulation. 
Another rather unique feature of the Federation is a significant level of 
tolerance toward internal divisiveness. It allows its members to undertake completely 
independent actions. For example, the Hamburg SE has supported (and hosted) the 
creation of the Federation of Scandinavian Stock Exchanges. It has also organized 
the 30th World Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce. The 
Federation allows its members to pursue their actions in accordance with different 
objectives and accents. For example, the Berlin SE is predominantly engaged in the 
privatization of the eastern part of Germany and in assisting financial institutions in 
Eastern Europe, so it puts forward the objectives of independence and freedom to 
operate. The Frankfurt SE, on the other hand, is mostly oriented to other major SEs 
abroad (specially in the US) and it stresses the objective of market efficiency and 
equality on a global basis. 
However, due to frequent communication, there is a high level of consensus 
within the Federation on the most important issues in relation to banking and 
securities trading. These issues include the regulation of secondary markets, clearing 
and settlement, and the emerging capital markets in Eastern Europe. This consensus 
is built on a widely-accepted axiom that a prerequisite for a "good" functioning of 
the capital market is confidence, deriving from government regulation and 
supervision. So, the values of safety and order are placed far above all the others. 
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In addition, the efficiency aim is underscored by insisting on the premise that the 
functioning of capital markets has always to be examined in a broader socio- 
economic context, e. g. in relation to monetary policy and foreign policy. The very 
same premise again emphasizes the Federation's posture toward the norms and 
institutions of the intergovernmental world. It prefers the accommodation posture, 
rather than to use opportunities to manipulate the political system. 
Even though the Federation is a member of several international 
organizations that deal with securities market, it is still fairly hesitant toward formal 
agreements or coalition building with other actors. By insisting on independence 
(e. g. from international regulatory rules), it actually seeks to adjust itself to the 
existing environment. 
6.2.1.3. Japan Securities Dealers Association 
The Japan Securities Dealers Association QSDA) exemplifies another type 
of actor that can be identified on the global scene. It was founded in 1973, but it 
originates from the prefectural securities dealers associations established in 1940 and 
1941. As the JSDA was established under the post-war laws, made to resemble the 
US approach toward the securities industry, it is formally recognized as a self- 
regulating organization (similar to the position held by the NASD in the US). 
However, as the analysis will reveal, the Japan Association and the NASD are 
comparable to a minimum extent. 
Today, the JSDA membership comprises 267 securities firms, 50 of which 
are foreign firms. Under the current regulations (the Securities and Exchange Law 
and the Law on Foreign Securities Firms), all domestic securities firms and foreign 
firms with branch licences have to join the Association. It is not very often that a 
single professional association has such a country-wide membership to encompass 
all firms in a particular sphere of activity. Although it is not explicitly stated 171 
, 
the authorization process (granting the licence) is definitely linked to application for 
membership in the JSDA. 
The basic aims of the Association are 
"to contribute to the protection of investors and to ensure that both domestic 
and foreign securities transactions, conducted by member firms, are fair and 
smooth. It also aims to promote the sound development of the securities 
industry. 11172 
In order to achieve these ends, the JSDA has defined its goals as being primarily 
related to the promotion of compliance by member firms with the law, and to the 
maintenance of order among firms. In addition, but rather secondary to those ones, 
the JSDA will work to enhance the public faith in the market and to promote 
efficiency of the market management. Much of its activities are devoted to the 
supervision of the market, enforcement of its rules and communication with the 
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government and other relevant organizations. 
A unique feature of the JSDA, however, relates to the absence of any 
explicitly-stated goal for promoting efficiency of the market transactions. So, even 
though it has been established to resemble the role of NASD in the US, today the 
Association mainly acts as an lengthened government-hand, over the market. This 
is particularly well exemplified by its complex organization. Central bodies of the 
JSDA are the General Assembly, Board of Directors and the Central Council. The 
large Board consists of 39 directors and five auditors that "monitor" its work. The 
Council is even a larger body (having in mind the overall size of the Association), 
with 53 representatives from member firms, affiliated organizations and academic 
authorities. In addition, there are numerous standing and special committees, each 
with subcommittees and expert advisory committees. Finally, there is a Disciplinary 
Committee to provide advice and recommendations regarding the discipline of 
member firms, their executives and employees. 
This highly centralized and hierarchical structure fosters communication, but 
primarily from the top down. Analyzing the survey of its main recent activities, one 
can conclude that the JSDA is far more sensitive to external demands specially if 
they come from the part of the government and its agencies. It is also clear that the 
basic values which should be protected are order and safety, far ahead of the 
efficiency (wealth) or freedom. 
Recently, however, there has been a noticeable change in the orientation of 
the Association regarding its basic goals. In March 1992, it hosted the annual 
meeting of the International Councils of Securities Associations (ICSA) in Osaka. 
It was agreed that all the members should endeavour to facilitate international 
transactions in the market and work toward promoting efficiency of the market. The 
JSDA fully accepted these objectives and emphasized the need for enhancing mutual 
understanding and sharing of inforination among members. 
6.2.1.4. Luxembourg Bankers' Association 
The Luxembourg Bankers' Association (ABBL) is not a particularly high- 
status actor on the scene, but it is worth mentioning because it represents a full 
contrast to the actors from Germany and Japan. The Association's significance for 
the analysis stems from two sources. One is the place occupied by the Luxembourg 
centre on the Euro-market, and the other is a wide scope of concerns and activities 
of the Association. 
The Association was created in 1939 by ten leading private banks of 
Luxembourg, and since then it has grown to an entity counting 142 members. The 
diversity of its membership is rather unique, as less than 10 percent of the members 
are originally from Luxembourg. In addition, the Association comprises different 
types of banks and financial institutions, such as commercial 
- 
banks, securities 
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houses, saving banks and even an international clearing system Centrale de 
Livraison de Valeurs Mobilieres (CEDEL). Such multinationality and diversity 
derive from a particular position at the centre in the world of finance. From the 
beginning of the 1960s, Luxembourg has been progressively liberalizing the 
financial sphere, and in 1965 the withholding tax was abolished for group financial 
holding companies. As far as capital markets are concerned, firms from 
Luxembourg (operating in Luxembourg) today underwrite almost one-fifth of all 
Eurobond issues. The Luxembourg stock exchange lists almost 70 percent of all 
Eurobond issues. 173 So, a distinctive feature of the ABBL is that it is not a 
"national" association in the strict sense, consisting of Luxembourg banks. It is a 
"national" association from the functional, market aspect, comprising almost all 
banks that operate therein. This characteristic is common to many associations in 
leading financial centres, particularly in the UK. But, it is by far most emphasized 
in Luxembourg. 
The ABBL has always carried out highly-varied and far-ranging activities, 
from organizing special courses for bank staff, developing contacts with authorities, 
establishing CEDEL, to promoting the Luxembourg financial centre abroad. In the 
early 1950s, the Association began to act as a "spokesman" for banks in dealings 
with the public authorities. A wide range of its concerns includes a broad economic 
environment (taxation, legislation, regulation), both at the national and international 
level, banking regulation at home and abroad, collective labour agreements, 
education, public relations, etc. What is even of a greater importance, the ABBL is 
the "spokesman" and negotiator for these matters for the sector as a whole. So, 
despite a great membership diversity, the Association has developed intensive and 
positive communication among its members, as well as a high level of consensus 
and a joint position toward many common stakes. 
"The aims of the Association shall be to protect and develop the professional 
and employers' interests of its members and to study all matters that might 
be of concern to the banking profession. "114 
As an actor highly sensitive to internal demands, even more than to external 
ones, the ABBL has always paid attention to market developments at home and 
abroad. It was upon the ABBL's initiative that CEDEL was created, in order to 
promote international clearing and settlement. Since the 1960s, the ABBL has 
maintained close liaison with other international organizations in the sphere of 
banking and finance, such as the Banking Federation of the EEC, and banking 
associations from abroad. As its main aims are to promote the members' interests, 
the ABBL devotes much of its activities to enhancing market efficiency and 
technological infrastructure. For the same reason, it has extended its concern over 
many fields, like employment relations, taxation, international regulation, etc. 
Regardless of the "national" origins of its members, the ABBL has always strived 
to protect and promote their interests by equal treatment of them. 
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The Association is a highly-adaptable actor, as it reacts promptly to any 
initiative that may affect its members' interests. The ABBL has been particularly 
active in commenting on, for example, EC pro posals and directives related to 
banking. By the same token, it takes a favourable posture toward formal and 
informal agreements with other actors, both at home and abroad. The Association 
has a strongly-developed sense of political efficacy, i. e. a positive attitude toward 
opportunities to influence and manipulate the political system. The ABBL has 
worked toward strengthening its liaisons with the Luxembourg Monetary Institute 
(the supervisory body for the banking sector). A Consultative Committee has been 
established, including four ex-officio representatives of the ABBL. 
The organization of the ABBL is not very complex: there is the General 
Assembly and the Executive Committee, whose work is supported by a number of 
highly-specialized technical committees, ad-hoc committees and the Secretariat. 
However, the structure of the Executive Committee is rather unique. It is composed 
of ten members, three of which represent three biggest (originally) Luxembourg 
banks. The other seven members represent major geographical groupings of banks 
established in Luxembourg: US, French, German, Japanese, Italian, Scandinavian 
and Swiss. For some unknown reasons, it is decided that various American banks, 
for example, can more easily reach a common position than commercial banks 
between themselves, or investments banks between themselves, or alike. However, 
even though the ABBL emphasizes its multinational structure, when it comes to 
executive decisions the treatment is slightly less egalitarian 
- 
in favour of domestic 
banks. In addition, both domestic and foreign -accept hat each and every action and 
decision has to be evaluated from the perspective of the Luxembourg centre's 
competitive position. 
So, despite its quasi-national nature in respect of the membership, the ABBL 
is very "national" in respect of the ultimate decision criterion. Undoubtedly, the 
concern is not the efficiency of the market per se, but the competitive efficiency of 
Luxembourg in relation to other centres. 
6.2.1.5. British Bankers' Association 
One of the most prominent actors in the debate about the global securities 
market is indisputably the British Bankers' Association (BBA). Since its foundation, 
the Association has grown to encompass 323 members from 62 countries, 
representing all major universal, commercial and investment banks. It has to be 
pointed out that the BBA is one of the very few associations that also have 
representatives from other banking groups and associations. "' 
The BBA is a very high status actor, influential and successful in 
representing its members' interests to relevant bodies and the public. It is clearly 
stated that 
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"the BBA's principle role is to give expression to the banking industry's 
views on domestic and international developments... The Association seeks 
to make these views known to ministers, their officials, Parliament, the Bank 
of England, the various European Community institutions, other international 
bodies, the press and media. ""' 
So, above all, it seeks to establish effective channels through which the political 
system can be manipulated and political decisions affected both at home and abroad. 
Moreover, it aims to build extensive external relations not just with regulators, but 
also with various professional societies and organizations. In 1991, for example, the 
BBA took an active part in meetings of the Foreign Exchange Committee in New 
York, the International Chambers of Commerce in Paris, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
The scope of the BBA's concern is too wide to be presented here, but certain 
remarks have to be made. In the sphere of consumer protection, the Code of 
Banking Practice was published in 1992, jointly with the Building Societies 
Association and the Association for Payment Clearing Services. Entitled "Good 
Banking" it establishes for the first time a standard of good practice'for the conduct 
of personal banking. In relation to accounting, the Association has produced a series 
of standards for the banking industry in the form of statements of recommended 
accounting practice (SORPs). The success of the BBA in communicating its views 
to legislators is particularly evident in the case of these recommendations. Namely, 
in commenting on the EC directive on disclosure of bank accounts, the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry took the position that the SORPs, rather than 
legislation, are the right way to address disclosure issues. "' The Association is 
specially active in the sphere of crime prevention and money-laundering. Since 
1990, it has participated in the Bank of England's Joint Money Laundering Working 
Group. Results of these efforts were first published in 1990, as the "Money 
Laundering Guidance Notes" for banks and building societies. In 1991, a similar set 
of notes were published for investment and insurance business. Apart from this, the 
Association has set up the Fraud Intelligence Unit, as a major step to combat 
fraudulent practices in banking. 
However, most of the BBA's recent activities are devoted to commenting on 
and discussing various EC Directives related to consolidated supervision, capital 
adequacy, large exposure, etc. 178 In reviewing these drafts or directives, the BBA 
pays attention to details of the proposed measures, as well as to their overall impact 
on the UK position relative to other centres. It is exactly the comments on these 
directives that most clearly exemplify the basic aims of the BBA: 
"In both cases [a directive on investment services and a directive on capital 
adequacy] the BBA has sought to defend the principle of free trade 
... 
and 
to ensure that important points of detail are not sacrificed in an attempt to 
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find quick and easy political solution. "I 
Having in mind UK financial history and the liberal attitudes towards finance 
and banking, it is not surprising that the crucial aim of the BBA's activities is the 
promotion of free-trade principles. Freedom to operate and competition are the basic 
forces to improve market efficiency, and over-regulation can just endanger the 
"proper" (free) market functioning. 
"At home and abroad the BBA will continue to stand for open markets, for 
free trade and for regulation which is effective without being bureaucratic or 
burdensome. It will also be important for the banks established in London 
to support every initiative to ensure the continued primacy of London as an 
international financial centre. " 110 
A particular example of this approach is the BBA's comment on the EC investment 
services directive. From the BBA's point of view, it important that investment banks 
are treated equally in relation to commercial banks, that host states should not be 
allowed to restrict dealings to "regulated markets", and that banks are granted direct 
access to securities markets. 
Another major aim of the Association's activities can be described as the 
maintenance, on a general level, of the relations and structures already established. 
This posture towards preservation is, of course, derived from the leading position 
of London as a centre in international finance. Also, it is built on a long-standing 
practice of self-regulation and confidence in banking in the UK. Commenting, for 
example, on the Bingham Report and following discussions to strengthen regulation, 
the BBA stressed that 
"... the BCCI episode should be kept in perspective and, in view of the 
highly distinctive nature of the institution concerned, it would be quite wrong 
to contemplate major changes in the supervisory framework applying to the 
banking system as a whole. ""' 
The Association usually takes a favourable posture toward making 
agreements and alliances with other associations and groups. In 1990, for example, 
the BBA worked particularly closely with the British Merchant Banking and 
Securities Houses Association and with fellow banking associations abroad to reach 
a joint position on the EC Directive on Takeovers. In the following year, the BBA 
formed an alliance with eight other leading representative bodies (the "Group of 
Nine") in order to present a united front to the Inland Revenue. At stake was a 
proposal on the taxation of foreign exchange gains and losses. 
The BBA's high-status feature is also evident in relation to major regulatory 
changes abroad. The Association does not only seek to comment and influence 
regulatory policy at home, but it also endeavours to make its views known to 
regulators in other countries. This was the case when, in 1991, the US Treasury 
introduced the legislation which should force foreign banks in the US to adopt a 
subsidiary structure and to meet US capital standards. 
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Although the BBA's primary concerns lie in the sphere of efficiency, it does 
pay due attention to the values of order and safety, both for its members and 
banking customers. The SORPs, mentioned above, are the proposals to introduce 
more order and transparency in financial positions. Another example is the Review 
of Banking Statistics, initiated in 1987, with the twofold aim of providing the 
government with accurate macro-economic data, and providing supervisors with 
extensive information in line with international supervisory agreements. 
So, the Association most clearly exemplifies a new type of political actor 
emerging on the global scene. Its scope of concern is rather wide, it is open to 
various agreements and coalition building with other actors, it has a well-developed 
sense of political efficacy, and above all, it seeks to make its views clear and 
properly communicated to fellow associations, domestic and foreign regulators and 
international organizations. 
6.2.1.6. British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association 
The British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association (BMBA) 
was founded at the beginning of 1988. Three years later, it consisted of 57 members 
representing major investment banks, securities houses of big commercial banks and 
some universal banks from all leading financial centres. 
A particular feature of the BMBA, due to which it is included in this survey, 
is its dual approach to the global debate on securities markets. Being represented in 
the British Bankers' Association, the BMBA sometimes takes this "indirect" route 
to present its views to legislators and the public. This is usually the case when the 
issue at stake is of a high salience, and affects the protection of certain basic 
principles 
- 
for example, seeking an equal treatment for banks and securities houses 
in relation to EC legislation. The high status of the BBA and its well elaborated 
machinery ensurethe BMBA that its views are going to be communicated more 
effectively, and probably with a greater impact on debates. 
However, when it comes to stakes and issues particularly relevant for 
investment banking, the BMBA prefers to enter directly into debate. For example, 
in 1989, the Association invited the Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to discuss certain regulatory measures affecting UK offers in the 
US. Another example is securities trading and policy formulation within the London 
stock exchange. Although the British Bankers' Association maintains close liaison 
with the Stock Exchange, the BMBA preferred to exert more direct influence and 
has joined the Stock Exchange's Equity Market Development Group in 1990. 
There is, nevertheless, a third route the BMBA can take in dealing with 
certain more complex issues, such as the prevention of money-laundering. As it has 
been mentioned, the Bank of England has established the Joint Money Laundering 
Working Group, in order to enhance cooperation between banks and regulators on 
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this particular issue. Although being "indirectly" represented (through the British 
Bankers' Association), the BMBA has also joined the Group itself in order to 
enhance investment bankers' cooperation. 
Even more than other associations in the sphere of banking and finance, the 
BMBA is very open to cooperation and consultation with other actors. Its external 
links include formal and (more often) informal consultations with Ministries and 
government departments, self-regulating organizations, securities associations, etc. 
These links are by no means restrained by geographical or political boundaries. The 
BMBA maintains close relations, for example, with the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (US), as well as with the International Councils of Securities 
Associations. 
The Association rarely enters into formal agreements with other actors, but 
maximally uses opportunities for making coalitions. In 1990, it has undertaken the 
initiative to create a European federation for securities industry, parallel to the 
already existing Banking Federation of the European Community. 182 
The main objective of the Association, very similar to the one of the NASD 
in the US, is to represent the members' interests in maintaining pressure necessary 
for reductions in costs and improvements in the market efficiency. In addition, as 
its members greatly benefit from London's role in international finance, the BMBA 
has sought to preserve such role. 
"The objective of the BMBA is to provide constructive reaction to regulatory 
initiatives, both in the UK and internationally. Whilst recognizing that the 
interests of our Members are best served by operating under effective 
systems of supervision, it is important that regulation does not impose 
unnecessary costs or prejudice the attractiveness of London... IfI83 
In addition to improvements in market efficiency, the BMBA strongly 
emphasizes the need to protect the value of freedom, namely freedom of entry and 
to operate on foreign markets and freedom of choice for investors. This is clearly 
stressed in the BMBA's comments on the proposed EC Investment Services 
Directive. Related to this, the Association presses for a flexible approach for 
information disclosure and publication of trade details on behalf of market-makers. 
International regulation in this field would have to pay more consideration to each 
country's tradition and culture, and allow for certain regulatory modifications 
accordingly. Such posture expresses a long-standing confidence in banking in the 
UK and an increasing reliance on self-regulation therein. 
Contrary to the approach usually taken by the British Bankers' Association, 
the BMBA does not insist on regulatory details to be agreed and included in every 
directive or agreement. Basic principles of freedom and equality among and between 
market participants should be agreed upon, but it should be up to every government 
to decide on modes of their implementation. 
"It seemed unlikely that early agreement could be reached on any over- 
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detailed text [of the proposed EC Takeover Directive]; the BMBA therefore 
continued to advocate a Directive that did no more at this stage than state 
general principles, leaving each country's competent authorities to implement 
them in the context of their national culture and legal structure. " 184 
Even though it is obvious that the BMBA is hesitant to support any form of 
heavy national or international regulation, it nevertheless recognizes the need to 
establish a proper set of standards for conduct of financial business. It soundly 
advocates a high value of practitioner input therein, as well as a closer cooperation 
in this field both nationally and internationally. The latter basically refers to a much 
needed collaboration between the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. 3 This is 
particularly important as IOSCO and the Basle standards should be complementary 
parts of the same regime governing global financial transactions. Even greater 
importance is attached by BMBA to work of different international non- 
governmental organizations (for example, ICSA) and their regular contacts with 
national and international regulatory bodies. 
The Association's openness and cooperative attitudes, as well as the 
multiplicity of channels it uses for lobbying, is a good example how new actors are 
formed (or existing actors adapted) as a result of the changing nature of world 
politics. Global politics is exactly made up by this kind of actor. 
6.2.2. International non-governmental organizations 
This group of actors that has emerged on the global scene comprises various 
"professional" associations and organizations. The attribute "international" is used 
here in a different context, i. e. to emphasise characteristics different from those 
usually understood by the term. In common parlance, "international" means 
something existing or occurring between nations, or a group, enterprise or 
115 organization having members or dealings in several countries. However, the 
term "international" in this analysis refers to organizations and associations which 
are not primarily oriented to maintaining or promoting the competitive role of the 
centre they are established in. All "national" associations, presented in the previous 
subsection, have multinational membership to a higher or lower degree. In the 
ordinary language, they could all be termed "international" associations. 
Nevertheless, as it was exemplified by the Luxembourg and British associations, 
their "national" character derives from the main decision criterion 
- 
whether a 
development / decision is harmful or beneficial to the centre's position on the global 
I More details about both actors can be found in the subsection 6.2.4. 
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scale. 
On the other hand, "truly" international organizations and associations are 
predominantly concerned with more general issues. They are usually related to the 
whole of the securities market, or to its particular segments, such as bonds or 
shares, primary or secondary markets, etc. These issues are not dealt with from the 
aspect of any particular "national" financial centre, but from much wider 
perspectives. The latter cover, for example, the overall technological infrastructure, 
standardization of business practices, general codes of conduct, and alike. So, one 
has to distinguish two aspects of the attribute "international". In the standard use, 
the attribute relates to an organization that is international in structure. However, 
it can also relate to an organization that is international in scope, from the aspect of 
values and stakes pursued. What has to. /highlighted here is that the two are not 
necessarily correlated. 
6.2.2.1. International Primary Market Association 
The International Primary Market Association (IPMA) is the trade association 
which represents leading firms in underwriting and management in the international 
capital markets. It was founded in 1984, and nine years after that IPMA had just 
fifteen member firms. With an extremely limited entry to it and with an exceptional 
structure and organization, IPMA certainly deserves to be included in this survey. 
One can argue that a single case like this is not sufficient for any generalisations to 
be made, but exactly the opposite is true. Examples like this may well point a 
direction in which international associations, in the sphere of banking and finance, 
could develop their organizational structure. IPMA clearly illustrates how the 
formation of new actor is heavily influenced by market developments, functions and 
structures. 
IPMA represents a very closed and elitist-directed association. According to 
the Articles of Association, the number of members was limited to one hundred. 
The membership criteria include two requirements: a) a prospective member has to 
be a successful bookrunner in Eurosecurities, already established in the market, and 
b) a prospective member should be a member of the International Securities Market 
Association 
- 
the main self-regulatory organization in the secondary market. "' The 
first criteria requires that a member has run the books during the three preceding 
years (alternatively, two years) in at least an aggregate of nine issues (alternatively, 
six issues) of Eurosecurities. It is also exactly defined which financial instruments 
shall be considered as Eurosecurities: they have to be denominated in one six major 
currencies or in ECU, and they have to be distributed on an international basis (i. e. 
outside the currency's country of issue). The second condition requires that, besides 
being active in the primary market, a potential member accepts principles and rules 
established in the secondary market. It is sought, in this way, 
. 
to overcome the 
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functional and other separations of the securities market, and to ensure that the 
transactions in securities are treated as a whole. 
Another unique feature of the Association is its organization. The highest 
body is the Board of Directors, which decides upon the general policy of the 
Association and upon all matters relevant to the proper functioning of the market. 
The Board composition resembles structures of the primary securities market, in 
terms of major currencies for denomination of securities. Its composition 
" 
... 
shall, so far as possible, represent the principal currencies or units in 
which Euro-Securities are denominated and the number of members of the 
Board representing each such currency or unit shall reflect the volume of 
issues of Euro-Securities... "197 
For example, in 1990, the US dollars were "represented" by nine Board members, 
and each other currency or unit by one member. 
The Association is closed to other associations or organizations, except for 
the ISMA which is allowed to be represented by one ex-officio Board member. 
From time to time, additional members could be co-opted, provided that the number 
of such members should never be more than one-quarter of the whole body. 
A rather hierarchical structure of the Association is based on two separate 
communication flows: decisions and recommendations (from the top down), and 
members' information (from the bottom to the top). In addition, work of the 
Executive Committee and of other committees is carried out within strictly defined 
limits of delegated power, and is always closely monitored by the Board. 
Regarding the main objects of the Association, the highest importance is 
attached to the promotion of cooperation between the primary market participants. 
In addition, the IPMA seeks to promote the standardisation of market practices and 
to enhance the technological (information) infrastructure of the market. Some of the 
recent IPMA activities towards these ends include publication of the "IPMA 
Recommendation" (a proposal for a code of conduct for the industry), and the 
introduction of the IPMA Screen Communication System. The latter enables a lead 
manager to syndicate a deal by computer and simultaneously to invite all prospective 
members of the syndicate into the deal. So, the efficiency of the market is certainly 
by far the predominant concern of the IPMA and it clearly stated that the IPMA's 
objective is (inter alia) 
"... to promote and develop the primary market in International Securities 
so as to bring about the greater efficiency and serve the interests of the 
market. "1" 
It is not very often that, in such an explicit way, interests of members are identified 
with (or even subordinated to) interests of the market itself. Having in mind that the 
IPMA epitomizes the "core" of the primary market in Eurosecurities (i. e. the 
leading managers), it is not surprising that its members perceive their interests as 
being best served if the interests of the market are protected. 
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However, the efficiency aim and the value of wealth are not the only 
- 
concerns of the IPMA. It is also active in providing information to members (e. g. 
in relation to regulatory changes), as well as in offering knowledge and expertise 
to the governments and other agencies. In comparison to other associations in the 
sphere of banking and finance, the IPMA is much less concerned with the 
enforcement of its rules, or with its members compliance with law. Nevertheless, 
it makes its views known in relation to major regulatory initiatives, such as the draft 
EC Investment Services Directive. 
6.2.2.2. International Securities Market Association 
The International Securities Market Association (ISMA) is one of the very 
high-status actors participating in debates about the global securities market. Such 
status derives from several features: the number and multinational range of its 
members, the success in creating and enforcing market rules, the position held in 
a few of the most important international fora and the respect its views enjoy 
therein, and the multiplicity of its communication channels 
- 
both internal and 
external. ISMA is the only international securities self-regulatory organization 
(ISSRO) in the UK. Under the 1986 Financial Service Act, ISMA has been 
delegated powers to regulate and supervise the international and Euro-bond market. 
In 1988, the UK Securities and Investment Board granted ISMA the status of a 
Designated Investment Exchange (DIE). 119 In 1990, the Association was granted 
affiliated membership of IOSCO, and in 1991 became a member of the International 
Councils of Securities Associations (ICSA). In 1990, ISMA applied to the EC 
Commission for negative clearance of its statutes, ensuring that ISMA is compatible 
with articles of the Treaty of Rome. 
ISMA, originally the Association of International Bond Dealers (AIBD), was 
founded in 1969 and is based in Zurich. In 1992, it comprised some 900 members, 
including all of the important banks and investment houses from Europe, North 
America, the Middle East and Far East and the Pacific Basin. They are all heavily 
engaged in international securities transactions, i. e. in the secondary market for 
bonds and equities outside the home country of the issuer. Apart from banks and 
other financial institutions, EUROCLEAR and CEDEL are also members of the 
Association. 
ISMA's truly global orientation is also exemplified by the scope of 
instruments transactions in which have should be transacted under its 
recommendations. They include securities denominated in 22 currencies, 
international multiple-currency unit bonds, ECU bonds, foreign US-dollars bonds, 
and Special Drawing Rights bonds. " So, in this respect, ISMA is a unique 
organization concerned with the whole of the global securities market transactions 
(excluding pure domestic transactions). 
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The foundation of ISMA coincided with a rapid development of the 
Eurobond market in the second half of the 1960s. As Euro-market transactions grew 
in volume and diversity, a need emerged to introduce certain rules of practice. So, 
the nineteen most active houses operating in the market gathered in 1969, in order 
to discuss ways and means to institute 
-a more-orderly market mechanism. A 
common position was easily reached that orderly market functioning could best 
serve the interests of both banks and investors. Since then, the Association has 
grown to cover a one-trillion-dollars market, with an annual turnover of US$ 6 
trillion. "I 
ISMA's organization is similar to many other associations, having the 
General Meeting and the Board at the top, and various committees for particular 
activities. Among the associations and organizations previously discussed, it mostly 
resembles 
-the structure of NASD (US). ISMA is organized along two lines: 
committees and sub-committees are concerned with different aspects of market 
transactions, such as the finance, membership, market practice; regional committees 
are organized in order to keep a close touch with regional developments, as well as 
to have "regional" interests communicated to the Board. 
However, besides these "standard" committees, ISMA has established the 
Council of Reporting Dealers, and a corresponding Committee. Some one hundred 
of the most active dealers form this Council, whose main aim is to improve the 
transparency and liquidity of the market. Namely, each potential member has to 
subscribe to detailed market rules, as regarding trading hours, the size of trades, and 
transaction reporting. This Council exerts significant influence on the ISMA general 
policy, particularly concerning recommendations on market practices. In addition, 
the Council is responsible for publication of the "Weekly Eurobond Guide" 
-a 
publication highly praised by market participants because it announces the next- 
week's transactions on the market. In this way, market transparency is greatly 
improved, as well as its predictability. One of the sanctions a dealer breaching the 
rules can face is removal from the Guide. 
The Association's main aim is to 
"... maintain the balance between the crucial level of innovation and freedom 
and the level of stability and predictability necessary for investors and 
borrowers to have confidence. In this context must be set the crucial issue 
of liquidity. The establishment of a viable secondary market for international 
securities with associated liquidity is vital. "" 
It is clear, from this quotation, that the basic values which should be protected are 
freedom, wealth, order and safety. Therefore, the ISMA's statutes defines its basic 
objectives as follows. Firstly, the Association will work to promote the development 
of joint positions of members toward salient issues. Secondly, it will work to 
enhance efficiency and orderly functioning of the market, creating and implementing 
rules and recommendations to govern the transactions. Thirdly, it will enhance 
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relations between its members and with related national and international markets. 
Fourthly, ISMA will provide information and guidance to goverm-nents and 
international authorities concerned with the market activities. So, the Association 
"... exists to help the market, not hinder it. As financial legislation develops 
around the world, it offers a real service by ensuring that the market 
continues to operate as freely as possible. The self-regulated freedom is in 
the interests of all concerned. ""I 
A review of the ISMA's recent achievements illustrates how successful the 
Association is. ISMA has established uniform market practices which govern all 
transactions in international securities between members. It has achieved the 
harmonization of settlement procedures and the furtherance of cooperation between 
the market, CEDEL and EUROCLEAR. ISMA has developed a network of regular 
contacts and information exchange with central monetary authorities in the countries 
of its members' origin. It has reached an agreement with International Primary 
Market Association (IPMA) on new rules and regulations governing the primary 
issues. Finally, it has introduced the TRAX, an industry-wide transaction matching 
and reporting system for all internationally traded securities. " 
The Association indisputably falls into the promotive adjustment category of 
political actors, although it has more-than-average sensitivity to both internal and 
external demands. As one of its objectives is to develop and maintain joint positions 
of members in relation to important matters, ISMA is also characterized by frequent 
and positive internal communication. Internal bonds between its members are easily 
created and further strengthened by the success of the Association. The latter 
primarily refers to the Association's efforts to communicate its members' positions 
to national and international regulators, as well as to its successful promotion of 
self-regulation on the global scene. ISMA does not frequently adopt new policies 
toward other actors, most importantly toward government actors. It opposes 
unnecessary and burdensome regulation, and emphasizes this particularly in relation 
to supranational bureaucracies (e. g. the European Community). For example, 
commenting on the EC initiative to establish a new Committee in charge of the 
whole of the securities market, the Secretary General of ISMA concluded that 
"... it may be that we do actually require such a body, which is relatively 
independent from the Commission, to perform the regulatory role. But if so, 
then the users of industry services, the industry itself, the self-regulators and 
the regulators all need to be involved in defining the Committee's 
objectives... The Committee should be structured in a way that those on it 
are not just there to represent competing national interests but have a remit 
to ensure that markets remain efficient and open... ""' 
In short, the Association represents truly a new type of political actor on the 
global scene. Being definitely international (in its scope of concern) and 
multinational (as to its membership, liaisons and contacts), ISMA closely follows 
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the market developments. This equally relates to its structure, actions and attitudes 
towards the most relevant issues: market efficiency, transparency, safety and 
regulation. Although ISMA is predominantly oriented to the promotion of market 
efficiency, it nevertheless takes an active part in debates about the global securities 
market. Moreover, as a detailed analysis in Chapter Eight will show, norms and 
rules developed within ISMA can significantly contribute to a better understanding 
of elements necessary for a prospective global regime in this field. 
6.2.2.3. International Federation of Stock Exchanges 
The International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) was set up in 1961, 
and thirty years after its creation it encompassed 40 member stock exchanges from 
thirty countries, as well as 25 corresponding exchanges. The latter group includes 
stock exchanges which have not yet been granted membership status (full or 
associate) but nevertheless keep in close contact. 
The FIBV's origins date back to the 1930s, when an initiative was taken by 
the International Chamber of Commerce to create an International Bureau of Stock 
Exchanges. This existed until the outbreak of the World War 11. In the late 1950s, 
several European stock exchanges undertook major steps to institutionalize their 
informal cooperation, as they felt it would be useftil both for themselves and for the 
secondary market as a whole. 
The organization of the FIBV features the General Assembly (as the main 
decision making body), the Executive Committee (in charge of broad policy 
development and the division of work), the Working Committee (the forum for 
exchange of information), various subcommittees and workshops, as well as the 
Secretariat. Frequent communication is encouraged between the members, as well 
as between the FIBV and other organizations such as IOSCO, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Federacion Ibero-Americana de 
Bolsas de Valores (FIABV), and the Federation of Stock Exchanges in the EC 
(FSEEC). The FIBV does not just keep in regular contact with these organizations, 
but it also initiates joint meetings of the Executive Committees, workshops on 
particular issues, seminars, etc. 
Apart from maintaining close liaisons with other relevant organizations, the 
Federation persistently seeks to make its views widely known and to broaden public 
support. 
"The first priority is the building of international press contacts, as the FIBV 
wants to position itself as an international organization. Media coverage of 
FIBV events and opinions should be further developed in order to increase 
the general awareness of the FIBV, its aims and policy. ""' 
The basic aim of the FIBV is twofold and simultaneously focuses on the 
national and global level: the improvement of securities markets functioning, and 
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the promotion of self-regulation. This aim is further specified in the following 
objectives: 1) the promotion of efficient, fair and secure national markets; 2) the 
promotion of cooperation to establish standards for transnational transactions; 3) the 
promotion of larger and more liquid capital markets, as well as the balanced 
development of the market segments (e. g. equity, bonds, etc. ); 4) the promotion of 
self-regulation within the total regulatory framework, and 5) the promotion of 
ethical behaviour in securities markets. So, the basic underlying values which guide 
and motivate the FIBV's activities are wealth, equality and freedom (from statutory 
regulation), and to a much lower degree 
- 
safety and order. Nevertheless, recent 
activities of the Federation, such as the agreed principles on business behaviour, 
added much more significance to the value of order in the markets. 
The FIBV has been active in relation to almost all issues concerning the 
securities markets, with a surprising exception of investor protection. For example, 
pertaining to international clearing and settlement, the FIBV has established a 
special Taskforce composed of FIBV members and representatives of 
EUROCLEAR, CEDEL, the Group of Thirty and Central Depositories of different 
countries. This clearly exemplifies the Federation's openness to other actors 
specialized in particular fields. Yet another example of the FIBV's readiness to 
cooperate with adequate professional associations is in the field of international 
securities regulation. Together with the International Bar Association (IBA) and the 
International Federation of Accountants, it has created the International Capital 
Market Group. The main purpose of the Group is to consider developments in the 
global capital market and to make regulatory proposals, as well as to promote 
investor confidence internationally. A particular attention is therein paid to "world 
class" issuers and transnational raising of capital. So, the FIBV closely monitors 
developments on the global level and, similarly to some other organizations, shifts 
its focus accordingly. As global transactions gain in importance, the proportion of 
attention being paid to them rises as well. 
Self-regulation is one of the FIBV's main aims, and the Federation is by far 
the most active proponent of the principle on all levels of regulation. It is not only 
the national-level framework that should rely on self-regulation. FIBV strongly 
advocates international self-regulatory cooperation and coordination. To support its 
position on regulatory issues, the FIBV has produced a set of evaluation criteria for 
international securities regulation. The - market-efficiency objective is again 
underscored as the most important crite4, ý i. e. any regulation should be market 
driven, flexible and minimally burdensome (the value of freedom), and at the same 
time conducive for competition (the value of equality). However, it is recognized 
that any regulation should assure that transactions are handled fairly and according 
to the highest professional standards (the value of safety). In addition, any 
international regulation should aim at reducing "systemic risks to users and 
participants in the markets and the inter-related global markets system. "" It is not 
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often the case that professional organizations take such a broad and comprehensive 
perspective, perceiving matters salient to them as parts of wider or more general 
issues. 
As mentioned, the FIBV has recently produced a set of conduct principles 
aimed at promoting the values of order and safety in the securities markets 
worldwide. The "Generally Accepted Principles of Securities Business Conduct" are 
a bench-mark for member exchanges in implementing the concept of fair treatment 
in the markets. A detailed analysis of these and other proposed principles of 
business conduct will be presented in the following chapter. 
A final remark on the FIBV has to be made, which is of a great importance 
for the course of this study. It is the fact that the FIBV perceives (treats) the 
members as constituting parts of an international exchange community. Their roles, 
rights and duties, as well as their common goals and aversions, are therein carefully 
defined and monitored. This attitude resembles to a high degree a similar perception 
developed in some of high-status "national" associations (for example, in Britain and 
Luxembourg). In the case of an international organization, such as the FIBV, the 
perception of an emerging professional community is qualitatively upgraded. The 
idea of a non-governinent cross-border community, which actively lobbies for its 
interests, is a new ingredient in global political processes. The importance of this 
novelty is even more accentuated because the FIBV accepts norms belonging to the 
state-centric world, transcended by such communities. 
"Members of an exchange community should conform to the just and 
equitable principles of conduct embodied in exchange rules and commonly 
practised in the marketplaces in which they conduct business. 11198 
In short, the FIBV is one of the most prominent actors participating in 
debates about the global securities market place. The Federation incorporates most 
of the promotive political features, primarily found in "national" professional 
associations, which here sustain a much wider perspective and a global scope of 
concem. 
6.2.3. National authorities 
Regardless of a constant increase in the speed by which global securities 
integration proceeds, national regulators and authorities still exert crucial political 
influence therein. The same applies to both national and international debates about 
the markets, although in the latter case national regulators are confronted with other 
views and perspectives. Basic regulatory structures in the four most important 
markets were presented in the second chapter of the analysis. 
-As a background, 
different national financial traditions were compared in order to put more light on 
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the origins of distinct approaches to banking and finance that exist today. 
Recalling the theory of economics and finance, the ultimate purposes of 
financial regulations can be formulated as: 1) the prevention of systemic risk, 2) the 
prevention of an excessive risk-taking by individual investors, and 3) the promotion 
of systemic efficiency. All regulators worldwide are engaged in a myriad of 
activities aimed at: maintaining the stability of their financial systems, ensuring the 
financial soundness of institutions, protecting investors against fraud and undue risks 
of losses, ensuring a proper working of competitive market forces, etc. 199 
However, the level of importance attached to each of these purposes varies to a 
considerable extent. 
Although each country's financial markets have their own peculiarities, two 
substantially opposed approaches to regulating financial markets can be identified. 
Concepts such as "prevention", "inspection", "information asymmetry" and 
"disclosure" are all related to one approach, which can be termed the anxiety 
approach. Opposed to that is the confidence approach, which subsumes concepts 
such as "self-regulation", "professional conduct", "regulatory flexibility" and alike. 
Oversimplifying, the main aim of the first approach is to bring the financial markets 
under a strict and continuous control, in order to evade failures and losses. On the 
other hand, the confidence approach stresses individual and social benefits from 
maintaining a relatively high level of freedom of markets, which are self-regulated. 
In the first case, "powers" of the financial markets are feared. In the other case, 
"powers" of the financial markets are relied upon. In the first case, financial forces 
are suppressed. In the second case, they are channelled and the best use is made of 
them. 
, 
This was an introduction necessary to comprehend a broad social position 
and general attitudes of national regulators. As a detailed survey in this field would 
transcend the scope of this study, just three examples are going to be analyzed. 
6.2.3.1. The Securities and Investment Board in the UK 
The Securities and Investment Board (SIB) was set up in 1988, when the 
main provisions of the 1986 UK Financial Service Act came into force. Within a 
new regulatory framework, most of the powers to regulate and supervise the 
securities market have been transferred to the SIB. The main underlying aim was 
to introduce an integrated framework which would replace a piecemeal approach that 
had combined government measures with self-regulation. 
The SIB is a private limited company with substantial regulatory powers, but 
it is not a government department. It is an agency funded by the financial services 
industry itself, with no contribution from the government. The Board comprises a 
number of practitioners and experts from the financial sectors, for it has been 
recognized that knowledge of practice and close touch with the industry are the 
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essential inputs to any effective regulation. However, there is also a number of 
independent members of the Board, which represent the users of financial services 
and the public at large. The importance of SIB is illustrated by the fact that its 
members are appointed jointly by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and 
the Governor of the Bank of England. So, the securities industry is not seen as an 
isolated, service segment of the economy. Furthermore, the securities market's role 
as one of the pillars of economic growth has been emphasized. Although not a 
government agency, the Board has the obligation to report annually to the Secretary 
of State and Parliament. 
The Board has statute-backed regulatory powers that include: the ability to 
authorize and restrain investment business, the ability to carry out criminal 
prosecutions if business has been conducted without authorization; the power to take 
civil proceedings and issue reprimands, as well as the forinal power of investigation 
with criminal sanctions. Finally, SIB has the power to recognize Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, i. e. to delegate to them the power of regulation of the investment 
business carried on by their members. SIB does not supervise only securities firms, 
but also investment departments of banks, insurance companies and building 
societies. So, the Board can take a proper view of the whole of the market, 
regardless of the type of participant. 
SIB's main aim is to develop a regulatory framework that equally serves two 
basic purposes: enhancement of investor safety and promotion of market efficiency. 
To this end, it is crucial that professional and industry standards are properly set up 
and widely followed. 
"SIB's major aim is to achieve a high level of investor protection and to 
promote overall efficiency in the financial markets. The system is designed 
to ensure that those providing any form of investment service, including 
those who deal in or advice on investment products, meet standards of 
honesty, competence and solvency. " (italics addedff 
The need for an overall regulatory framework has been recognized explicitly, but 
the regulation of financial markets must not hinder competition and basic market 
forces. The regulatory system, as perceived by the Board, has to be flexible enough 
to be able to react to changes and developments. The latter concerns not just 
different segments of financial markets, but also links with other markets as well 
(e. g. commodities markets). The value of safety ranks high, but not to the extent it 
does in some other financial centres. For example, an Investors' Compensation 
Scheme has been created, providing for payments of up to 48000 pounds sterling to 
private investors if an authorized firm goes into default. For that purpose, the SIB 
maintains high authorization standards for firms, such as consideration of adequacy 
of financial resources and the previous record of the firm. However, too much of 
the protection is not seen as beneficial, and the regulatory action cannot be expected 
to prevent problems caused by market factors. 
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"The overall aim of the regulatory regime is to ensure healthy, 
internationally competitive markets in which both users and practitioners can 
have confidence. 11201 
So, as in the cases of the UK banking associations, efficiency of the markets is the 
top priority 
- 
particularly their competitive position in the international system. 
The SIB is very open to discussions and cooperation with other SROs, 
professional associations and international organizations. As has been mentioned, it 
has joined both international government organizations (e. g. IOSCO) and 
international non-government organizations (such as the ICSA). The SIB's main 
attitude to regulation is that it must always rely on a balance between national 
tradition, local peculiarities, government priorities and the industry needs. This is 
among the best examples of the confidence-regulatory approach. 
"When you design a regulatory system and its specific rules most people 
would agree that you'd be foolish to ignore a special role that the industry 
practitioner can play in designing or preventing unworkable regulation... In 
my view, Government and self-regulation must interact if it's to be good, 
and co-operative regulation. The correct point of balance is the challenge. 
Striking balances is really what we have to do as regulators. "' 
Although the SIB was created rather recently, in comparison to the long- 
standing history of similar agencies in some other countries, it has already 
positioned itself on the global scene. For example, it occupies one of the two 
leading roles in the most prominent organization in the field (interchangeably with 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission): SIB's representatives chair either the 
Executive Committee or the Technical Committee of IOSCO. In that way, the Board 
is perceived to be very near the decision-making "heart" of an international 
regulation process. 
In short, the Board epitomizes another new type of actor in debates about the 
global securities market. It is not a pure government agency, but has been delegated 
important regulatory powers. Although most of its activities are oriented to 
preservation of order, basic guiding principles significantly depart from norms and 
structures of the governmental world. The consideration it pays to the industry 
needs, as well as the reliance on self-regulation, clearly distinguish the Board from 
regulators in other countries. 
6.2.3.2. The Securities and Futures Authority in the UK 
The Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) was set up in 1991, by merging 
the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBD) and the Securities 
Association (TSA). It is one among four SROs empowered by the SIB to exercise 
authority in their particular area of financial services. 103 The SFA is responsible 
for regulating (authorization and supervision of) firms that deal or advise in 
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securities and derivatives. 
SFA has 1400 member firms, and most of them are securities dealers and 
brokers and advisory firms. Concerning the international composition of the 
membership, half of the total are UK firms and the rest are firms from continental 
Europe, US and Japan. So, once again, the UK's high attractiveness to foreign 
business is exemplified in a multinational structure of local associations and 
organizations. Once again, it is really the whole of the securities market that is in 
focus, regardless of national origins of market participants. 
The Authority carries out various activities in relation to authorization, 
monitoring, investigation and prosecution, and enforcement. Authorization of firms 
is actually the most important part of the regulatory process. 
"Firms that seek authorization must provide information which demonstrate 
that they are adequately funded, have viable business plans, that their 
management and staff are suitably experienced and competent and that there 
is no history of malpractice. "" 
So, what is stressed is firstly the need to protect and improve market efficiency 
(solvency, planning, competence), and secondly to promote safety for investors. 
Once a firm has been authorized, it has to maintain close contacts with the SFA and 
provide regular and special information. Above all, the firm has to comply with 
205 SFA rules 
-a new, three-tier, conduct-of-business rules, structure. If a more 
serious breach of rules is suspected, a more focused investigation is undertaken by 
the SFA. This is the phase when the SFA becomes very active in using its liaisons 
with regulatory authorities, both at home and abroad. As it cannot undertake 
criminal prosecution, the SFA passes results of its investigations to the Department 
of Trade and Industry, or to the Police. 
Practitioner-based self-regulation is seen as the proper way of coping with 
modem securities markets. 
"The aim of SFA is to promote and maintain high standards of integrity and 
fair dealing in the carrying on of investment business by bringing to bear the 
detailed knowledge andfle-xibility of practitioner based self regulation to the 
supervision of securities and futures firins and to secure compliance with 
rules fairly and effectively. " (italics addedYO6 
The SFA maintains close links with its membership, to a degree beyond that 
of most of regulators in other countries. This is specially the case when it comes to 
concrete issues of a great salience. For example, commenting on the EC proposal 
for a Capital Adequacy Directive, the SFA International Capital Committee 
"... attached considerable importance to consultation with the membership, 
and the Chairman of the Committee wrote to all firms on two occasions to 
inform them of developments, to highlight issues of concern and to solicit 
their views... 11207 
Furthermore, the SFA does not just endeavour to reach a joint position among its 
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members, but also extensively uses its public relations and links to authorities (at 
home, abroad and international) to communicate its views effectively. In the case 
of international government organizations, where it is not directly represented, the 
SFA works in close coordination with the UK representatives (e. g. the SIB). 
6.2.3.3. The Securities and Exchange Commission in the US 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was founded by 
Congress in 1934, under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act. It is 
described as an independent, non-partisan, quasi-judicial regulatory agency. Its 
foundation was laid in an era which was particularly ripe for reform: there was the 
Great Crash of 1929, a great number of publicized financial scandals, as well as 
numerous cases of market malpractice revealed by the so-called Pecora 
Committee. 208 
"The revelations of the Pecora Committee rival the revelations of the 
modem-day Watergate investigation in terms of the public attention and 
demand for reform to which they led. 1121 
It was in a time of economic instability and political change when public desire for 
financial reforms actually laid the foundations for a new regulatory regime. SEC 
became one of the pillars of the regime. One must take a broader historical view on 
the circumstances that prevailed, in order to understand fully the SEC's mission. It 
was the fear of the market, its powers and mechanisms, that underlined the passage 
of the 1933 Securities Act 
- 
called "truth in securities" legislation. The main axiom 
has been that if information is properly (evenly) distributed among market 
participants, the market will perform its functions most efficiently (the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis in economic theory). After the disastrous experience of the early 
1930s, already-existing lack of confidence in markets was further exaggerated. 
So, the SEC's main responsibility has been to exercise control and 
supervision of the market in a way which would provide protection for investors. 
More specifically, its mission has been to administer federal securities laws, most 
of which were passed during the 1930s and 1940s. 210 
"The purpose of these laws is to ensure that the securities markets are fair 
and honest and to provide the means to enforce the securities laws through 
sanctions... These laws were designed to facilitate informed investment 
analyses and decisions by the investing public, primarily by ensuring 
adequate disclosure of material (significant) information. 11211 (italics added) 
The Commission carries out its work, both in its Washington headquarters 
and in regional offices, through four divisions and offices charged with specific 
responsibilities. The Commission itself is composed of five Commissioners, whose 
appointment has always been a highly politicized matter. One of the rules, rather 
unique among regulators worldwide, implies that no more than three of the 
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Commissioners may belong to the same political party. The Commissioners are 
concerned with matters such as interpretations of laws, amendments, new rules, 
actions to enforce the laws and discipline, etc. Their work is supported by the staff, 
which grew in size over 20 times during sixty years of the SEC's existence. 
The SEC's main activities are primarily oriented toward supporting the 
values of order, safety and equality in the market. It is concerned with information 
disclosure in primary distribution (securities registration), disclosure for publicly 
traded firms (financial statements of issuers), control of secondary markets (rules 
for conduct on the stock exchanges), insider activities, corporate governance, anti- 
fraud regulation, and control over investment companies. So, promotion of market 
order and investor safety have for a long time been the SEC's only preoccupation. 
However, as certain market developments (e. g. the emergence of "third" and 
"fourth" markets) were occurring in the beginning of the 1970, it became obvious 
that regulation was falling behind the reality. Promotion of competition in securities 
markets and enhancement of their efficiency gained in importance. It has been 
realized that strict control and safety standards should not be the only values to 
guide the work of SEC. As capital started to flow out from the US (in order to 
avoid this strict control), the value of wealth and efficiency goals ascended on the 
agenda. In 1975, SEC was mandated to facilitate the development of a National 
Market System 
- 
an automated auction market for all outstanding securities. "' An 
example of the pre-1975 SEC's attitudes is the interpretation of trading and sales 
practices (1934 Securities Exchange Act): 
"These provisions seek to curb misrepresentations and deceit, market 
manipulation, and other fraudulent acts and practices. They also strive to 
establish and maintainjust and equitable principles of trade conducive to 
maintaining open, fair and orderly markets. 11213 (italics added) 
The Commission is among very few regulators that maintain such an 
authoritative posture toward the securities industry. In striking contrast to, for 
example, the UK Securities and Futures Authority, the SEC takes due care that the 
decisions and rules are flowing from the top down, and that information is 
constantly flowing upwards. It is always emphasized that the SEC is an independent 
agency, i. e. a non-govemmental body. However, it often acts not an agency for the 
securities industry 
- 
but An agency "over" the industry. So, it could also been 
described as "independent" from the industry itself. 
SEC exemplifies a high-status political actor, having in mind a wide range 
of powers delegated to it and diverse means to achieve its mission. As its main goal 
has been to control the market, the speed and depth of the financial revolution has 
been perceived (by SEC) as the most important threat to its work. A feeling of high 
value-deprivation is sometimes very obvious: 
"The 'Brave New World', as Commissioner James Treadway termed the 
changing and rapidly -growing financial service industry, is the biggest issue 
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facing the Commission 
- 
and one which is beyond its control. ""' 
It is not only unforeseeable market developments that are felt as threats. 
Certain measures in the field of international regulation are also seen as jeopardizing 
the SEC's role and status. That is the reason underlying a very cautious approach 
of SEC towards supranational regulation. 
"We have to be prepared to take whatever time it takes to work out the 
problems with new standards before we inflict them on markets, not 
afterwards. Capital standards in particular can have significant unintended 
results, like the immense reduction in commercial lending by banks in the 
US that has been at least in part caused by the Basle capital standards for 
banks 
, 
""I 
SEC is definitely among a very few highly-influential actors participating in 
debates about the global securities market. The Commission is so well positioned 
on the scene that its views are most effectively communicated to other participants. 
For example, its chairman also chairs the IOSCO Technical Conunittee, which deals 
with matters of an essential importance for the global securities market. 216 
Although it almost never enters into formal agreements with other actors, it 
maintains direct, informal contacts with regulators and professional associations 
abroad. 
Although the macroeconomic conditions that surrounded the SEC's creation 
are by no means similar to the present-day environment, the Commission has 
maintained some of its basic features. 
"Regulatory bodies, like the people who comprise them, have a marked life 
cycle. In youth they are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic, and even 
intolerant. Later they mellow, and in old age 
- 
after a matter of ten or fifteen 
years 
- 
they become, with some exceptions, either an arm of the industry 
they are regulating or senile. The SEC was especially aggressive, and the 
Wall Street was certain to seem a challenging antagonist. ""' 
The uniqueness of SEC relates to the fact that, over a long period of existence, it 
has neither become senile, nor an agency for the industry. In the b eginning of the 
1990s, SEC is even more assertive in continuing to protect the values of order and 
safety 
- 
as the emergence of the global securities market is yet more of a challenge 
than the chaos of the 1930s. 
6.2.4. International organizations 
This group of actors is a very diverse one, as it comprises international 
organizations (or more precisely, committees of such organizations, which deal with 
financial regulation) and various regulatory groups formed on different supranational 
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levels. Basically, these are intergoverntnental actors, but it also includes a new type 
of political actor on the global scene: international quasi non-governmental 
organizations. 218 
"An iquango is an international organisation which includes in its 
membership both government departments and/or other governmental 
institutions and single-country, non-governmental organisations and/or multi- 
country, international non-governmental organisations. 11211 
Two examples of iquangos are included in this study: the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Councils of Securities 
Associations (ICSA). Neither of them is a pure international non-governmental 
organization (though that has been permanently stressed by the IOSCO Secretariat 
and by some authors ... ), nor a "classical" intergovernmental organization, 
established by an agreement among governments. IOSCO comprises "national" 
authorities concerned with securities regulation. The ICSA has self-regulatory 
organizations, an international self-regulatory association and several trading 
associations as its members. As illustrated, sometimes national securities regulators 
are highly independent from their governments (both in respect of decision-making 
and funding). In other instances, regulators are indeed government departments. Yet 
in other cases, regulators of the securities industry are formally government- 
independent, but actually serve as an "arm" of the government. In general, most of 
the regulators are, considered to be "independent agencies" or "independent 
regulatory commissions". Such bodies are freed from full administrative control 
from their governments, and perform quasi-judicial and regulatory functions in 
connection to one or several industries. They are sometimes labelled as "quangos", 
in order to stress their broad regulatory powers and a relatively-high level of 
autonom y. 
However, most of these regulatory bodies have been founded by their 
governments, and are still responsible to corresponding ministries or government 
departments. Most often, chairpersons of such bodies are appointed by the president 
or the government. For example, the US president designates chairmen of SEC, 
who play strong leadership role. The SEC's proposed legislation, budgets and 
litigation are reviewable in the Senate. In the UK, members of the Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB), including its executive chairman, are appointed jointly by 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the Governor of the Bank of 
England 
. 
22' Having in mind a diversity of the both IOSCO's and ICSA's 
membership (which will be discussed in the following section), as well as still 
theoretically ambiguous nature of "independent regulatory commissions", it can be 
concluded that the two represent a new type of political actor 
- 
iquangos. 
The diversity of the group accentuates not only different nature of the actors, 
but also a wide scope of routes that can be taken by single-country actors in order 
to achieve a preferable disposition of stakes. For example, the regulators from the 
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UK participate directly in debates carried out within: IOSCO, the G-10 Basle 
Committee, the EC Banking Advisory Committee, the Banking Supervisory Sub- 
Committee of the Committee of Governors of the EC central banks, the OECD 
Committee on International Investment, the OECD Committee on Capital 
Movements and Invisible Transactions, the UN Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, and the GATT Group for Negotiations on Services. 
This group also exemplifies a varying degree of political status the analyzed 
actors enjoy, as well as the different scope of their concerns. For instance, the UN 
Commission on Transnational Corporations deals with more general matters, like 
a code of business conduct, which are nonetheless related to the global securities 
market. It is by far much less influential than certain organizations or regulatory 
groups "specialized" in the securities markets. Different committees from the 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the OECD and EC, also enjoy a rather 
high status, but their scope of concern is neither "general" (as of the UNCTC), nor 
global (as of IOSCO). These committees emphasise certain concrete stakes, such as 
the authorization of market entry, but always from the perspective of a broader 
organization. In addition, certain actors place the debate on the global securities 
market within the context of other hyper-issues (e. g. regulatory groups from 
developing countries, within the context of development). 
It might seem unreasonable, at first, to cluster such different actors under the 
same heading. However, what gives them common characteristics is the fact that 
they all actually epitomize different answers of the intergovernmental world to an 
emerging global issue. The proliferation of forms and modes of these responses 
indeed justifies the choice of Global Politics as a theoretical framework for this 
analysis. Regulation of the securities market has become an issue of an-extremely 
high salience for many actors, although not being in the realm of the classical "high 
politics". National interests are perceived as being seriously affected by global 
capital flows, but the archetypal state weapons seem rather irrelevant. Moreover, 
integration processes have generated many new opportunities for communication and 
political manoeuvres. 
6.2.4.1. International Councils of Securities Associations 
The International Councils of Securities Associations (ICSA) was formed in 
1988, under the name "International Councils of Securities Dealers and Self- 
Regulatory Associations". This organization still endeavours; to establish itself as an 
actor on the global scene, by trying to widen the membership and make its views 
more effectively communicated to regulators and public. Although not being among 
the most prominent actors, the ICSA certainly deserves to be included in this 
survey. The primary reason for that lies in its rather unique membership 
composition: the ICSA equally encompasses both professional associations and self- 
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regulatory bodies. It epitomizes one of the most important institutional links which 
is definitely going to gain in relevance, as global financial expansion continues and 
regulatory problems mushroom. 
Originally, the organization was composed of two councils: the Council of 
Self-Regulatory Associations and the Council of Securities Dealers Associations. 
The first represented organizations with regulatory authority over their members 
under the laws of their domiciliary country. The second Council encompassed 
professional and business associations and organizations. 
"It was formed in 1988 out of the growing internationalization of securities 
markets and the need to establish harmonious, efficient systems to operate 
and regulate cross-border trading of securities. ""' 
So, promotion of market efficiency was seen as one aim, and development of an 
adequate cross-border regulation as another aim, separate from the first one. For 
that reason, the organization was composed of the two Councils 
- 
on the assumption 
that these two aspects of the global securities market (efficiency and regulation) have 
to be dealt with separately. At least, it was assumed that regulators have one group 
of motives in common, and business has another. However, as issues related to 
international transactions grew in 'complexity and their interlinking, it became 
obvious that any kind of "separation" between the actors involved could hamper 
both basic aims. The need for a closer cooperation between the industry and 
regulators led to abandoning the original structure of the organization. 
In 1992, the organization comprised 11 members: three self-regulatory 
organizations (from Canada, the US and Britain), one international self-regulatory 
association (ISMA), and seven independent professional associations from the 
industry-. In some other international organizations concerned with the global 
securities market (e. g. IOSCO), these different types of actors do not have an equal 
status as they do in the ICSA. For example, this is the only international forum 
where British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association and the UK 
Securities and Futures Authority have equal voice. However, besides placing the 
regulators and professionals around the same table to discuss international issues, 
the ICSA provides an environment conducive for development of new links between 
them. So, for example, these two types of actors can communicate more effectively 
also on issues not transcending the UK borders. In addition, they can more easily 
develop a joint position on issues relevant for the preservation of the UK position 
in world finance. 
The main aim of the organization is the promotion of the sound growth of 
the international securities markets and the facilitation of international transactions. 
This basic aim is further specified through two objectives: encouraging 
harmonization in the procedures and regulation of the markets, and building a joint 
members' position toward salient issues. A great importance is attached to the 
second objective, so the ICSA permanently works on establishing frequent 
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communication (internal and external), promoting mutual understanding, and on 
sharing and exchanging of information between the members. One of the concrete 
goals, albeit not explicitly stated, is that members should build the contacts with 
their respective home-country governments in a way that would enable them to 
lobby effectively for the global growth of the securities markets. An illustration for 
this can be found in a statement of the Chairman of the Korean Securities Dealers 
Association, made after it had been welcomed as a new ICSA member. 
"I assure you that I will do my best to perforin the role and responsibility as 
an ICSA member and to closely coordinate with our government authorities 
in further expanding the depth and width of our securities market 
internationalization both with respect to permitting increased international 
investment in Korean securities and expanded access for foreign securities 
professionals to the Korean securities markets. 11223 
Concerning international regulation of the securities markets, the ICSA takes 
the position that it must not develop as an impediment for the global growth of the 
markets. Furthermore, any harmonization must be undertaken gradually and within 
a broad international context. 
"In promoting the development of global capital markets and securities 
business, we must continue to cooperate in preventing regulations from 
becoming obstacles to these goals. At the same time, it is necessary to 
coordinate on a global basis the necessary regulations for securities 
transactions and business. For this purpose, ICSA must work actively and 
effectively to support IOSCO. (italics added)""' 
Having in mind these postures taken by the ICSA, it is not surprising that certain 
rather "conservative" regulators (for example, from the US and Germany) are far 
from participating in the Councils. So, what the ICSA actually represents is a small, 
but fairly united, front on the global scene that presses toward preserving a relative 
freedom of the global securities market. A unique feature of the organization is that 
it comprises actors according to their basic orientation, but regardless of their status, 
influence, internal organization or powers delegated to them in the home countries. 
The protection of the value of freedom underlies all the actions, but not the freedom 
from all regulation. The imposition of order is actually a prerequisite for the 
efficient global development of capital markets, but only as long as it does not 
impinge on basic market forces. 
6.2.4.2. International Organization of Securities Commissions 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is 
unquestionably an institutional centre of debates about the global securities market. 
The first IOSCO Annual Conference was held in Venezuela, in 1974. In 1987, 
IOSCO was legally incorporated as a non-profit organization, headquartered in 
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Montreal. 
In 1992, IOSCO had 92 members representing 60 countries. Its membership 
is divided into three categories: 1) regular members (national authorities) with 
voting power; 2) associate members (some trading associations) which do not vote, 
but are eligible for the Presidents Committee, and 3) affiliate members (stock 
exchanges, professional associations and international organizations) which are only 
eligible for the Consultative Committee. The first group is highly diversified and 
comprises securities commissions, banking supervisors, financial authorities, central 
banks, ministries of finance, stock exchanges and associations of stock exchanges. 
The representative body of each country is chosen according to its regulatory 
structure. What is of a great significance for this analysis is the composition of the 
third group of members. The affiliate members include stock exchanges, derivative 
exchanges, associations of exchanges and associations of dealers, but also 
representatives of the Commission of European Communities and OECD. In 
addition, some self-regulatory organizations are also represented, for example the 
International Securities Market Association. 
So, all types of actors are represented in IOSCO: governments, government 
agencies, self-regulatory organizations, international governmental and non- 
governmental actors, individual market participants and their associations. Besides, 
all market segments are "covered": securities and derivative instruments. IOSCO's 
central role in debates over the global securities market is due to, inter alia, these 
two features of its membership: all types of actors are there, and they represent or 
regulate all major market segments. Although national commissions form the "core" 
of the Organization and vote for strategic decisions, IOSCO is very open for 
consultations with other actors. What is even more important, all the affiliate 
members have equal status regardless of their nature. So, for example, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange has a same say as the OECD or the EC representatives. 
The Presidents Committee is at the top of IOSCO's organizational structure, 
and is made up of all the presidents of member (regular and associate) agencies. It 
elects the Executive Committee, which in addition comprises representatives from 
the Regional Committees (Interamerican, European and Asia-Pacific Regional 
Committee). The work of the Executive Committee is supported by two specialist 
bodies. The first one, the Technical Committee consists of the securities agencies 
that regulate the most developed markets in the world. It is concerned with the 
matters most essential to the global market: multinational issues, disclosure and 
accounting; regulation of secondary markets and intermediaries; exchange of 
information, etc. 
The second specialist body is the Development Committee, which endeavors 
to promote the development of emerging securities markets. It has identified the 
three priority areas: market incentives, clearing and settlement, and 
internationalization experiences and disclosure. 
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So, IOSCO is structured along the two lines: a regional and a developmental 
o ne. The existence of the two structuring criteria emphasizes its truly global scope 
of concern. Certain problems and matters relevant to the securities markets originate 
from each country's historical background, culture and tradition. There are also 
problems derived from regional integration processes. For that reason, common 
interests and aversions can more easily be identified among countries belonging to 
the same region. For example, a cautious approach toward opening financial markets 
is widely shared among many countries in the South-East Asia. Yet other important 
matters are closely related to the level of market development and sophistication. 
For example, regulators of emerging markets are much more concerned with 
attracting foreign investors than with supervising global securities issues. This two- 
fold problem approach enables IOSCO to take the broadest possible perspective over 
arising stakes. In addition, affiliate members bring in their own perceptions 
- 
for 
instance, the industry's point of view. In this way, it is easier to identify common 
denominators, i. e. to cluster issues within distinct issue-dimensions. Hence, adequate 
policy packages can be created and negotiated, as well as concrete policy measures. 
Having in mind that IOSCO is actually a set of regulators, it is surprising 
how its main objectives are ranked. 
"The member agencies have resolved: to cooperate to ensure a better 
regulation of the markets, on the domestic as well as on the international 
level in order to maintain just and efficient securities markets; to exchange 
information in order to promote the development of domestic markets; to 
unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of 
international securities transactions... "" (italics added) 
So, for the Organization as a whole (as interpreted by its Secretariat), the values of 
equality and wealth are perceived as being the most important to be promoted. The 
value of development is emphasized as a separate value, although some of its 
content can also be subsumed under the value of equality. For example, some of the 
nonns that accentuate the right of developing countries to participate in the creation 
of a global environment favourable for their emerging markets, or sharing of 
developed markets' experience, can also serve the promotion of equality among 
market participants. Finally, the value of order is underscored by recognizing the 
need to establish a common framework for supervising domestic and cross-border 
transactions. 
When the analysis is focused on the IOSCO Committees, however, different 
accents are put on the underlying, basic values. The Executive Committee, for 
example, perceives IOSCO as the major international forum for collaboration on 
regulatory issues. Its broad aim is to 
"... facilitate the efforts of national regulators in ensuring that such business 
is conducted by adequately capitalized firms through safe and sound market 
systems, with investors afforded proper protection. 11226 
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So, system soundness (adequate capital base of firms) and investors' safety should 
primarily guide the work of IOSCO. 
The Technical Committee, on the other hand, places much more emphasis 
on creating a comprehensive and stringent system of market regulation and control. 
From this point of view, IOSCO is seen as a forum that gathers experts to review 
regulatory problems and propose practical solutions. Apart from recognizing the 
impact of global integration, national laws and national regulators must maintain 
autonomy and the largest body of responsibility. So, IOSCO should serve to reach 
a consensus among regulators: 
"For the future, our work will hopefully continue to be useful in functioning 
as a 'clearinghouse' of ideas and techniques of members around the world. 
As the world we live in becomes perhaps a bit more uncertain, it becomes 
all the more important to share early warnings of problems and solutions that 
work or don't work with each other. However, if the Technical Committee 
were to be used to try to force the attitudes of some markets onto others, the 
result would be unfortunate and unproductive. "227 
The Consultative Committee (made up of the affiliate members) sees IOSCO 
as a vehicle for cooperation in the securities regulatory field, but not just 
cooperation among government (statutory) regulators. Such a prominent international 
forum should serve the promotion of self-regulation, and of cooperation between the 
government and self-regulatory agencies. 
"Self-regulatory organisations are natural and important parts of the 
securities regulatory system. Regulatory cooperation between goverm-nent 
regulators and self-regulators is essential to successful regulation. 
Cooperative regulation is highly desirable, and in IOSCO one aspect of that 
regulation can be achieved by allowing self-regulators early opportunity to 
respond and to influence proposed IOSCO substantive regulatory 
policies. ""' (italics added) 
From this perspective, IOSCO should create an environment favourable for 
developing closer contacts between the industry itself, its own regulatory structures 
and government agencies. 
IOSCO is concerned with many aspects of the securities industry's 
functioning and regulation, at both the national and the global level. Its major recent 
activities include: 1) a proposal on capital adequacy standards for securities firms; 
2) a set of principles ("Memoranda of Understanding") which should foster 
reciprocal assistance among members on market oversight and the prevention of 
fraud; 3) the Rio Declaration, that calls on signatories to provide assistance on a 
reciprocal basis in the gathering of information for market supervision; 4) the 
resolution on the principles for the oversight of screen-based trading systems for 
derivative products, and 5) the resolution on international principles of business 
conduct. 
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For the course of this study, the first and the fifth group of these activities 
are of a great importance. The Memorandum on Capital Adequacy Standards of the 
Technical Committee was addressed to the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervisors. It sought to clarify and improve (or even amend, where necessary) the 
Basle proposals, regarding minimum levels of capital for internationally active 
securities firms and banks. It has to be pointed out that in January 1992, for the first 
time, the IOSCO Technical Committee and the Basle Committee held a joint 
meeting to consider proposed capital rules, to achieve preliminary understandings 
and determine forms of the future cooperation 
. 
229 Both sides have recognized 
efficiency benefits which should be derived from eliminating the competition 
between the frameworks. If the market is going global, so must the regulation as 
well. If the distinctions between different market sectors are blurring on the global 
level, separate / parallel regulatory frameworks can either induce an overregulation 
or open loopholes. In either situation, the efficiency goal is hampered. 
In 1991, IOSCO adopted the Resolution on international conduct of business 
principles, expressing basic standards of business conduct for financial firms. The 
IOSCO members were called on to recognize, implement and promote the following 
principles: a) honesty and fairness, b) best service, c) capabilities, d) information 
about customers, e) information for customers, f) conflicts of interest, and g) 
211 compliance. It has been realised that not all of a firm's activities and attitudes 
can be regulated ex ante. For example, regulation cannot "foster" or "encourage" 
a firm to act in the best interest of its customers. Regulation can act ex post, after 
certain rules (professional standards or legal rules) have been breached. So, the 
purpose of these principles is to stimulate the development of a general market 
environment that would not be conducive for fraud, malpractice, sloth and 
incompetence. ' A very similar set of business principles has been recently adopted 
by the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (see above). 
So, IOSCO is a top-status actor in debates over the global securities market. 
It is indeed a global actor, regarding the scope and structure of its membership, but 
also the scope of its concern. IOSCO is very open for communication and 
negotiation with other actors, regardless of their position on the scene. It cooperates 
with the Basle Committee, but also with, for example, the International Federation 
of Accountants, the International Standards Organization, the Group of Thirty, etc. 
IOSCO is highly sensitive to both internal and external demands, and is very active 
in maintaining proper communication channels. It is permissive to internal changes, 
and even allows different interests of different members to be put forth. IOSCO 
fully recognizes the complexity of global market structures, and that is the reason 
behind including intergov6rnme ntal organizations in its membership. However, 
norms and principles of the intergovernmental world are still upheld. Even though 
I These principles will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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the members should implement "Memoranda of Understanding" for better 
supervision of markets, one of the principles recognizes the right of the requested 
authority to refuse to provide assistance on public policy grounds. Nevertheless, 
IOSCO does create an environment wherein government bodies and other-than- 
government agencies can directly communicate. 
6.2.4.3. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (formerly the Basle Committee 
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices) was originally set up by the G- 
10 governorS231 in December 1974. In 1992 it comprised representatives from 
twelve countries. 
The progressive intemationalisation of financial markets, during the early 
1970s, added to the need for deeper understanding and cooperation among central 
banks of the main developed countries. As early as 1971, concerns about the 
evolution of external currency markets led to the establishment of the Eurocurrency 
Standing Committee of the G-10 central banks. Experience in this field, as well as 
the failures of the Herstatt Bank (Germany) and the Franklin National Bank (US) 
in 1974, prompted the authorities to strengthen their cooperation. As international 
banking was expanding, the Basle Committee was gaining in significance and 
positioned itself as the centrepillar of international regulatory efforts. The collapse 
of the Banco Ambrosiano in 1982 (discussed in Chapter Four) gave a strong impetus 
to the work of the Committee. Having in mind that the Committee was created by 
the authorities from the most developed markets, it not surprising that its activities 
and proposals attracted world-wide attention. Although its work is carried out in the 
Bank for International Settlements, the Committee has no formal links with the 
Bank. 
The work of the Committee encompasses three main areas: 1) it is a forum 
for communication and discussion over specific supervisory problems; 2) it 
coordinates the sharing of supervisory responsibilities among national regulators; 
and 3) it works toward enhancing standards of supervision, in order to strengthen 
the soundness and stability of international banking. So, the Committee is not just 
to provide direct contacts among regulators, but also to establish the division of 
labour and standards and procedures for cross-border supervision. 
The Committee's first task was to draw up a set of principles governing the 
supervision of banks' foreign establishments. The initial document was agreed upon 
in 1975, and it came to be known as the Concordat. These arrangements, revised 
in 1983, took the fonn of recommended guidelines for best practice (not minimum 
standards). The essence of the document is in the assignment of supervisory 
authority to the appropriate government, so that the responsibility is shared among 
the host- and the home country. 232 The assignment of supervisory responsibility 
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applies to three types of banking institutions (branches, subsidiaries, and joint 
ventures) with respect to three factors (solvency, liquidity, and foreign exchange 
operations and positions). 233 
In 1990, a supplement to the Concordat was issued, regarding information 
flows between banking supervisory authorities. It seeks to provide practical guidance 
for permanent contacts and collaboration among regulators. The Concordat was 
supplemented again in July 1992, in relation to supervision of banking groups 
(which can include, besides banks, other financial and non-bank entities). The 
responsibility for supervising international banking groups rests with a home-country 
authority, and the creation of these groups should receive the prior consent of both 
home and host countries. The 1992 Supplement also stresses the right of authorities 
to gather information from cross-border groups, and their right (but not the 
obligation) to impose restrictive measures upon such groups. 234 
Another important document agreed upon is the 1988 Capital Accord, 
officially entitled "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards". It sets out the details of the agreed framework for measuring capital 
adequacy (assessing a bank's capital in relation to credit risk), as well as standards 
to be achieved over certain period of time. 235 
The Capital Accord certainly represents the most significant agreement 
concerning financial markets reached among the most developed countries. It 
emphasizes a relatively high degree of consensus among the most influential 
regulators, in respect to a general approach towards the global financial market 
place. As described by the Committee's former chairman, Peter Cook, this 
agreement 
"... is only a staging post 
- 
albeit an important one 
- 
in a continuing process. 
The Committee's agreed paper is thus rather the end of the beginning than 
the beginning of the end on this subject... It may be reasonably regarded as 
a significant milestone in the establishment of a common supervisory 
response to the existence of a single, highly competitive, international 
banking market. it236 
It was necessary briefly to overview major achievements of the Committee's 
work, in order to illustrate its general posture towards developments on the global 
financial scene. Basic values sought to be protected are undoubtedly the ones of 
safety, order and equality. Particularly in contrast to IOSCO, there is almost an 
absolute lack of attention paid to issues such as market efficiency, competition, 
market barriers, integration of emerging markets, etc. The system soundness and 
stability are perceived as being crucially dependent on an adequate regulation and 
continuous supervision. Moreover, governments are regarded as being able to 
exercise such a control, either unilaterally or in coordination with other 
governments. Norms and principles of the intergovernmental world are strongly 
upheld, particularly concerning the highest level of policy- and decision-making. 
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The 1990 Basle Concordat Supplement, for example, is 
"... designed to encourage more regular and structured collaboration between 
supervisors, with a view to improving the quality and completeness of the 
supervision of cross-border banking, while not in any way seeking to 
supplant the discrete responsibilities of host and parent supervisors. 
(italics added) 
Although the Committee fully recognizes the need for cross-border 
cooperation of regulators, it however allows the existence of certain "reserves" a 
country can put on this cooperation. 
"It is recognized that parent authorities cannot always be expected to 
communicate potentially damaging information about the difficulties of a 
parent bank, disclosure of which would hinder the restoration of 
confidence... Another possible obstacle is the existence of national secrecy 
laws designed to protect the legitimate interests of bank customers. ""' 
So, the cooperation should be developed but only to the extent where it does not put 
in jeopardy certain "higher" national goals (for example, macroeconomic stability 
and confidence in the financial -system affecting it). The Committee's attitude of 
respect for the intergoverninental world are evident especially when it comes to 
practical collaboration and implementation of agreements. For example, the 1988 
Capital Accord stresses that the agreed standards need to allow flexibility of 
implementation according to differing legal and structural circumstances across 
countries. 
Having in mind that the Committee is composed of representatives of the 
main developed countries, wherein the great majority of international banks are 
parented, it is not surprising that parent authorities' rights are strongly advocated. 
The 1983 Principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments, for 
example, have opened the possibility of extraterritorial reach of parent authorities. 
"It is the responsibility of the parent authority to ascertain whether the host 
authority is able to undertake adequate supervision... In cases where host 
authority supervision is inadequate the parent authority should either extend 
its supervision, to the degree that it is practicable, or it should be prepared 
to discourage the parent bank from continuing to operate the establishment 
in question. ""' (italics added) 
The Committee is reluctant to suggest any form of radical changes, 
particularly if that would result in the creation of new, supranational bodies or fora. 
In the case of international banking groups, for example, it would be neither 
adequate nor sufficient to form cross-border groups of regulators. 
"Another lesson from the [BCCI] affair is that the 'college' concept is not 
a full substitute for a clearly designated lead supervisor who can effectively 
monitor the worldwide operations of a complex group. ""' 
The Committee has become one of the most influential international fora. 
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dealing with financial regulation. The impact of its proposals and the agreements 
reached, extends well beyond the Group of Ten countries 
- 
founders of the 
Committee. For example, members of the Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors"' have also subscribed to the Basle Concordat, as well as a number 
of other countries. On the industry side, banks have put a lot of effort by themselves 
to strengthen their capital base. "' Proposals and "papers" submitted by the Basle 
Committee have always been the most important ones to be discussed at the bi- 
annual International Conferences of Banking Supervisors. 243 
Another characteristic of the Committee is exemplified by its desire to 
achieve high value satisfaction. The protection of values of order and safety is 
sought through a two-fold approach to banking regulation. On one hand, the 
Committee works toward creating a global environment that is conducive for 
effective financial supervision and control. 
"This overview of some of the current initiatives of the Basle Committee is 
interesting in its own right, but to the community of supervisors its value 
should lie not in its specifics but rather in the message that those specifics 
are conveying about the broad environment in which we must discharge our 
responsibilities... It is important that we have a vision as to what may lie 
ahead as we seek to adapt our ideas and our ideals in a manner that is 
sensitive to the past but alert to the future. "244 
On the other hand, the work of the Committee has widened to encompass many 
stakes outside the two "original" areas (consolidated supervision and capital 
adequacy). Some of the recently covered matters include: limits on large exposure, 
measuring and managing liquidity, the supervision of financial conglomerates, 
netting arrangements for interbank settlements, and regulatory proposals for 
securities firms. From the Committee's point of view, they all serve for the 
realisation of the same two values 
- 
order and safety, hence they would form an 
issue-dimension. 
Although the Committee has been primarily oriented to the supervision of 
commercial banking, it has nevertheless entered debates about the global securities 
market. Its approach to this hyper-issue will be examined more closely in the 
following chapter. However, what is important for this part of the analysis is the 
Committee's role in preserving structures of the intergovernmental world. 
It has been creating a general surrounding for the community of regulators 
to exercise control, and has been simultaneously dealing with a number of concrete 
stakes. Although its proposals are not legal minima, the Committee's reputation 
actually enforces a worldwide compliance. In this way, the Committee has seized 
a position which assures itself that no other actor (or group of actors) can seriously 
affect the ranking of values it advocates. 
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6.2.4.4. Other international groupings 
Whether it is a universal organization such as the UN or it is devoted to 
regional integration such as the European Community or the SEANZA forum, many 
intergovernmental organizations have set up a committee or a commission to deal 
with global financial markets. A feature that distinguishes them from other actors 
on the scene relates to their less-than-global scope of concern. Most often, the main 
attitudes and goals are set within a global framework interpreted at the 
organization's level. They are important structures for political processes at the 
organization's level. Regarding global debates, they definitely add another 
perspective, the one of international organizations as political actors per se. With 
the probable exception of the EC committees, they take neither a very broad nor a 
very detailed approach to international financial matters. These actors frequently 
limit participation in debates to a group of stakes, which they perceive as being 
salient for the realisation of the same values. These activities, however, need to be 
included in this survey as they underscore a multiplicity of channels being created 
- 
among national regulators themselves and among various groups of national 
regulators on the global level. 
As publicly available information from international fora (e. g. IOSCO and. 
the Basle Committee) and international regulatory conferences do not reveal many 
details about the participation of these actors, basic attitudes will be exemplified by 
an overview of their recent activities. The scope of this overview allows for the 
inclusion of only few actors, which are nonetheless very influential in the debate 
over securities markets regulation. 
a) The EC Banking Advisory Committee 
Following the 1985 White Paper, the Commission of the European 
Communities aimed at creating a new policy and an adequate framework for, inter 
alia, the free movement of financial products. It has been realized that one of the 
major components of the Single European Market and the European financial 
common market is related to financial services. It was necessary to liberalize 
operating conditions for financial services, but also to give consumers access to the 
best possible service throughout the EC. In 1988, the Commission decided to 
proceed with the full liberalization of capital movements. 245 Concerning the 
liberalization of banking services, it was decided to work, already in the early 
1970s, towards harmonizing the rules governing credit institutions. Hence, the First 
Banking Directive was adopted in 1977, and the principle of home-country control 
introduced. The Second Banking Directive was adopted in 1989,246 inaugurating 
the single banking passport and new provisions on the minimum capital required by 
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credit institutions. 
Concerning the securities markets, in June 1992 political agreement was 
reached on the contentious elements of the Investment Services Directive". Once 
adopted, the Directive will parallel the Second Banking Directive, setting minimum 
conditions for authorizations and the single "passport". The proposed Capital 
Adequacy Directive" will complement it by establishing the minimum capital 
requirements for both banks and investment companies carrying out investment 
business. 
In such an environment, the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) has a very 
active role to play. It was set up by the 1977 Directive, and comprises three 
representatives from each of the bodies responsible for bank supervision in the 
Member States. The BAC works in close cooperation with the Contact Group of EC 
Supervisory Authorities, and they jointly follow the implementation of the 
Directives. It also performs a role of advising the Commission on new proposals, 
and gathering comments and proposals from the public. To fulfil this role, the BAC 
maintains close liaisons with national regulators and self-regulatory organizations 
(both national and international), as well as with banking federations and 
associations. Finally, the BAC works toward additional coordination of banking 
legislation at the EC level, concerning deposit protection schemes, large exposures, 
consolidated supervision and capital adequacy for securities houses. 
The BAC is open for cooperation with other actors, for example with the 
Basle Committee and IOSCO, on equal terms. However, it takes the view that 
stricter rules should be imposed on investment banks regarding their capital base. 
This somewhat reflects a fear, widespread among some of the EC members, that 
European investment banking is more vulnerable to competition from the outside 
(particularly from US securities houses). Nevertheless, the BAC does not propose 
strict rules in relation to supervision of market functioning, e. g. reporting and 
transparency. When market efficiency is suspected to be hampered due to 
publication requirements ("exceptional market conditions"), the authorities may 
delay or suspend the requirements. More flexible rules may be drawn up by the 
authorities for bond trading as well. 
In relation to consolidated banking supervision, the BAC takes a rather 
different view from the Basle Committee. 
"There was also agreement in favour of the principle that the competent 
authorities supervising different types of financial institutions should beftee 
to exchange information for prudential purposes on condition that this is 
dealt with in a confidential manner and that there is reciprocity. ""' (italics 
added) 
So, it is even more up to the governments to decide whether to disclose information 
or not. The principle of reciprocity is reiterated through all major documents, and 
this definitely emphasizes a positive posture taken regarding prospective regime 
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fonnation. " Safety and, to a much lesser extent, efficiency are seen as the basic 
values to guide all the activities. 
b) The Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee 
The Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee was established by the Committee 
of Governors of the EC central banks in 1990, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Delors Report". As Stage One of the plan for Economic 
and Monetary Union requires the completion of the European financial area and the 
complete liberalization of capital movements, it has been necessary to set up a new 
body to coordinate the work of supervisors. The Sub-Committee is composed of 
senior representatives of each Community central bank or another competent 
authority. 
The principal task of the Sub-Committee is to hold regular consultations on 
matters of common interest relating to banking supervision. It pays particular 
attention to reaching a joint position among authorities on issues with a Community- 
wide dimension. Equal attention is being devoted to communicating positions where 
necessary. One such issue is the stability of both financial institutions and markets 
in the Community, and for that reason it often creates working groups to carry out 
detailed studies. In order to ensure effective coordination with other actors, it liaises 
with, for example, the Basle Committee, the EC Banking Advisory Committee and 
with the Commission of the European Communities. 
Since its formation, it has dealt with following matters: the proposed 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), supervision of financial conglomerates, 
consolidated banking supervision, the BCCI affair, and cooperation among European 
national credit registers. 
Although being predominantly oriented toward monetary matters, the Sub- 
Committee also pays due regard to matters falling within the competence of the 
central banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and markets. It has 
been realised that central banking and broad monetary affairs should not be dealt 
with separately from financial markets. A close cooperation between central 
authorities in this regard should add another perspective (macroeconomic) towards 
the role of financial markets. Furthermore, the composition of the Sub-Committee 
"upgrades" the macroeconomic perspective to the Community level. So, the basic 
value of order (stability) is not to be promoted only at the national level, but also 
at the organization's level. 
c) The OECD Committee on International Investment 
The Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
was established by the OECD Council in 1975, in order to establish a framework 
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for close cooperation relating to cross-border transactions. Its first task was to draft 
a set of guidelines for conduct of transnational business, in consultation with two 
other OECD bodies: the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the 
Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC). 
The Committee exemplifies a response of the intergoverninental world to 
emerging global markets, but very different in nature from other governmental 
responses. It resembles the Organization's perception that international flows of 
capital are mostly beneficial to recipient countries, and therefore liberalization of 
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markets a're a prerequisite for further economic growth. 
"From the 1960s on, liberalisation gained impetus and has continued and 
developed to the present. These efforts have been part and parcel of a 
broader trend in the OECD area encompassing liberalisation of cross-border 
capital and service operations, greater recourse to the operation of market 
forces, deregulation and privatisation, fiscal reform, and so on. The 
generally more welcoming attitude to international direct investment is also 
related to the growing internationalisation and interdependence of 
economies... "" (italics added) 
The Committee's scope of concern and approach are also different from other actors 
on the scene. Measures chosen to affect rising global markets are primarily oriented 
to financial institutions and firms. They are not so much regulatory and restrictive 
in nature, but seek to influence (guide) the behaviour of market participants. At the 
international level, these measures are aimed at strengthening and further developing 
mutual cooperation and understanding between governments and investors. 
The work of the Committee has to be viewed within a broad approach taken 
by the OECD towards international investment. In 1961, the Member States adopted 
the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the Code of Liberalisation of 
Current Invisible Operations. It was sought to abolish progressively all restrictions 
on movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation. 
That included granting authorization for direct investments, admission of securities 
to capital markets, buying and selling of securities, operations in real estate, 
personal capital movements, etc. 25' In 1976, the OECD adopted the Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and the related 
instruments: the national treatment instrument, the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, international investment incentives and disincentives, and Conflicting 
Requirements. The Committee had a significant role in designing the Guidelines, 
and also participated in devising other instruments. The importance of these 
instruments, accompanied by the Codes, derives from the fact that they address 
" 
... 
a complex set of economic social factors affecting international trade, 
balance of payments, finance, technology, competition and market structures, 
industrial patterns and employment. " 
Moreover, they have been created to provide governments, politicians, the business 
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community, labour organizations and the public with guidance in dealing with cross- 
border transactions. The complexity of the transactions, as well as their overall 
impact on economic and social transactions were taken into account. The values of 
freedom and equality rank as the highest general priorities, but the Committee has 
allowed certain important exemptions. For example, under the National Treatment 
instrument, governments are permitted to assess its implementation from the aspect 
of "classical" national interests. - 
"The Member countries should, consistent with their need to maintain public 
order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfil commitments 
relating to international peace and security, accord to enterprises treatment 
... 
no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic 
enterprises. " 
However, as these grounds have been frequently used to justify the imposition of 
barriers, efforts have been undertaken to limit the use of such measures. In this 
context, the Council decided in 1991 to formulate the Committee's tasks more 
explicitly. Since then, its general tasks have been to follow the implementation of 
the instruments, and to propose measures for abolishing the exceptions (e. g. for the 
National Treatment). The Committee's special tasks have been formulated so as to 
improve its role as a forum for direct consultations, as well as to invite views of 
other Committees, the business community and other parties. 
The Committee's prospective role in debates concerning the global securities 
market can be assessed from three perspectives. Firstly, as the OECD is represented 
in IOSCO, the Committee is well positioned to communicate the Organization's 
views to securities regulators worldwide. Secondly, it can exert influence on national 
regulators, both during negotiations and when implementing measures on the 
Organization's level. Thirdly, it is among a very few actors that address the business 
community itself, apart from the "sovereignty-bound actors". The set of adopted 
Guidelines, together with other internationally agreed codes of conduct, marks a 
(probable) shift in attitudes of the intergovernmental world toward the multi-centric 
world. The analysis of the Guidelines will be included in the following chapter. 
d) The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations 
The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UN CTC) 
was established by the ECOSOC in 1974, following the report of the Group of 
Eminent Persons. " The Commission was designed as an intergovernmental body, 
subsidiary to ECOSOC, consisting of experts from 48 countries. Its primary role 
was to act as a forum for discussion and comprehensive consideration of matters 
relating to transnational corporations. It features a characteristic that is assisted in 
a private consultative capacity by a number experienced professionals and 
academics. They all come from both industrialized and developing countries, so a 
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diversity of views and experience is maintained. 
"The decision [to establish the Commission] acknowledged the need to 
establish a focal point for the deliberations already being conducted by the 
international community on transnational corporations. In addition, it 
recognized the importance of involving individuals from the quarters directly 
concerned and immediately affected by these deliberations. " 
The UN Centre on TNCs was created with a mandate to assist in the formulation 
of international arrangements, agreements, and a code of conduct. It was also given 
the task of studying the political, legal, economic and social aspects of TNCs' 
activities, as well as developing a comprehensive information system on their 
activities. In 1977, it set up the Intergovernmental Working Group for formulating 
a code of conduct. It was not just a broad socio-economic: perspective that 
distinguished the work of the Commission from other actors. The negotiating 
technique that its Group adopted has been quite innovative. As it was faced with 
diametrically opposed proposals from industrialized countries, on the one hand, and 
developing and socialist countries, on the other hand, the Group decided to take a 
step-by-step approach in compromising over matters of concern. The objective was 
to elaborate the language covering the concerns of governments and to reach, as 
much as possible, a consensus. However, by1mid 1993, the Code had still not been 
completed. 
The negotiations over the Code, its content and legal nature, illustrate how 
deep disagreements exist between governments from industrialized and from 
developing countries. The first group wants to avoid all-encompassing, binding 
requirements. Their corporations should be free to operate and allowed to call on 
their home countries in cases of serious international problems. The second group 
of governments expects a binding code and TNCs to respect the interests of host 
countries. The corporations should refrain from interfering in internal affairs, and 
contribute to development objectives of host countries. 
"In essence, the problem seems to turn upon the fine tuning between the 
autonomy of the entities and the demands of the global strategy of the 
transnational corporations as chartered at its headquarters. Ultimately, the 
issue is the redressing the economic imbalances between North and 
South. " 
Although the Commission has not been directly involved in debates over the 
global securities market, its work on the Code could have a significant impact. 
Bearing in mind that most banks and securities houses, participating in the market, 
are indeed transnational corporations, the importance of the proposal should be 
acknowledged. In addition, as a number of its provisions have found consensus 
among all 
-group -of-countries, the Code can usefully complement any eventual framework (or regime) in the area. 
"An international framework agreement which limits itself to the 
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intergovernmental level, by necessity omits considerations of a series of 
important and difficult issues... The actual conduct of enterprises is not 
touched upon in intergovernmental instruments such as that being negotiated 
in the field of trade in services. "151 
As this approach receives a wider support, the Commission is going to gain in 
importance as a political actor on the scene. 
The list of international regulatory groups does not end here', but the 
ones analyzed seem to illustrate, to an adequate extent, the diversity of 
intergovernmental efforts to deal with the rising issue. 
To conclude this lengthy survey, the world of today features a great diversity 
and multiplicity of political actors. In this particular case, that diversity ranges from 
individual banks and local associations, through various international organizations 
and associations, to universal organizations such as the United Nations. The actors 
have been categorised Oust for analytical purposes) into four groups: banks and 
dealers, international non-government organizations, national authorities and 
international organizations. In spite of that, strict demarcation lines between them 
have proved to be theoretically unjustifiable. Attitudes and postures of an actor 
cannot be ex ante defined, just according to its name, status or origin. The same 
applies for values one may expect they strive to enhance. It is not always the case 
that banks are solely interested in promoting freedom to operate, efficiency or the 
value of wealth. By the same token, government regulators may well consider the 
values of order and safety as subsidiary to over-all efficiency. However, a few very 
general conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, the ranking of values which are to be promoted or preserved varies 
across actors and time. Although banks and their associations primarily accentuate 
values such as freedom and wealth, they indeed recognize that order must be 
maintained at all levels of functioning. National regulators and their "organizations" 
still predominantly stress the values of order and safety. Even so, they have come 
to accept the fact that the pursuit of these values is ineffective if it seriously hampers 
over-all market functioning and efficiency. So, both "sides" have entered the 
political process, bearing in mind that a compromise has to be reached at the 
intersection of their aspirations. 
Secondly, there is a great diversity of actors, both within and among the 
groups. Two developments have to be underscored in this respect. Financial 
institutions of today have grown out of their "classical" intermediation functions. 
Banks have developed transnationally not just to be able to execute orders and 
underwrite securities worldwide 
- 
modem banks persistently (and successfully) 
endeavour to shape the environment by using the political system. On the other 
hand, regulators have realized that the maintenance of close contacts with the 
business community is necessary. Moreover, contacts must be established and 
nurtured also with professional associations in other countries, 
- 
as well as with 
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international non-governmental organizations. 
Thirdly, the multiplicity of channels through which an actor can contend over 
political questions emphasizes an unrecognized (but highly sophisticated) global 
network of communication and debate. In the case of the global securities market, 
this less visible side of the phenomenon certainly deserves much more theoretical 
attention if analysis is to be accurate. The frequency with which most of the actors 
communicate (internally and externally) adds to this global market a new adornment: 
very lively, round-the-globe and round-the-clock political interplay. As the market 
continuously advances, the issue ranks higher and higher on the political agenda. To 
recall Keohane and Nye", this survey clearly illustrates an ongoing shift in the 
world political reality: from the realist ideal type toward complex interdependence. 
What is still missing for the whole picture of complex interdependence is an outline 
of agenda setting and concrete stakes that are under the contention. The following 
chapter elaborates this in more detail. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AGENDA FORMATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
GLOBAL NORMS 
So far the analysis has outlined different aspects the economic content of the 
global securities market. Firstly, its origins have been described from a wider 
historical aspect. Then, the market's roots have been examined with regard to the 
"classical" market functions, the main participants and their national "ingredients". 
Thirdly, the global market has been delineated according to its main segments and 
features, relying primarily on quantitative findings. Fourthly, four major financial 
market disturbances have been included in the analysis in order to underscore the 
significance of market warnings to both regulators and market participants. This 
analytical shift demanded new theoretical frameworks to be drawn in, and the study 
has turned to the field of International Relations. 
Two subsequent chapters have offered an alternative course for a study of 
the global market over and beyond the economic data. The Globalist approach to 
international relations seems to be the only, theoretically justifiable and practically 
useful, paradigm able to comprehend modem world phenomena. The part of this 
analysis related to political actors has undoubtedly demonstrated that complexity of 
the global capital market does not entail only numerous instruments and techniques. 
In addition, that complexity is built upon different networks of communication, 
bargaining and negotiations among a great diversity of actors on the scene. 
- 
The most important actors involved in the global debate about securities 
markets have been described in the previous chapter. Their communication, a 
particular, global political process, has been centred around several political 
questions or stakes in relation to the global market. These stakes differ according 
to salience they invoke for different actors, they vary in relation the type and status 
of stake, but they also differ concerning the number and diversity of values 
involved. The level of stake generality also varies, as well as the nature of access 
routes for different actors. As this is a rather novel approach to analyzing the global 
market, specific theoretical grounds first have to be presented, followed by a careful 
application. 
7.1. 
-Agenda setting 
The concept of issues has been presented in the part of the analysis dealing 
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with four main perspectives on International Relations (Chapter Five, section two). 
Just to summarizO12, an issue comprises a set of political stakes linked by the 
values they embody, while a policy contains a set of answers to a series of political 
questions which are handled simultaneously by political actors. Similarly, an issue- 
system presents a set of actors, a set of stakes (linked by the value) and a process 
of interaction among the actors about the stakes. When the actors contend over 
proposals for the simultaneous disposition of stakes from value-linked issues, there 
exists a wider issue-system. For example, a wider issue-system for maintaining 
stability of global economic flows includes the following issues: international v. 
national control, macroeconomic coordination v. competition, international lending 
(for balance-of-payments purposes), and money laundering. A wider issue-system 
for improving global economic efficiency consists of issues such as the market 
integrity, transfer of technology, trade v. direct investment, etc. These issues are 
perceived as being on the same issue-dimension, i. e. relevant for the realisation of 
values of order and security, in the first case, and relevant for the value of wealth 
in the second. 
When it comes to dealing with issues and stakes, the real world of political 
behaviour may be more complicated, functional (and other) linkages create policy- 
systems. So, a wider policy-system encompasses functionally related policies, when 
the actors contend over proposals for simultaneous disposition of stakes from these 
policies. "' For example, there is a wider policy-system for global capital flows, 
cutting across several wider issue-systems and including several policies such as 
integration of the European Community through Economic and Monetary Union, 
control of terrorists and drug barons through prevention of money laundering, 
international action against Saddam Hussein through financial sanctions, or 
promotion of development in newly industrialising countries through creation of new 
capital markets. In the case of policy-making for the global capital market the 
functional linkages alone dramatically increase the political complexity, even before 
bargaining linkages or actor linkages are considered. 5Stakes, like for example entry 
requirements, data reporting, standardisation of market procedures, are interrelated 
to such an extent that their disposition must be negotiated within a broader context. 
This is has to be done simultaneously even though the stakes relate to different 
issues, and lie on the different issue-dimensions. Actors perceive certain stakes and 
issues (or groups of stakes and issues) as being related to certain values, whose 
satisfaction they aspire to maintain or increase. It is therefore necessary to examine 
how and why certain actors perceive issues as being relevant to them, how they 
attract the attefition of decision-makers, and how and when issues reach the agenda. 
"An agenda consists of proposals for allocating stakes in issues over which 
'I am grateful to dr Peter Willetts for making helpful suggestions on the, nature of functional 
linkages. 
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actors are contending... A single global agenda can be identified and can be 
defined as those issues and associated proposals that attract serious attention 
from either a large number of actors or from those capable of resolving the 
claims. " 
What the analysis has to identify, therefore, is parts of individual actors' agendas 
that overlap. 
Different factors influence agenda setting, like feelings of deprivation, 
organizational context, actor communication and their status, etc. But before an 
issue reaches a stage when it has attracted "adequate" attention, claims of those 
deprived have to be specified and wider support has to be acquired. For example, 
the proposals for regulating investment banking in the EC had been discussed in 
various fora (e. g. the European Banking Federation, national investment banking 
associations, etc. ). Nevertheless, as long as investment banks did not clearly 
articulate and specify their "discontent" with the proposals (e. g. minimum capital 
requirements, sectoral barriers, etc. ), and until they did not attracted sufficient 
support of high-status banking associations and international organizations, the issue 
of liberalization of international investment operations did not enter the formal 
agenda of the wider policy-system for global capital flows. 
An even better example is the issue of market quality, particularly in relation 
to business conduct of transnational firms. This issue was initiated in mid-70s, 
including actors such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
International Chamber of Commerce, OECD, UNCTAD and the UN Commission 
on Transnational Corporations. " It, however, remained dormant for some time, 
or precisely, until the late 1980s. Then, activities of other actors, like the 
International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) brought it back to the agenda in 
a slightly different fornfl. The issue was re-defined and specified around a 
number of principles to guide business conduct (honesty, best efforts, cooperative 
attitude toward regulators, etc). These principles will be analyzed later in more 
detail. The rise of the issue's importance can be attributed to two factors: it has 
attracted "sufficient" attention of two high-status actors, and it has ranked high on 
the agendas of more than one hundred actors joined in the organizations (covering 
more than 70 countries world-wide). So, it has reached the final phase: entrance to 
a formal agenda. 
Mansbach and Vasquei'll have offered an agenda-setting model, with three 
main variables: issue-salience, access routes and the status of actors involved. 
Among them, salience is indisputably the most important variable, because it refers 
to the perceived importance of an issu& to an actor. The extent to which an actor 
will feel an issue as being relevant to its objectives depends on few factors. 
An issue will be more salient if it involves a value-deprivation, as opposed 
to an issue which pertains to an already satisfied value. For example, the issue of 
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liberalization is not felt as being so critical, because a certain level of openness 
(satisfaction of the value of freedom) has already been achieved. Contrary to that, 
the issue of international control is very salient to most actors: regulators feel 
deprived of order, and banks and market participants feel deprived of the value of 
security. 
Another factor that influences issue-salience relates to the number and 
diversity of involved values. The greater the number and diversity of values 
underlying an issue, the higher its salience. The issue of liberalization involves 
different values, such as freedom, equality, wealth and security. Although belonging 
to the same wider issue-system (maintaining the global economy openness), the issue 
of economic integration does not rank so high on agendas, partly because it involves 
a smaller number and more homogeneous values (such as freedom and equality). 
Issue-salience also depends on the status of the stakes under the contention. 
If the stakes are outside the control of any actor, they will not induce a high 
salience. But, if the stakes (that compose an issue) are already controlled by an 
actor, or a group of actors, the issue-salience will significantly increase because it 
will involve perceptions of the danger of value deprivation. For example, the stake 
of self-regulation (mode of control) has provoked vigourous debate over its 
advantages and shortcomings, between proponents of the "anxiety" approach (e. g. 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission) and proponents of the "confidence" 
approach to banking regulation (e. g. the UK Securities and Investment Board). "' 
The type of stakes which the actors contend over is the next factor 
influencing salience. If an issue includes concrete stakes, whose disposition will 
immediately and directly affect value satisfaction, it will be perceived as being less 
salient in comparison to an issue which revolves primarily around less concrete 
stakes. For example, the issue of market quality includes concrete stakes, such as 
standardisation of procedures, trading halts, trade reporting, etc. On the other hand, 
the issue of international control encompasses ymbolic stakes, which just "allow" 
value deprivation or enhancement (e. g. capital adequacy) without an immediate 
impact. The issue of liberalization v. protectionism revolves around transcendent 
stakes (e. g. benefits from global integration) which are related to general beliefs and 
norms and should therefore invoke the highest salience. 169 
Once the issues have been perceived as salient for an actor, it can take 
different routes to bring them to the agenda. Some of these routes have already been 
exemplified in the analysis of particular actors in the wider policy-system of the 
global securities market. High-status actors (owing to their role /reputation 
/resources) usually take a direct route and can themselves place a salient issue on 
the agenda. For example, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has entered 
into direct communication with the other major actor in the system, IOSCO, to 
discuss various issues in relation to investment banking. Another high-status actor 
(e. g. the British Banking Association, BBA) has taken an alternative, though not less 
137 
influential, indirect route through international organizations: through IOSCO, the 
European Banking Federation, etc. Actors with a lower status have to rely on 
influencing high-status actors, or alternatively on an indirect access to international 
organizations (e. g. the British Merchant Banking Association, being a member of 
the BBA). 
So, the process of agenda setting will depend upon the level of issue- 
salience, the variety of possible access routes for communication and influence, and 
the status of actors in the system. A wider policy-system for the global securities 
market handles numerous issues, with a varying degrees of salience for the different 
actors. It can be perceived as encompassing a number of functionally related 
policies, as it cuts across at least four wider issue-systems: efficiency, economic 
stability, political stability, openness and development. These wider-issue systems 
include several particular issue-systems, each comprising actors, stakes and 
processes between those actors. For example, the issue of liberalization belongs to 
a wider issue-system for maintaining global economic openness. Together with other 
issues (like regional v. global integration, integration v. autarchy, etc. ), it is closely 
r. elated to the value of freedom. Functionally, it is related to issue-systems such as 
the quality of the market, international v. national control, and the issue-system of 
emerging markets. So, the politics of the global securities market actually involves 
the contention over stakes belonging to different policy-systems, as well their 
simultaneous disposition. Nevertheless, global capital flows are not the only flows 
to transcend state borders and state jurisdictions. Transnational production, resource 
utilization, global trade and communication flows are all aspects of a truly world 
economy. Therefore, the global economy can be viewed as a policy-domain, and the 
choice between maintaining an orderly market economy, as opposed to a socialist 
command economy, as one among several hyper-issues the world faces today. 271, 
One of the conclusions from the previous chapter is that different actors 
differently rank their priorities and goals, and hence the values they support have 
a different ranking. For example, banks and business tend to attach more importance 
to the values of freedom and wealth, than to security and order. On the contrary, 
most of the regulators and their organizations put forward the values of order and 
stability. The contention among these two positions (groups of actors) actually 
involves discussing the ranking of issues on the global agenda. Mansbach and 
Vasquez describe this as the relative salience of issues: 
"It provides a way of comparing the concerns of individual actors and 
ranking them according to the significance that they have for global society 
as a whole. A major part of the agenda-building process is a struggle over 
salience rankings. The most important of these struggles is over which issue 
will be at the highest ranking, thereby taking precedence over all 
others. 11271 
It however has to be kept in mind that contention over the relative position of issues 
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on the agenda primarily concerns high-status actors. During this process, a number 
of "most explosive issues" (Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 107) will come to dominate 
the agenda. This is particularly the case if the stability of the status hierarchy 
(Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 113) is challenged. For example, the issue of 
international v. national control of global operations is highly salient for different 
reasons. The hierarchy of actors, for a long time dominated by both US firms and 
regulators, has been undermined by the rise of actors and organizations related to 
Euromarkets. Secondly, the hierarchy of actors has been challenged by the 
expansion of international non-governmental actors in the field of finance. 
Regulators from countries other than the US, as well as international non- 
government organizations, have gained in power/control over both resources and 
outcomes. So, stakes like whether the self-regulatory or statutory concept should 
dominate international regulation of global financial flows, or to what extent national 
regulators should be compelled to cooperate and share information with other actors, 
can be regarded as the parts of this critical issue. 
Agenda setting depends on issue-salience, access routes to the agenda, and 
the status of engaged actors. Nevertheless, not every issue can reach the agenda, 
and, even among those which get to be discussed, not all will be settled. Sometimes, 
issues are brought to the agenda, discussed and contended, with decisions being 
made in relation to them. Sometimes, however, issues do reach an agenda, but 
definitive arrangements for their resolution are not possible. Some issues never 
come to an agenda, and yet some issues on an agenda stay latent for some time 
before they are finally resolved or removed from the agenda. Mansbach and 
Vasquez analyze these shifts through the concept of issue-cycle. "
"During its life, an issue may be characterized by changes in stakes, 
fluctuations in perceptions regarding those stakes, and variation in the cast 
of actors that are contending for them... Critical issues usually pass through 
at least four, and sometimes five, stages once they have reached the global 
agenda: crisis, ritualization, dormancy, and/or decision making (as 
alternative paths off the agenda), and administration. 11273 
Before analyzing these stages an additional theoretical remark has to be made, 
regarding various sources of issues. Mansbach and Vasquez have defined two basic 
origins of issues: the environment and the actors 
. 
21 The first comprises factors 
that are not directly linked to the behaviour of actors, e. g. technological advances 
or the rise of common problems that endanger existing value satisfaction. For 
example, improvements in the computer and telecommunication technologies have 
greatly contributed to the emergence of new issues and stakes (e. g. international 
regulation of transborder data-flows), as well as to changes in the underlying values 
(e. g. the value of international security now encompasses, inter alia, economic 
security). Secondly, the actors can also be a source of issues when, as a result of 
their behaviour, new stakes are created or old ones brought to an agenda. For 
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example, the entry of large investment banks into Euromarkets have significantly 
altered the perceptions and policies of other market participants, national regulators 
and international organizations in this field. There is no need to elaborate this in 
more detail, because the first part of this analysis (Chapters 1 to 4) has actually 
described both sources of the issues related to global capital flows. 
So, once a critical issue comes to an agenda, it passes through several 
phases. The duration of each of them depends on various factors, such as the 
existing structural arrangements, frequency of communication, issue-salience, etc. 
During a crisis phase, interactions become more frequent and actors come to realize 
that their expectations are not valid any more. A need for new arrangements 
emerges, which leads to the second stage: a ritualization phase. The involved actors 
still take hostile attitudes towards each other, but there will be signs of patterned 
behaviour and shared perceptions of rules and limits. From there, an issue can pass 
to an administrative stage, where final allocations will be made. More often, 
however, actors will make some interim decisions, before certain conditions for a 
final disposition are met. Alternatively, an issue can pass to dormancy (with or 
without any interim decision) and remain latent for some time, before it is brought 
back to the agenda or definitely removed from it. For example, the BCCI affair and 
its aftermath (Chapter Four) can now be reviewed from another perspective. The 
issue of international regulation has become a critical one. National regulators have 
realized that new arrangements are urgent. Transnational banks' expectations about 
the continuous, adequate functioning of "free" market forces have become 
groundless. Frequency of interactions and communication among major actors has 
dramatically increased, resulting in a consensus over the nature of the problem: 
more order on the global financial market has been perceived as the key objective. 
Nevertheless, actors have still not managed to reach an agreement over a set of 
policy tasks and norms to handle the issue of international regulation. So, it can be 
concluded that the issue is still in the ritualization stage. 
A number of the other issues related to global capital flows have also entered 
the global agenda: some of them are still in the crisis stage, and some have been 
moved forward in the issue cycle. As it is very difficult to draw (ex ante) a strict 
distinguishing line between the two stages for each particular issue, the analysis will 
now focus on concrete (actual) stakes under contention. 
7.2. The global agenda 
As described, a global agenda consists of parts of individual actors' agendas 
that overlap, i. e. it comprises issues which are seen as having high relative salience 
for most of the high-status actors. Global capital flows, similarly to other 
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phenomena of the modem world, have induced a great variety of stakes that have 
come under contention. Out of them, only few have attracted "adequate" attention 
of actors that are capable of making an authoritative allocation of values. 
7.2.1. International control and co-operation 
An extraordinary expansion of global capital flows has left most regulators 
faced with various dilemmae: how to assess and compare economic benefits from 
this integration; how to approach, organize and carry out control over these 
activities; whether to control institutions or financial activities; how to "grasp" the 
complexity of the global market; whether to co-operate with other regulators 
(national authorities), and "give up" a certain degree of autonomy, or to pursue an 
"independent" national policy... Since the end of the 1980s, and particularly after 
the BCCI episode, a wide consensus has been reached upon the fact that global 
economic integration must be accompanied by closer co-operation (and even 
collaboration) among regulatory authorities. The work of the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, as well as some directives adopted in the EC, establishes that 
a general agreement has been concluded about the basic nature of the problem. 
There remain, however, some significant questions which are still open: the mode 
of control (statutory or self-regulation), supervision of financial conglomerates, the 
nature and the extent of cooperation among regulators, and, above all, capital rules 
for securities firms. 
One of the pillars of the international supervision of banks, which would 
later serve the framework for securities houses as well, is the 1975 Basle Concordat. 
It was revised in 1983, and supplemented in 1990. The Concordat outlined 
principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments on a consolidated 
basis'15, so that it is possible to supervise the financial side of the group as a 
whole. Consolidated supervision was accepted as a regulatory response to an ever- 
growing intemationalisation of banks. The Concordat allowed for the allocation of 
regulatory responsibilities between the host and the home country. Both countries 
are responsible for the supervision of the group: the home country assesses the 
group's solvency and liquidity, while the host country monitors these parameters for 
the foreign banks' establishment on its territory. If either of the two sides fails to 
carry out its duties properly (or if one side perceives the other as being incapable 
of doing that), the other can turn to alternative arrangements. The home country 
could (should) extend 
-their supervision extraterritorially, or discourage the 
expansion in the territory concerned. The host country could discourage or prohibit 
establishment on its territory, if it regards supervision by the bank's home country 
inadequate. 
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"Adequate supervision of banks' foreign establishments calls not only for an 
appropriate allocation of responsibilities between parent and host supervisory 
authorities, but also for contact and co-operation between them. ""' 
The basic principles of the Concordat, i. e. that no foreign banking establishment 
should escape supervision, and that the supervision should be adequate, were 
extended and supplemented in 1990. Regulators were encouraged to develop more 
regular and structured collaboration among themselves, in order to improve the 
quality and completeness of the supervision. Host and home authorities should fully 
cooperate during the authorization procedure, and information needs of both sides 
should be met as completely as possible. For example, the parent supervisor should 
ensure an adequate flow of information from the parent bank in a consolidated form, 
on the basis of regular reporting within the group. Mutual trust should be developed 
between the home and the host supervisor, including a continuous flow of 
information, removal of secrecy constraints, maintaining the confidentiality of 
information, etc. 277 
In the summer of 1992, the Committee produced a new paper, setting out 
minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their 
278 foreign establishments. The BCCI affair had crucially influenced these 
recommendations, which should be applied by individual authorities in their 
assessment of the relations with corresponding regulators abroad. One of the most 
important standards is related to a request, made to the host country authority, to 
evaluate the home country capabilities to perform consolidated supervision. This 
includes reviewing the home authority's powers, experience and practices. So, all 
international banks should be supervised by a "capable" home country authority, 
which is the first one to give its consent to the bank's outward expansion. This 
consent should be made contingent upon the subsequent inward consent of the host 
country authority. In order to supervise the bank adequately, the authorities should 
possess the right to gather information about the bank's foreign establishments. 
Finally, if the host country were to perceive one of the standards as not being met, 
it could impose restrictive measures and even prohibit entry. From a broad policy 
perspective 
"... the major thrust of the minimum standards paper was aimed at 1) 
strengthening the application of the principle of consolidated supervision to 
all internationally active banking groups, 2) adding a further element of 
discipline to practices surrounding the cross-border establishment and 
maintenance of banking offices, and 3) promoting a still higher level of 
communication and coordination among the international community of bank 
supervisors. 11279 
The underlying principle of home country control was also included in the 
1989 EC Second Banking Coordination Directive. 280 It was accompanied by the 
principle of mutual recognition by the EC supervisors of each other's measures and 
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practices (e. g. authorization and prudential supervision systems). So, branches of 
banks, in whichever EC member state they are located, are supervised by the home 
country authority. In order to avoid a particular "regulatory competition" (by 
authorities) and excessive "regulatory arbitrage" (by banks), it was necessary to 
intensify harmonisation of bank regulation within the EC. '11 In 1990, an amended 
proposal for a Council directive on investment services was made", reiterating 
the principles of home country supervision and mutual recognition. The 
responsibility for supervising the financial soundness of an investment firm will rest 
with the home-country authority. Once authorized, an investment firm can establish 
branches or provide services throughout the Community. At the time of writing the 
Investment Service Directive has not been accepted, but a political agreement has 
been reached on contentious elements 
- 
publicity of securities transactions, and the 
direct access of banks to stock markets. However, there are still several stakes 
which are under the contention, but they are relevant for the proposed capital rules 
and for the issue of liberalization v. protectionism. 
So, even the principle of consolidated supervision of banks and securities 
houses is not under the contention. Its importance for a prospective regime for 
global securities flows is immense. Furthermore, one of the main organizations in 
the field of securities business regulation 
- 
IOSCO 
- 
has issued a list of principles 
which should serve as a basis for establishing proper contacts among regulators. "' 
Practical questions involved in the negotiation and implementation of a 
"Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) are: investigatory assistance as broad as 
permitted, confidentiality, a clear description of procedures, protection of the rights 
of persons subject to an MOU request, consultation of the authorities, public policy 
exceptions, types of assistance, uses of information, participation of authorities and 
the cost-sharing. 284 So, authorities should cooperate to the fu 
, 
llest extent, but on 
a reciprocal basis and always within the limits of national laws and public policy. 
"An MOU should provide that the Requested Authority maintains the right 
to refuse to provide assistance in instances where the provision of assistance 
would violate the public policy of its state. The concept of public policy 
would include issues affecting sovereignty, national security, or other 
essential interests. 11285 
This "public policy exception" can be found in most of the directives, declarations 
and codes concerning global capital flows. If such an escape clause is maintained, 
it is evident that no kind of a supranational regulator can be created, and that any 
kind of future arrangements will have to rely on voluntary cooperation of 
authorities. Time will show to what extent regulators are really in favour of a close 
international cooperation in market oversight and regulation. 
Nevertheless, what still remains under contention is the question of self- 
regulation, as opposed to statutory regulation. Self-regulation has long been 
practised in the countries that take the "confidence" approach to banking and 
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investment business (e. g the UK). In the securities industry, it involves participation 
of securities exchanges and associations of securities dealers in the regulation 
process. One of the primary reasons for self-regulation is that such organizations are 
"closer" to the market and hence more aware of the problems, structures, 
participants' attitudes, etc. The International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) 
is among the most prominent advocates of this concept, and has recently completed 
a report on self-regulatory rules and standards. "' Self-regulation has many 
advantages over the statutory (government) regulation, such as an ability to improve 
ethical standards, participation of practitioners, sensitivity and responsiveness to 
meet changing needs and developments, an expertise in financial matters, lower 
costs, etc. Therefore, self-regulation should cover various areas of securities 
business, like securities listings, market surveillance, clearance and settlement, 
licensing, codes of business conduct, arbitration, insider-trading detection, etc. 287 
A recent FIBV report? " has revealed that a wide basis for national and 
international self-regulation already exists. Moreover, there is a significant degree 
of readiness of the institutions concerned to share information and cooperate in this 
course. 
"The Report concluded that most (97 percent) FIBV member exchanges have 
significant market surveillance and investigative capabilities, which can 
produce comprehensive reconstructions of trading in their markets. The 
Report observed that 37 percent of the exchanges indicated that they could 
disclose customer information to securities markets outside their home 
country. "I" 
So, the potential and the willingness are already there and it is now up to 
international government organizations to make the best use of that. 
The "anxiety" approach to banking and finance calls for a different exercise 
of control and regulation, either directly by the government or through official 
regulatory agencies. Proponents of statutory regulation put forward various 
arguments: 1) self-regulatory organizations cannot properly distinguish between the 
interests of the public at large and the interests of their members, 2) self-regulation 
can create a "captured regulated system" (a cartel which operates in the interests of 
established major firms within the regulated industry)', 3) the securities industry 
is a business that affects public welfare, and therefore requires public supervision 
and control, 4) self-regulation, without government supervision, may provide only 
the appearance of protection for the public, and 5) self-regulation is based on limited 
or even inadequate standards, application of which is "left to the unfettered 
discretion of private regulators""'. 
"The anti self regulators cry out such labels as 'industry capture', 'the 
rabbits can't tend lettuces' or 'poachers can't turn game keepers' From the 
other side come equal insults. Statutory regulation is 'blind bureaucracy'; 'it 
pulls up everything green just in case its a weed'; 'armies of form fillers, 
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'lawyers' paradise'. , 292 
The self-regulation stake can be thought of as a symbolic one, disposition of which 
is primarily affected by changing hierarchy structures. It adds another dimension to 
the already critical issue of international control. Even though it has been widely 
acknowledged that regulators should fully cooperate, it is still a matter of dispute 
which (or what type) of regulators are concerned. In 1992, the IOSCO Consultative 
Committee has offered a "compromise" between these two: cooperative self- 
regulation. The self-regulators should bring regulatory problems, in their early 
stage, to the supervising governmental body in order to seek assistance in finding 
solutions. Government, in turn, should be open to proposals which it perceives as 
coinciding with public and general economic interests. It should also accept the self- 
211 regulators' private interests and their competitive needs. 
Another important aspect of international securities regulation concerns the 
nature and characteristics of the regulation itself. This has not yet been brought to 
the global agenda, but as the debate on various stakes goes further, and as some 
concrete decisions are made, the consistency and general orientation of the 
regulation will come into focus. 
In 1992, FIBV issued a list of evaluation criteria for international securities 
regulation. 294 Recognizing the need for regulation of market forces and 
competition, the following criteria should be taken into consideration when 
designing (or evaluating) any international regulatory framework. The regulation 
should be market driven, flexible and responsive to market needs, and should 
minimally restrict free-market forces. It should aim at investor's protection and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets. The framework should generally promote 
competition, efficiency and quality of markets, but should also assure that 
transactions are conducted in a fair and professional manner. The ultimate goal of 
international regulation should be a reduction of the systemic risk inherent to the 
global market system. Finally, the regulation and control should be carried out, as 
much as possible, through self-regulation. So, even though certain interim 
dispositions have already been made through statutory regulation (e. g. capital rules), 
the general orientation of international regulation has not yet come under contention. 
This does not mean it is not salient to the actors, nor that there is a general 
consensus over the nature of regulation. It simply means that the regulatory elements 
have not yet been viewed as parts of the complex whole, so their complementarity 
and consistency still waits to be assessed. One of the criteria will definitely attract 
the attention of other actors: that the regulation should be market driven and lay a 
minimum burden on market forces. This wilt undoubtedly cause much contention, 
both among regulators and within the business community, particularly when it 
comes to assessing the "market-driven" ground for capital and disclosure 
requirements, entry barriers, etc. 
"It is hardly surprising that the [US) SEC and the [UK] SIB find it difficult 
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to reach common ground: they are trying to achieve widely different goals. 
The SEC regulates for the worst case,... worst days and the most aggressive 
trading firms. By contrast, the British approach is to let securities firms do 
as much business as possible without taking huge risks which will disrupt the 
market. 11295 
So, the issue of international control involves various stakes related to 
allocation of responsibilities and mode of control. It also tackles the stake of 
"supervisory imperialism "', i. e. the debate over what kind of approach to 
international regulation should be taken: the one of banking regulators or securities 
regulators. In commenting on the proposed regulation of financial conglomerates, 
an EC representative to the 1992 IOSCO Conference pointed out that 
"... the rules devised for regulating financial conglomerates should, so far 
as possible, respect the peculiar characteristics of the different sub-sectors 
and the legitimate differences in the way they have traditionally been 
regulated. " 
It has been widely agreed that there would be a tremendous benefit, in the long run, 
from harmonisation of rules across the banking industry. The same applies to 
harmonisation of rules concerning the securities industry. Nevertheless, the situation 
is very different with respect to regulatory harmonisation between the two sectors, 
due to different regulatory priorities. Bank regulators aim at protecting depositors, 
controlling the influence of banking business (e. g. lending to industry) on the 
macroeconomic parameters (e. g. money supply), and preventing bank collapse. 
Securities regulators have different priorities, such as protecting investors from 
fraud and malpractice, promoting competition, the pricing of financial services, etc. 
Their approach is also different in relation to practical regulatory solutions. For 
example, most bank regulators favour the so-called "building-block approach" for 
market risk requirements, whereas most securities regulators apply the so-called 
"comprehensive approach". The first splits out specific risk requirements from those 
for general market risk, while the second captures both specific and general market 
risk in a single weight (this will be elaborated in more details in the following 
subsection). 
The debate over which approach should be taken has been further fuelled by 
the traditional differences between the UK and continental Europe. The latter 
tradition includes universal banks as the leading model for financial institutions, so 
the countries like Germany, France and Switzerland have persistently lobbied for 
the bank-regulation approach. Many of the EC Directives in relation to the securities 
industry were modelled after banking regulation (particularly the German example), 
in spite of the fact that nature of the business is far from being the same. The aim 
was that banks should have a level playing field with securities firms, so that the 
competitive position of large universal banks would not be threatened. A comment 
made by a US investment banker on the intra-EC negotiations is particularly 
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illustrative: 
"The people in Brussels have been comprehensively bullied by the Germans. 
I recently heard one senior EC official make the extraordinary statement that 
we have to have a German-style regulatory system, because they do not have 
financial scandals in Germany. 11298 
So, bank supervisors (the universal banking lobby) have "hijacked" the EC 
negotiations on international securities regulation. However, this has not been the 
only "route" to the global agenda taken by the lobby. The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, as the single most influential force among the securities 
regulators, has been taking a position quite similar to the one of continental 
negotiators: strict and tough capital rules, the comprehensive approach to risk 
requirements, a mistrust in portfolio and diversification theories 299 
, 
etc. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1992, a sort of a compromise has been reach 
among the two groups of regulators concerning a prospective agreement between 
them. Regulation of the two industries (banking and securities) would have basic 
elements in common, but allowing for important exceptions. For example, national 
authorities which already apply methodologies or techniques different from those 
agreed upon would be allowed to continue so 
- 
under the condition that they provide 
at least similar level of capital soundness. " 
7.2.2. Capital rules 
These different approaches to international securities regulation were the 
grounds upon which some of the most fierce debates have emerged, particularly in 
relation to the instrument (object) of control 
- 
capital soundness of firms. Capital 
adequacy has always been at the centre of banking supervision, due to an 
unquestionable and long-held assumption that proper capital backing significantly 
reduces the possibility of a bank's collapse and serious market disturbances. Capital 
adequacy has most often been measured as the ratio of a bank's capital to its 
commitments (both balance sheet and off-balance sheet). Until recently, a great 
variation in the practical solutions (e. g. in the definition of capital) had existed, 
threatening the relative competitive standing of banks in different countries. In spite 
of an immense expansion of transnational banking activities, regulation had not 
"followed the suit" and had remain largely at the discretion of national authorities. 
An important step towards the international convergence of capital regulation 
was the Anglo-American accord on capital adequacy measurement, in January 1987, 
as one of the policy responses' managing the debt crisis. The importance of the 
accord lies in the fact that it was the most obvious illustration of the degree to which 
management of global economic phenomena has become a part of "high politics". 
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Actually, when the eighth largest bank in the US, "Continental Illinois", reached the 
brink of bankruptcy in 1984, American regulators finally accepted that a more 
comprehensive framework for capital adequacy was needed. As the Federal Reserve 
Board had already been for some time in close contacts with the Bank of England, 
the two sides found it particularly useful to act jointly. The Federal Reserve sought 
to achieve a two-fold objective: to force other countries' banks (particularly the 
Japanese ones) to strengthen their capital base, and to avoid any disruption in 
relations with the US domestic banking community. The Bank of England wanted 
to get a powerful ally in fighting against German-influenced efforts in the EC to 
impose alternative capital-adequacy standards. 
"For the British, a joint US-UK approach would provide a powerful counter 
to the capital adequacy standard which was being debated in the Brussels 
headquarters of the European Commission and which the Bank of England 
found objectionable. For the Americans, a bilateral agreement would satisfy 
the US commercial banks, which opposed any new unilateral regulations that 
might place them at a competitive disadvantage. "10' 
The 1987 accord provided a common definition of capital, adoption of a risk-asset 
system, the inclusion of all off-sheet commitments, and the calculation of specific 
capital/asset ratios for individual banks. " Many objections were raised to the 
accord, particularly by the Germans, the Japanese Government and by the American 
Bankers Association. They were primarily related to the need for a flexible 
regulatory approach (e. g. considering different traditions), dangers of 
overcapitalization, and equality of treatment, both between the US and foreign banks 
and between the US commercial banks and other financial service providers (e. g. 
securities houses). One of the problems associated with the Accord, which later 
provided a basis for hot debate over securities regulation, was the different 
perceptions of "adequate capital". The US regulators had used a simple, fixed, 
capital-to-assets ratio, regardless of the quality of the assets. In contrast, Britain and 
other countries had developed more sophisticated " risk-weighted " standards, and had 
paid "due attention" to other techniques used by banks to lower their risks (e. g. 
asset diversification). Although the accord was designed closely in line with the 
second approach, the attitudes of the US regulators were difficult to modify. What 
was important to them were "big numbers", i. e. the overall amount of the capital, 
and this later proved to be a serious obstacle for negotiating standards for securities 
firms. However, the accord did eventually provide a basis for creating a multilateral 
framework for regulating bank capital, as the most powerful weapon to strengthen 
the market. 
The most important proposal in this field was made by the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision in 1988, known as the Capital Accord. It sought to achieve 
the dual objective of improving the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system, while at the same time being fair and consistent with existing 
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national regulation. "' 
"Two fundamental objectives lie in the heart of the Committee's work on 
regulatory convergence. These are, firstly, that the new framework should 
serve to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system; and secondly that the framework should be fair and have a high 
degree of consistency in its application to banks in different countries with 
a view to diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among 
international banks. "" (italics added) 
Following discussions in the Committee and public consultations, the capital 
agreement was revised in November 1991 to ensure greater consistency in defining 
bank capital. " 
The basic elements of the Basle framework include the definition of 
constituents of capital, risk weights and the target, standard ratio. Capital is defined 
as consisting of two tiers: core capital (tier 1) comprises equity capital and disclosed 
reserves, while supplementary capital (tier 2) includes undisclosed reserves, 
revaluation reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated term 
debt. " Each item of a bank's exposure is weighted according to a presupposed 
relative risk of counterpart failure (credit risk). Risk weights rank from 0 percent 
(applied to, for example, claims on OECD central governments) to 100 percent 
(claims on the private sector). A target standard ratio, to be reached at the end of 
1992, was set up at 8 percent: it requires banks to hold $8 of capital for every $100 
of lending. Regardless of on-going debates about the primary objective or the 
usefulness of the Accord, banks have boosted their capital ratios since its adoption. 
Some of the biggest US commercial banks have their capital ratio elevated to over 
10 percent, while the German banks have gone even higher. French and Japanese 
banks were not so eager but most of them have already exceeded the 8 percent 
level. " A more detailed survey of the rise in banks' capital will be presented in 
Chapter Eight. 
The approach taken by the EC is very similar, and has been developed in 
some directives related to banking and finance. The Second Banking Directive 
(89/646/EEC) establishes a minimum capital requirement, generally 5 million 
ECUs, for newly authorized institutions. Once authorized, all institutions have to 
maintain the capital at or above the level required. A significant inconsistency of the 
Directive relates to the definition of capital. At the time of authorization, it is core 
capital that must meet the requirements. Afterwards, any capital ("own funds""') 
qualifying for the solvency calculation can count. In 1989, the Council adopted the 
Solvency Ratio Directive (89/647/EEC) which defines the method of calculating a 
solvency ratio for banks and prescribes a minimum ratio of 8 percent. 109 Most 
importantly, it gives the Basle agreement legal force in the Community. 
Although these efforts, both in Basle and within the EC, definitely contribute 
to the enhancement of order in the global financial market, they fail to grasp reality 
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properly. Recent trends in modem finance, elaborated in Chapter Two and Three, 
underscore despecialization and disintermediation as basic features of the global 
market. So, there are many types of financial institutions operating today, there are 
numerous and various risks apart from credit risk, there are different techniques for 
controlling and hedging those risks, etc. At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
frameworks described seemed unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: they failed to 
include various market risks in assessing an institution's capital adequacy, and they 
did not provide adequate basis for framing similar standards for other financial 
institutions. The 1987 stock market crash focused attention on the growing 
interdependence of the world's securities markets and on the need to improve their 
regulatory structures. 
The main forum for dealing with these questions became the Technical 
Committee of IOSCO. At the 14th IOSCO Annual Conference in 1989, the 
Committee presented a report on "Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities 
Firms". It was the first time that a common framework for regulating securities 
markets was proposed. Although it was not as detailed as the Capital Accord, it did 
refer to basic regulatory principles. 110 A securities firm should have sufficient 
liquid assets to meet its obligations, given the risks it faces. Marketable securities 
and commodities positions should be "marked to market", in order to give a true 
picture of a firm's positions. The requirements should cover all the risks, and in 
particular general management risk, position risk and settlement risk, within the so- 
called "haircut" approach (the ratio of equity capital rises with the riskiness of the 
assets held). "' 
As mentioned, the IOSCO Committee reached an agreement with the Basle 
Committee in January 1992, in relation to important aspects of the regulation of the 
securities markets. Proposed minimum capital rules would represent minimum 
standards, and would apply to internationally-active banks and securities firms, as 
determined by their national authorities. The rules would cover definition of capital 
and the methodology for assessing position risk for debt and equity. Concerning the 
first, it has been agreed that, due to the specific nature of investment banking, 
securities firms should be allowed to use short-term subordinated debt for capital. 
This, however, can only be done under certain conditions: such assets cannot exceed 
250 percent of the firm's equity capital including reserves, and there should be a 
"lock-in" provision which prohibits the withdrawal of capital in the case of the 
firm's financial difficulties. In deciding whether to impose an "inner limit" on 
subordinated loans received from other entities (within or outside the group), a 
conflict among different traditions in banking regulation emerged again. On one 
hand, countries like Germany, France and Switzerland supported such a restriction: 
they feared that their universal banks would then loose the competitive advantage 
of having "big" balance sheets, in comparison to investment banks which have to 
rely on external loans. Most of the other countries on the Committee opposed the 
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inner limit. 
In establishing a proposed standard for holdings of traded securities, the 
"building-block approach" was adopted (though with certain reservations made by 
the US, which were mentioned earlier). General market risk relates to a firm's 
exposure to broad market movements, while specific market risk concerns a firm's 
exposure to adverse movements in specific stocks. So, for each instrument two 
capital requirements are needed, and the sum of them presents the overall capital 
requirement. Concerning equity position risk, it was agreed that a minimum 
standard for a diversified book of highly liquid securities should be 4 percent of 
capital for specific risk and 8 percent for general market risk. "' Apart from other 
questions under dispute, the SEC persistently opposed matching of the long and 
short positions of the firm (the so-called netting), while other countries accepted it 
to a certain degree. 
In contrast to the IOSCO/Basle general (or broad) framework, the EC has 
developed a detailed and comprehensive framework for assessing capital adequacy 
of both investment firms and credit institutions. The proposal for a Council 
13 Directive on the Capital Adequacy (CAD), published in 1990, 
, 
included the 
following elements: 1) minimum capital requirements according to the type of 
business (e. g ECU 500 000 for those directly engaged in trading, ECU 100 000 for 
agents or portfolio managers, ECU 50000 for others); 2) position risk requirements 
on securities holdings with certain "haircuts" (e. g. 10 percent for listed equities and 
25 percent for unlisted ones); 3) a foreign exchange risk requirement of 8 percent, 
and 4) base requirements for investment firms (25 percent of a firm's overhead costs 
in the preceding year). In contrast to the IOSCO/Basle app roach, netting between 
short and long positions is allowed, and debt instruments are categorized by maturity 
and issuer (central government, other public sector, qualifying and othery". 
The 1990 proposal on CAD has provoked strong debates concerning: 
investment firms' capital, the measurement of the risk, and the definition of capital 
to be provided against such requirements. Disputes have also arisen in relation to 
general treatment of investment banks in comparison to credit institutions 
(insufficient degree of harmonization), and treatment of some investment banking 
business (e. g. underwriting) not explicitly covered by the 1990 Proposal. So, in 
1992, the Commission submitted an amended proposal for a Council Directive on 
capital adequacy"'. The changes from the original proposal included, inter alia, 
those of technical nature and "amendments made to achieve more equality in the 
treatment of credit institutions and investment firms""'. The "building-block 
approach" for market risk has been adopted, separating general and specific market 
risk for both bonds and equities. For the latter, it demands 8 percent against general 
risk and 4 percent against specific risk. Concerning bonds, three basic classes of 
debt are envisaged: central governments items, qualifying items and other items, and 
specific risk weighting is attached to each of themý`. For general risk, the CAD 
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procedure allows either a "maturity" approach or a "duration-based" approach. The 
first provides for offsetting of matched (i. e. long and short) positions across the 
maturity spectrum, which is divided into three zones. The firm's general capital 
requirement is then calculated according to a rather complicated formula, taking into 
the account all maturity zones, matched and unmatched positions. A modified 
"duration" basis takes account of a bond's current market value and remaining 
maturity: duration is the weighted average maturity of all payments of a security, 
coupons plus principal, where the weights are the discounted present values of the 
payments. "' Another important change was introduced, regarding the treatment 
of underwriting. Firms are allowed a "discount" on the underwriting positions 
between 90 percent (working day one) and 25 percent (working day five). After the 
fifth working day, there is no reduction in relation to the underwriting positions. 
Since the publication of the proposed EC Directive, an intense political 
debate has been carried out, including almost all actors portrayed in the previous 
chapter. This is definitely among the most critical stakes on the global agenda, since 
it has led so many different actors, from different countries and from different 
banking traditions to become involved. It is also a symbolic stake perceived to be 
related to a number of values which the actors seek to promote or protect. It has 
also contributed to redefining other issues (stakes), such as the issue of 
liberalization, the issue of market quality, etc. 
For example, the UK banks perceive the CAD as a "tacit" agreement to 
drive large investment business out of London, probably to markets which have 
more lax domestic regulation, so that global competition structures will be affected. 
The capital adequacy stake has defined the axes of major coalitions, for example, 
between continental negotiators in the EC, the universal banking lobby in the EC, 
transnational commercial banks and large investment banks, and the US SEC, versus 
the UK regulators and smaller investment and merchant banks. The level of its 
criticalness can be assessed by analyzing how it cross-cuts prior alignments: the 
Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Board did act together in 1987 to impose 
internationally agreed capital standards, but the UK Securities and Investment Board 
and the US Securities and Investment Commission are certainly not allies in relation 
to capital rules for securities firms. There seem to be various linkages created 
between this and some other stakes and issues, the most obvious of which link the 
issue of liberalization ("passport for investment banks "319) and the issue of 
international control. 
"The CAD is politically inspired. It is the Bundesbank's price for supporting 
the investment service directive (ISD), with which the British are keen to 
press ahead. Sir Leon Brittan, prime British mover behind the ISD, describes 
the CAD as 'the key that will unlock the ISD'. 020 
The German and French governments have taken the position that if investment 
business is to be liberalized throughout the EC, investment firms must be subject to 
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the same rules as the other players in the securities field, i. e. as universal banks. 
The UK banks, as well as the UK authorities, fear that such regulation would 
severely affect the competition between large and small banks, but will also prevent 
securities firms from underwriting large Eurobond issues. Furthermore, underwriters 
would be force to engage in the so-called "fire sales", as they have to provide the 
full capital backing for the positions held after the fifth day. The quality of the 
market will also be affected, as the new rules will considerably restrict market- 
making in equities (i. e. the risk they can take). The methodology for assessing 
equity positions is also under contention: British banks and authorities argue that it 
is too "crude" and simplistic, and that it does not include the quality of the issuer 
or the liquidity of the market for the security. The definition of a trading book is 
highly disputable, because it leaves all other-than-positions activities to be regulated 
as "banking business". Securities firms fear that if substantial amounts (8 percent) 
of core capital are tied up against the so-called banking activities (in their case, that 
would include fees due and foreign exchange risk), their capacity for trading will 
be further impaired. 
Nevertheless, in spite of many "hot" political questions to be resolved, the 
process has advanced much further in comparison to other issues or stakes. It seems 
that the issue of international regulation and control has passed from the crisis stage 
to the ritualization stage, with the situation being that the nature of the goals has 
been agreed upon: it is the value of order that should be protected. 
7.2.3. Liberalization 
Defining and maintaining a proper balance between restriction and promotion 
of market forces has always been one of the most important problems governments 
face. In the post-war period, regulation of the financial sector used to take the form 
of restricting market forces, i. e. curbing competition. Not only were cross-border 
capital flows and the right of establishment significantly restricted, but there was 
also direct intervention in the price mechanism (for example, interest rates were 
controlled). 
From the 1960s onwards, government regulation has shifted from the 
restricted to more market-oriented systems. Interest-rate controls were gradually 
abandoned, capital flows liberalized and the financial sector progressively 
deregulated. Liberalization of cross-border activities has not been related just to 
capital flows, but has also been set as an ultimate goal for managing international 
trade (particularly under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, GATT). As global economic integration advanced, governments realized 
what had been accepted by business community long before: within the framework 
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of a market economy, pursuit of the basic value of wealth (efficiency) is crucially 
dependent on the protection of the value of freedom (openness). Until the end of 
1970s, there was more a declarative inclination to openness and liberalization. This 
was true in both the OECD area and the EC. In 1961, the OECD adopted the "Code 
of Liberalisation of Capital Movements" and the "Code of Liberalization of Current 
Invisibles", while the Treaty of Rome (1957) explicitly calls for a gradual abolition 
of internal frontiers for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. 
The latter also implicitly includes the right of establishment and the progressive 
liberalization of banking and insurance services, as integral parts of the planned 
internal market. 
While liberalisation momentum has built up and spread, the end of the 1980s 
saw a number of signs in policies and practices counter to this trend. For example, 
the US 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act contains some restrictive 
provisions in relations to foreign acquisitions: the President's new authority enables 
him to block individual foreign investments for national security reasons. There are 
also problems related to the imposition of conflicting requirements on multinational 
firms, e. g. when a home country's legislation with extraterritorial reach- conflict 
with a host country's legislation or policies. The UK government has even passed 
a Protection of Trading Interests Act to give itself general authority to counter the 
problem of extraterritoriality. Recent years have also witnessed a growing use of 
reciprocity in the treatment of foreign investments by host countries, particularly in 
areas such as banking, insurance and other services. Concerns have also arisen in 
relation to the contribution of regional or bilateral agreements (NAFTA, Australia 
and New Zealand) to the development of a truly global economy. Restrictions on 
the range of activities in the financial sector (e. g. separation of banking and 
securities business) still exist, notably in the US and Japan. In many cases, 
regulators require establishment as a condition for permittin g the offering of 
financial services, thereby excluding non-resident providers. Most of these 
restrictions are related to underwriting, broker/dealer services and syndication. 
Concerns have also been expressed, on part of the developing countries, in relation 
to the contribution liberalization can make to the development process, and also in 
relation to the integration of their emerging markets into the global financial market. 
So, in short, the issue of liberalization of financial services has reached the 
agenda of most actors on the scene. Concerning governments of developed market 
economies, it can be concluded that the nature of the goals to be pursued has been 
agreed upon: in order to improve the overall efficiency of capital allocation, the 
global system must be kept as open as is feasible. The banking community also 
agrees that the global financial system should be maintained open, but they perceive 
the value of freedom as the prime motive for that. Freedom to move across state 
boundaries, freedom of investing and creating branches, freedom of operating and 
competing 
- 
these are all expressions of the same basic value. These perception are 
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also closely related to the protection of the value of equality, for example, equality 
between different financial institutions and between local and foreign institutions. 
On the other hand, many developing countries still hold strong reservations 
about these values and put much more emphasis on the value of development. 
Actually, many developing countries perceive the value of freedom as the possibility 
of making their own "choices" regarding autonomous development policies. They 
may also agree, at least in principle, that the higher the level of the international 
system's openness, the greater the economic benefits. However, they are not able 
to accept the developed countries' package of norms in realizing this basic principle. 
Surprisingly, developing countries' perceptions in this regard sometimes resemble 
the ones of banking community: liberalization cannot be pursued without the value 
of equality (e. g. the access of their companies to developed countries' capital 
markets, or sharing of information). In order to comprehend the complexity of the 
issue, three approaches will be analyzed here 
- 
those taken by the OECD, GATT, 
and the EC. 
The origins of the approach taken to the liberalization issue by the OECD 
can be traced back to its foundation. Pursuant to the 1960 Paris Convention, the 
Organization shall promote policies designed to achieve, inter alia, the highest 
sustainable economic growth and financial stability, and thus to contribute to the 
development of the world economy. From the beginning, it has set a goal of 
maintaining an open international (world) economic system, while improving the 
climate for international direct investment. As mentioned, two Codes were adopted 
in 1961, in order to set a general framework for a progressive liberalization of 
capital movements: 
"Members shall progressively abolish between one another restrictions on 
movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic 
cooperation... Members shall, in particular, endeavour to treat all non- 
resident-owned assets in the same way irrespective of the date of their 
formation... Members shall endeavour to avoid introducing any new 
exchange restrictions of the movements of capital or the use of non-resident- 
owned funds... Members shall grant any authorization required for the 
conclusion or execution of transactions and for transfers specified... "I" 
The Code on Capital Movements was revised and amended several times, in order 
to include new developments and improve its explicitness in certain areas. While the 
right of establishment was earlier explicitly excluded from the Code, a 1984 
amendment expanded the definition of inward direct investment. Of particular 
importance is the provision requiring member States not to maintain policies or 
practices in regulated sectors that will raise special barriers to non-resident 
investors. After entry, foreign establishments should be granted standards of 
treatment no less favourable than granted to domestic enterprises ("national 
treatment "322), and on a non-discriminatory basis. However, member States have 
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been permitted to derogate from certain liberalization measures, or to lodge 
reservations to them. This specially concerns the existence of "serious economic and 
financial disturbances" or the adverse developments of the overall balance-of- 
payments (Article 7). Regardless of the perceived long-term benefits from 
liberalization, the Code "shall not prevent" a member State to exercise its right to 
maintain public order, protect its essential security interests and fulfil its obligations 
related to international peace and security (Article 3). 
Although extensive liberalisation has been accomplished, a survey of 
remaining restrictions shows that in particular the issuing of securities (and money 
market instruments), as well as their introduction on the secondary market is still 
not liberalized. In general, the reservations imply that permission is required for the 
operations concerned, rather than that they are absolutely prohibited. For example, 
Germany, France and some other countries restrict the issue of Eurosecurities, for 
the purpose of controlling the use of their currencies abroad. Other countries restrict 
the purchase of securities on the domestic market by foreigners 
, 
while some control 
purchase of securities abroad by residents. "' It is worth mentioning that only four 
countries lodged no reservations: Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK. 
The provision of cross-border financial services has been liberalized by an 
extension of the "Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations". One of 
the significant differences in comparison to the Code on Capital Movements is the 
provision which calls for the extension of liberalization to other operations: 
"Where Members are not bound, by virtue of the provisions of this Code, 
to grant authorizations in respect of current invisible operations, they shall 
deal with applications in as liberal a manner as possible. ""' 
However, an important degree of discretion was again left to member countries for 
taking measures for the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, sound institutions 
and for the protection of investors. Particularly in relation to banking and investment 
services, most of the countries still require establishment on their territories. 
Finally, the establishment of foreign banks has become widely accepted 
throughout the OECD (especially bearing in mind the efforts carried out within the 
EC and the related directives). The obligation to liberalise foreign bank 
establishment, on the same basis as national treatment, was included in the OECD 
Code on Capital Movements in 1986. Accordingly, countries would refrain from 
imposing new restrictions, and would progressively abolish existing ones. 
Nevertheless, most countries still apply the reciprocity principle: states reserve the 
right to approve the establishment of foreign banks on a reciprocity basis. For 
example, it is permitted by the Second Banking Directive in the EC regarding non- 
EC countries. 
It is often argued that reciprocity provisions are a powerful negotiation 
weapon, particularly in inducing opening of other countries' markets. The opponents 
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argue that reciprocity is indeed a form of protectionism which could give rise to a 
"protectionist spiral", that it undermines the already achieved level of liberalization 
and formally introduces a discriminatory practice. Reciprocity is still a matter of 
dispute, but it is very likely that this component will be built in any multilateral 
framework for global capital flows. Within the OECD, only seven countries do not 
support the reciprocity principle. (Four of them do not support it even though they 
are EC members and are "allowed" to apply it under the EC Second Banking 
Directive. )" 
The issue of liberalization of trade in goods has been in GATT's focus since 
its establishment more than forty years ago. Liberalization of services is a far more 
recent item on its agenda. At the 1982 Ministerial Meeting, it was decided at the 
initiative of the US that each contracting party with an interest in services should 
examine the sectoý at the national level and exchange information about that, both 
among themselves and through the GATT. Two years later, a set of Agreed 
Conclusions was adopted, initiating a process of information exchange in relation 
to services in GATT. At the Ministerial Session in ]Punta del Este in 1986, a 
Declaration was adopted launching the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. It was agreed that the negotiations on services would be separated 
from goods and would not be placed within the legal framework of GATT. For this 
undertaking, the Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) has been established. It 
has been among the most ambitious projects undertaken to establish a multilateral 
framework of principles and rules for trade in services. Three main objectives were 
laid down in the Declaration: 1) expansion of trade in services under the conditions 
of transparency and progressive liberalization; 2) promotion of economic growth of 
all countries, and 3) promotion of the development of developing countries. 
The GNS has proved to be a forum where completely opposite views on 
services, liberalization and economic efficiency have been presented. On one hand, 
developed market economies have been pressing for a wide and comprehensive 
liberalization, while, on the other hand, developing countries have been generally 
reluctant to open their markets for services. Their views are totally different also in 
respect to the basic nature and goals of a future agreement. The developed countries 
aspire at reaching a comprehensive framework, with specific rules in the form of 
a binding international convention, and with a dispute mechanism to request 
compensation in the case of breach of the rules. 
"Without any specific rules of the game that countries should respect when 
implementing national regulatory regimes and policies, it would be difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to achieve most of the benefits that services now have 
to offer all countries. 11326 
On the other hand, the developing countries oppose any kind of a 
comprehensive and binding arrangement, on the grounds that the service sector is 
rather "sensitive" and has a significant impact on macroeconomic conditions. They 
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do not see national regulation as being restrictive to global liberalization, but rather 
as being a necessary "barrier" to promote a country's development objectives. Most 
frequently, they perceive services as the instruments by which a country exercises 
its political and economic sovereignty. So, by liberalizing them (i. e. by opening up 
to competition from more developed countries), developing countries fear they 
would limit their governments' ability to carry out development policies. 
Furthermore, if services were to be brought within GATT, the same rules would 
apply for totally different environments and cross-linkages could be created between 
the trade in goods and in services. For example, a country could impose a condition 
that it would open up its markets for goods if the other country opened up its 
service sector. So, instead of introducing more equality, such a negotiating system 
could only lead to greater inequality, by limiting the autonomy of the development 
process. 
"It appears that perhaps a thin layer of multilateralism with a large space for 
working the balance of advantage bilaterally might be a better approach. 
And, an approach in terms of guidelines would perhaps be more feasible 
than an approach in terms of mandatory, legal, contractual 
arrangement. 11327 
In spite of major, conceptual disagreements between the two groups of 
countries, it is particularly interesting to outline the basic principles that have been 
offered"g. Firstly, services should be subject to the "appropriate regulation" which 
links the concepts of progressive liberalization and respect of national policy 
objectives. So, services should be liberalized but within the limits set out by 
"general objectives" such as national security, sovereignty, the ability to conduct 
national policies (e. g. a development policy), and the maintenance of law and order. 
Other principles include: non-discrimination (most-favoured-nation-treatment in 
GATT), standstill (preventing moving "backwards"), transparency of regulation, and 
respect for development objectives. 
The progress on negotiating the framework for services has been rather slow, 
due to the already mentioned divergence among the developed and developing 
countries, but also due to the existence of several practical questions still to be 
settled. For example, it has not yet been decided which industries or subsectors are 
to be covered. An agreement has not been reached upon a proper definition of trade 
in services: developed countries propose that it should include both trade (when 
services actually cross the frontier) and foreign direct investment in services (when 
a supplier is actually present in the importing country). Developing countries oppose 
this position, fearing that it would completely open their "infant" service markets. 
However, a debate that has emerged in the GNS clearly points out that the 
"classical" principles to provide comprehensive liberalization have to reviewed. 329 
In December 1993, the Uruguay Round was completed, but services were left out 
of the agreement. 
158 
The European Community's approach to the issue of liberalization dates back 
to the early 1960s, when the Council of Ministers adopted two Directives for the 
lifting of restrictions on capital movements in the Member States. This primarily 
concerned short-term and medium-term credits, investment, personal capital 
movements and trade in quoted securities. Other operations, like issuing bonds and 
long-term loans, were deregulated conditionally. Liberalization of these financial 
transactions was not sought per se, but rather as a necessary condition for the 
development of the common market. However, in 1964, the Council of Ministers 
rejected a proposal for a third Directive which would have eliminated the remaining 
discrimination in national legislation. Great dissimilarities continued to exist, 
particularly regarding the issuing and placing of securities, stock exchange listing 
and the acquisition of securities through financial institutions. 
For more than two decades, the issue of liberalization stayed dormant, and 
even new restrictions were imposed on capital movements and banking services. 
Many wider economic problems accounted for this: massive (speculative) capital 
flows from the US, the long-run crisis of the dollar, two oil crises and the related 
balance-of-payments problems, etc. The beginning of the 1980s brought new 
initiatives to take the issue back to the EC agenda, particularly bearing in mind the 
early success of the European Monetary System (operating frorm. 1979) and a rapid 
global integration of capital markets occurring at that time. 1985 White Paper 
outlined the basic approach that could be taken in order to bring about a European 
Financial Common Market, and the issue of liberalization of the financial sphere 
was considered in a comprehensive way. A new policy in this respect was to be 
governed by three major principles: minimum coordination of individual national 
rules, mutual recognition and home-country control. 
Another important development has to be mentioned here, because it later 
proved to be of particular significance in negotiating and adopting the EC banking 
regulation. A revision of the EEC Treaty came into force on July lst 1987 as the 
Single EuTpean Act, introducing majority decisions for numerous questions, 
including in relation inter alia to the common financial market. Nevertheless, 
decisions on fiscal matters, which are also fundamental for creation of the financial 
area, remained subject to unanimity. Bearing in mind the whole spectrum of banking 
traditions within the EC, this revision laid the grounds for some of the most fierce 
political debates concerning banking regulation. 
During 1987 and 1988, capital transactions were further liberalized, so as to 
include long-term credits, the acquisition of unlisted foreign securities,. the 
admission to the capital market of securities issued in another EC country, short- 
term and money market instruments, etc. "' Nevertheless, a special safeguard 
clause was maintained to enable Member States to take protective measures if their 
monetary or exchange-rate policies are disrupted by liberalization. 
An extensive liberalization of banking services began in 1973, when the 
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freedom of establishment was introduced, reaffirming the principle of non- 
discrimination. The first Banking Coordination Directive was adopted in 1977 331 
, 
setting out an important additional principle of home-country control. For the first 
time, a reference was made to the level and adequacy of a bank's own funds (Article 
6). In 1988, the Second Banking Directive was adopted 132 to promote the freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide financial services, both viewed as 
essential prerequisites for the achievement of the internal market. The Directive 
introduced a "single passport" for credit institutions: 
"... by virtue of mutual recognition, the approach chosen permits credit 
institutions authorized in their home Member States to carry on, throughout 
the Community, any or all of the activities listed in the Annex by 
establishing branches or by providing services; 11333 
A bank with the "passport" is permitted to conduct a whole range of activities, 
ranging from "pure" credit operations (e. g. consumer, mortgage and other credits), 
to participation in share issues, portfolio management and advice. This is subject to 
the provision that the institution is authorised to carry out the services at home. 
Such an extension of the regulation to permit the engagement in most investment 
services implied that the process of regulatory harmonization had to include 
investment banking as well. Despite all the underlying preferences for liberalization, 
the Directives mainly concern the internal area, i. e. have been designed to provide 
liberalization among the Member States. Nevertheless, the opening up to other, non- 
EC countries can be seriously affected by the application of the reciprocity clause, 
when the status of a bank from a third country is made "negotiable" and conditioned 
by the status and treatment of EC banks in that country. The latter will cover 
situations when EC banks are not ensured genuine national treatment, effective 
market access and competitive opportunities comparable to those offered by the EC. 
This provision has attracted most controversy, in relation to many of its aspects and 
elements. It has been argued that it serves to build a "Fortress Europe" and that the 
concept of "effective market access" has been deliberately left vague enough to 
permit different explanations. Sometimes, it has been claimed, it can be used as a 
powerful political "leverage" to achieve other objectives. The following statement 
made by Sir Leon Brittan in the US may illustrate such a perspective. 
"The Community, like the US administration, is fully committed to the 
objective of liberalizing banking and financial markets at home and abroad. 
The US administration has consistently supported the Commission's efforts 
to create the single market by 1992. The Commission equally supports the 
drive of the US administration to deregulate and reform banking and 
financial markets here. With mutual support and hard professional work we 
should be able to arrive at the same destination at the same time. 1,334 
Concerning a single securities market, efforts to harmonize regulation in this 
field date back to the early 1970s. It was agreed that information asymmetry 
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constitutes an important barrier for capital movements, and hence for market 
efficiency. Furthermore, it was realized that adequate information disclosure can 
significantly improve the protection of investors, and that such disclosure 
requirements should be uniformly designed throughout the Community. Most of the 
Directives adopted since 1979331 aim at improving market transparency and 
investor protection. 
Two Directives from the second half of the 1980s are of a particular 
importance for this analysis. In 1985, a Directive was adopted to harmonize 
regulation and liberalise activities in relation to transferable securities (units issued 
by investment fundSý31. It was a milestone decision that required all the 
restrictions on the free marketing of units to be removed. Another major decision 
was to permit the automatic stock-exchange recognition of listing particulars, once 
337 they have-compiled with the 1987 Directive coordinating such rules. 
So, by the end of the 1980s, a substantial degree of regulatory harmonisation 
had been achieved, already allowing much more liberalized securities flows within 
the EC. However, as credit institutions were granted "single passport", countries 
with a developed investment banking sector started to press for a similar freedom 
for investment banks. The strongest advocate of this has been the UK, with not only 
a long investment banking tradition, but also with a substantial share of international 
and global securities business being conducted there. So, in February 1990, the 
Commission received a proposal for an Investment Service Directive (ISDY11. 
Similar to the Second Banking Directive, the ISD will allow credit institutions to 
offer investment services in any Member State on the basis of a licence held in one 
state. It is designed to set minimum conditions for such authorization, and to set the 
conditions under which an authorized investment firm can establish its branches or 
provide services in another Member State. According to the Annex of the Directive, 
liberalization covers activities such as broker and dealer operations, market-making, 
portfolio management, underwriting, operations on derivative and money markets, 
etc. 
Two basic principles of EC regulation, home country control and mutual 
recognition, have been reiterated, as well as the reciprocity clause in relations with 
non-EC countries. So, the authority from a state where a bank is registered (home- 
country) will supervise the bank's compliance with a number of rules, concerning 
the initial capital required, the adequacy of its "own ftinds" and sound management. 
Furthermore, the home country authority will supervise continuing observance with 
prudential rules: for the purpose of investors' protection, dealer operations (when 
the firm is the principal) have to be kept separate from broker-activities, and the 
firm shall be required to have sound internal control mechanisms. The firm shall be 
required to establish its own investor-compensation scheme or to be a member of 
a general arrangement in that respect. The host country authority, however, will 
continue to be able to impose conduct of business and other consumer protection 
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rules within certain limits. 
Concerns that were expressed, in relation to the ISD, on behalf of many 
actors involved were numerous and diverse in nature, and they clearly highlighted 
how perceptions vary. For the German government, the Directive had become a 
"safeguard" to protect local universal banks from fierce competition on the EC 
securities market. This was done through making the adoption of the Directive 
conditional: securities flows could be liberalized, but only if investment banks were 
to fall under capital rules similar to those devised for credit institutions. Large 
universal banks, therefore, would not be forced to accommodate to investment 
banking patterns, but instead investment banks would have to augment their balance 
sheets. Resulting from the EC banking directives (CAD, Large Exposure Proposal, 
Own funds, and Solvency ratio), what came into question here was whether to allow 
EC-wide and unfettered competition, or to "channel" market forces for the ultimate 
goal of improving efficiency. The position of the German government in this case 
was much less related to the issue of liberalization, and maybe more connected to 
a particular promotion of the value of order 
- 
German-style regulation of the EC 
financial market place. 
British banks took different Positions in relation to many "unallocated" 
stakes, particularly those regarding the operation of market forces, and also linked 
the values of equality and wealth (efficiency) to the issue. What was of a high 
salience for them was the question of liberalizing both segments (or types) of 
markets 
- 
regulated and unregulated. A bank should be free to choose where it could 
conduct its business (within the EQ, but it could not ftilly exercise this right if the 
transactions had to be carried out solely on regulated markets. The reasoning behind 
this is that the "order-driven" market, as exists in the UK, already protects investors 
by imposing rigid dealing-rules and codes of conduct. So, the market itself had 
created certain conditions for promoting the value of order, and hence there was no 
need to rank this value higher than the one of freedom, or even efficiency. British 
banks were also pressing for certain changes in relation to market transparency and 
information disclosure, as well as concerning direct access of banks to stock 
exchanges and other markets. 
However, the Investment Services Directive was adopted in May 1993 and 
is due to be implemented in the member states at the beginning of 1996.339 
An additional remark has to be made in relation to the political fight over EC 
banking regulations. Namely, most of the so-called "national" banking and 
merchant-houses associations link together not only domestic institutions but also the 
foreign ones operating locally. So, one can conclude that the views of "British 
banks", as described above, are not exclusively held by the institutions originating 
from the UK. Most of such views are shared by important American, German or 
Japanese banks that carry out a substantial portion of their international business 
through London. This may add a new perspective on cross-border competition, and 
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yet another perspective on global politics. 
These three approaches have been chosen in order to illustrate how different 
international organizations (in the widest sense, as regular patterned interactions) 
perceive the issue of liberalization v. protectionism. Most actors described in the 
previous chapter feel the issue as being very salient to them, but to include a survey 
of all the attitudes and views would require an unreasonable extension of the 
analysis. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the strong controversies surrounding 
this issue underscore the very basic perceptions (values) and questions (policies) in 
relation to the market economy: to limit or promote market forces, to regulate or 
deregulate market forces and/or market participants, etc. Some actors perceive these 
stakes as being related for realisation of the value of freedom, others discern them 
as serving the protection of order, and yet others feel them as contributing to greater 
or less equality. 
When it comes to policy norms and questions, positions are also quite 
divergent, despite the fact that the most general principle (belief) is not contentious: 
the global securities market should be kept as open as possible, because of the 
overall economic benefits. However, the development of policy norms (which is a 
necessary precondition for a regime creation) is still hindered by this qualification 
"as much as possible". Here, governments' traditional concerns with sovereignty 
come in again. The extent to which openness is feasible (reasonable, viable) depends 
on the country's government and its assessment of "national objectives". Those 
objectives rank from national security, balance-of-payments stability, to orderly 
market functioning, industrialization and service development, etc. Furthermore, a 
government's discretionary assessment is accompanied by a range of "weapons" it 
can use: reservations on agreed multilateral frameworks, suspension of some of the 
measures deriving therefrom. or the reciprocity clause. However, one cannot neglect 
the impact of other, non-governmental actors, but their actions are most often only 
directed to their govermnents, i. e. to the representatives in international 
organizations. 
7.2.4. Market standards 
Another aspect of the global securities market is its quality, meaning the 
easiness and cost-effectiveness of making the market transactions, the breadth and 
depth of the market, its reach and stability, its flexibility to accommodate to 
changing financial needs, etc. In addition, a broader sense of market quality implies 
another dimension: prudent behaviour and the code of business conduct. If one 
studies carefully each of these market dimensions, it becomes plain that what is 
essential and common to all of them is the question of market standards. The capital 
163 
rules, described above, can also be regarded as a sort of standard which should (at 
least, that was the underlying intention when they were agreed upon) improve the 
market quality. However, in this study, they were analyzed in the context of 
international control 
- 
as the instruments of control. Now, the analysis will focus on 
a group of market standards which are very different in their nature, but are still 
expected to be important in creation of any future international regime for securities 
flows. 
A code of business conduct has always been one of the pillars of banking 
systems developed in a more liberal tradition, what has been termed here as the 
"confidence" approach. Designing such rules has been regularly carried out with 
close cooperation among all the "parties" involved: banks and practitioners, banking 
associations, regulatory authorities, and investors and customers. Maybe that could 
be the reason why such rules have most often invoked a high level of compliance 
(some of those arguments have been presented in relation to the self- 
regulation/statutory regulation debate). Nevertheless, the most important 
consequence resulting therefrom is undoubtedly a higher predictability of other 
actors' 
. 
(market participants') behaviour and attitudes. By reducing an important 
dimension of uncertainty, such rules can significantly improve the market quality. 
In the case of global financial markets, uncertainty is especially accentuated due to 
various financial traditions, backgrounds and environments which are globally 
integrated. 
During the 1970s, when the expansion of transnational corporations was 
occurring rapidly, many actors on the global scene became aware that certain 
international "rules" for that expansion must be created. In the absence of any 
supranational authority, such rules could not be of a binding character, but instead 
could take a form of "guidelines" 
- 
directed to both transnational firms and host- 
country governments. The issue of liberalization v. protectionism as regarding 
foreign direct investment was placed very high on the agenda, and business conduct 
was analyzed from that perspective. International efforts to implement rules 
regarding direct foreign investment and the conduct of the agents of such investment 
date back to the proposed Charter for an International Trade Organization, prepared 
in Havana in 1948. "0 The Charter (which was never adopted) dealt with 
restrictive business practices, promotion of an investment climate, monitoring of 
foreign investment, etc. During the following two decades, the UN became the main 
forum for dealing with these questions, and several important resolutions were 
adopted. 341 
Outside the UN, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development has issued, in 1976, a set of "Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 1'342 
. 
These Guidelines consist of recommendations to both transnational 
firms and host countries, and actually present a "model" of behaviour expected from 
such firms. For example, enterprises should take fully into account the policy 
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objectives of the host country, publish consolidated financial statements, disclose the 
structure of the firm, refrain from disturbing local competitive structures, and take 
due account of the need to protect the environment. Although these Guidelines are 
voluntary and of a very general nature, it is important to notice that they present the 
first, multilaterally agreed framework for a global economic phenomenon. 
Another highly-politicized framework for such activities has been negotiated 
by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations since 1974. Once adopted, 
this rather ambitious code would cover general aspects of the firm's behaviour (e. g. 
respect for national sovereignty and domestic laws, adherence to economic goals and 
socio-cultural objectives, respect for human rights, etc. ), as well some special 
aspects (economic, financial and social). The draft text also calls for the disclosure 
of financial and organizational information about the whole of the enterprise, and 
emphasizes the need for intergovernmental cooperation and information 
exchange 
. 
343 Most of such internationally-designed codes aim at improving the 
general economic environment by, for example, opening up national markets for 
foreign investment or introducing more equality among domestic and foreign firms. 
Although the underlying motives for these codes have not been an improvement of 
the market quality, they are important for this study for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
they point out a rising awareness of the "world community" that global problems 
are different from international problems, and that they should be dealt with upon 
widely accepted (shared) principles. Secondly, these codes mostly address the firms 
themselves, because, it has been realized, without their voluntary adherence to such 
recommendations any international regulation is unproductive. 
Concerning conduct of financial business, particularly in the securities 
markets, the early work in the EC on a European code of conduce 44 is very 
significant. The explanatory memorandum states that, in order to promote 
harmonious economic development, the role of the securities markets is to provide 
adequate matching of supply and demand for capital. Therefore, it is absolutely 
necessary to create conditions for the proper working and integration of these 
markets. Keeping in mind that the recommendation on a Code was made in 1977, 
this was really a "fresh approach" to the capital market in general. 
"... the Commission is anxious to take full account of the dynamics of the 
financial market and of business life, and consciously to adopt a positive 
attitude which seeks to improve the machinery of the market and the 
effectiveness of those operating on it. 11141 
The Code is not addressed directly to firms operating on the securities markets but 
instead to their supervisors, setting out a fundamental objective, certain general 
principles and a number of supplementary principles. The objective is to 
"... establish standards of ethical behaviour on a Community-wide basis, so 
as to promote the effective functioning of securities markets (i. e. by creating 
the best possible conditions for matching supply and demand for capital), and 
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to safeguard the public interest. 11116 
The first general principle recalls that any securities transaction has to be carried out 
in accordance with host-country rules. In order to reduce market imperfections 
(asymmetries), fair, accurate, clear and adequate information should be made 
available to the public. Equality of treatment should be guaranteed to all holders of 
securities of the same type issued by the same company. Companies' supervisory 
boards, directors and managers should avoid any action expected to hamper the 
proper functioning of the market. Moreover, any professionally engaged person 
should avoid jeopardizing the credibility and the effectiveness of the market, and 
should endeavour to avoid all conflicts of interest. In addition to these basic 
principles, the Code further sets a number of supplementary principles, e. g. 
concerning 'fair behaviour' by financial intermediaries, the recommendation to carry 
out activities on organized markets, avoidance of price manipulation and 
establishment of "chinese walls", and the publication of information. 
In 1990, IOSCO adopted a Resolution on International Conduct of Business 
Principles"', and called upon all its members to recognize them as basic standards 
for financial firms in their activities on the domestic as well as the international 
level. These principles are honesty and fairness, diligence, the use of all capabilities 
and resources, information about customers, information for customers, conflicts of 
interest, and compliance. So, to explain these principles briefly, firms are expected 
to conduct business activities in an honest and fair way, i. e. to avoid misleading and 
deceptive acts or information. Moreover, they should have the duty of best 
execution (i. e. they should seek to execute the orders at the terms most favourable 
to the customer), and should effectively use all the necessary resources and 
procedures for proper business performance. One of the ways to ensure proper 
market functioning is to provide adequate flows of information: firms should seek 
financial and other information from their customers, and should disclose relevant 
information (e. g. about risks) to customers. Finally, firms should comply with all 
regulatory requirements applicable to the conduct of business. 
The most important feature of this conduct is that it covers financial 
operations on both the domestic and the international level. However, these 
principles are directed only at the brokerage firm-customer relationship, while other 
types of relationships have been neglected. 
This "omission" was corrected in 1992, when the International Federation 
of Stock Exchanges adopted its own set of principles for securities business 
conduct. 348 An earlier version of these principles was accepted in 1988, containing 
very general principles for securities trading. They included rules and 
recommendations with respect to stock exchange membership, traded material, 
trading process, and clearing and settlement of transactions. The 1988 Principles 
were further elaborated four years later, taking into consideration the IOSCO 
principles of business conduct. The scope of application was widened to cover the 
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relationships between: 1) stock exchanges and their members, and their employees; 
2) stock exchange members themselves, and 3) stock exchange members, and their 
customers and employees. 
The 1992 Principles resemble the IOSCO ones to a great extent, but are far 
more detailed and developed. The principles cover almost all aspects of business 
conduct that may affect the relations mentioned above: honesty and fairness, 
diligence, professional capabilities, disclosure of information, conflicts of interests, 
and compliance with statutory (government) and self-regulatory obligations. For 
example, firms (members of a stock exchange) should conduct their business with 
honesty and fairness in order to honour the integrity of the pricing mechanism, 
which is the most important function of any exchange. For that reason, they should 
avoid misleading acts or representations, refrain from disrupting the market, test 
new trading strategies, and promptly report transactions. Considering the capabilities 
principle, the FIBV expanded it to include financial responsibility rules for firms, 
and the duty of an exchange to monitor its members' financial positions. So, due 
attention was paid to the complexity of the organized securities markets, but still 
their global integration was hardly mentioned. Similarly to the approach taken by 
IOSCO, what was in focus was the international market, organized and controlled 
by national securities authorities. 
Regardless of their scope and underlying intentions for their creation, all of 
these principles fail to include one particular aspect of global securities and global 
finance, money laundering. It can be argued that such activities have already been 
outlawed, and that codes of conduct should relate only to legal or permitted 
operations. Banking associations in some financial centres (e. g. BBA in London) 
have adopted special guidelines in this respect, which would eventually be included 
in their codes of conduct. 119 Various international fora. deal with this problem and 
it has indeed been placed high on many agendas. However, as the questions of how 
to detect and prevent such an abuse of the global financial system are rather 
complex, the scope of this analysis remains limited to "standard" securities market 
transactions. 
7.3. Conclusion 
This part of the analysis has attempted to present the complexity of the issues 
related to the global capital market, in order to illustrate formation of the global 
agenda. Even after such a lengthy presentation of the "actual" state, it is difficult 
to conclude whether there is one global agenda, or different issues are placed on 
different international agendas. Due to very strong functional linkages between the 
issues, one can assume that there is a single, world-level agenda where most of the 
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critical stakes in relation to capital flows are being debated. Until the end of 1992, 
none of the three issues has reached the decision making stage, and it is disputable 
whether they have entered even the ritualization phase. However, after a careful and 
detailed comparison of the advance made on each of the issues, it is possible to 
summarize a group of basic beliefs that underlie these political processes. If this is 
taken as a body of principles and norms to govern actors' behaviour, one can 
assume that there are certain conditions for a broad framework for global capital 
flows to emerge. The following description may be criticized as being too simplistic, 
but it had to be done in such a way in order to fulfil the main purpose of the second 
part of the analysis: to give another perspective, complementary to the basically 
economic phenomenon. 
The basic values which are to be protected are wealth, order, freedom and 
development. National regulators, for example, perceive the global integration of 
capital flows as threatening the basic value of order; most banks see that 
phenomenon as opening new opportunities for an enhanced satisfaction of the values 
of freedom and equality; international governmental organizations consider it mainly 
as one of the alternatives for improving the overall economic efficiency (the value 
of wealth). Actors' ranking of the values, as the essence of politics, is definitely not 
fixed and differs to a great extent. What is common to all actors is that they feel the 
need for collective action, either to avoid joint losses or to achieve joint gains. It is 
possible to outline several basic principles that would eventually guide a regime for 
global capital flows. 
Firstly, national authorities should fully cooperate in supervision of 
transnational banking. This can be further elaborated through a set of norms, such 
as: 1) no transnational activity should be allowed to escape supervision; 2) such 
supervision should be carried out on a consolidated basis, so as to provide control 
of the whole of a transnational bank; 3) cooperation among national authorities 
should be as extensive as permitted by the limits of national laws and public policy; 
4) international regulation should not impose excessive burden on market 
participants, and thus adversely affect the market efficiency. 
Secondly, the market stability is crucially influenced by the level of 
soundness of transnational banks. For the protection of the values of order and 
security, international regulation should develop a set of widely-accepted standards 
for assessing the financial strength of banks. Possible norms which should "fortify 
optimal solutions""' may be: 1) financial institutions should maintain adequate 
capital against their operations; and 2) the adequacy of capital should correspond to 
different risks inherent to transnational financial operations. 
Thirdly, protectionism can greatly reduce overall economic benefits, so 
national markets should be open to non-nationals. This widely-accepted general 
orientation needs ftirther clarification, and hence a set of norms would eventually 
be developed, as to include the following: 1) banks should have the freedom of 
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establishment and operation; 2) there should be no discrimination between domestic 
and foreign banks; 3) countries should be allowed to limit the level of market 
openness under certain, well defined conditions, and 4) the achieved level of global 
openness should not be decreased. 
Fourthly, efficiency of the market is primarily determined by adequate 
business conduct of transnational banks. So, in order to protect the value of wealth, 
behaviour of all actors should be guided by the following norms: 1) in carrying out 
their financial operations, banks should comply with the highest ethical standards; 
2) an adequate level of market transparency should be maintained; and 3) investors 
should be granted appropriate protection from derogation of the two previous norms. 
This may give an impression that all the basic principles and norms are 
accepted universally and in all details. Nevertheless, as this chapter has presented, 
there still remain many stakes under contention, and a final disposition of them may 
significantly affect the whole structure. As the environment and the actors 
themselves are permanent sources of issues, future developments can generate new 
issues. Also, some of the old issues can be taken off the agenda, either because 
certain interim dispositions will be made, or an issue will become dormant. In 
addition, if a prospective regime is to become operational, a body of rules and 
decision-making procedures will have to be created. At present, there exist certain 
rules in relation to, for example, reciprocity, the location of the main super-visor and 
derogation from the norms (e. g. under which conditions a member-country can 
derogate from the norms of the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements). 
From the theoretical point of view, an important conclusion can be drawn 
in relation to future development of the global capital market. Apart from the impact 
of broad economic trends, that development will be crucially affected by the "high 
politics" of global securities flows. One of the possible outcomes of such a global 
political interplay may take the form of a regime to govern the market. In the 
absence of a world government, but also far from anarchy, one can expect that some 
sort of multilateral agreement on the "rules of the game" will be reached. The 
concluding part of this analysis strives to justify this conclusion. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TO THE GLOBAL MARKET 
The doctrinal history of economic thought is loaded with lengthy and 
thorough analyses of all kinds of phenomena from this sphere of social development. 
These analyses have usually been carried out within the strict confines of the single 
discipline. Sometimes these borders have been narrowed and sometimes expanded, 
but it has been widely accepted that, for example, basically economic phenomena 
should be studied by economists, using "tools" of economic analysis and relying on 
findings of economic theory. The strength of tough academic resistance to wider 
research horizons definitely is derived from a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, the 
speed at which new, unknown phenomena arise in all aspects of human life has 
significantly contributed to the challenging of this intellectual rigidity. Concerning 
over-all social development, recent decades have particularly emphasized the speed 
and diversity of change. 
The ultimate goal of this analysis has been to offer one of many possible 
dimensions within which basic economic and political research could be broadened 
and presumably be enriched. It is not aimed, however, at denying the "scientific 
sovereignty" of the disciplines concerned. It rather aspires to illustrate a way in 
which the disciplines' grounds could be fortified 
- 
by making them more responsive 
to the real-world changes. 
As pointed out in the introduction, this analysis has a two-fold purpose. For 
economists, to help them realize that beside a quantifiable world of interest rates and 
exchange rates, there exist other 
- 
subjective and axiological 
- 
motives for action. 
For political scientists, to contribute to their better understanding of sources of 
political issues: in order to comprehend the rise of certain economic stakes and 
issues, they should pay due attention to economic analyses of the environment to 
political systems, macroeconomic factors and basic economic and market structures. 
Although this study is divided into two parts, this has not been done for the purpose 
of maintaining the demarcation of the research lines between economics and politics. 
On the contrary, an attempt has being made to extend the analysis over and beyond 
rational-choice explanations (for the first part) and exclusively political 
considerations (for the second part). 
The main analytical assumption has been that modem economic phenomena 
must be studied within a multidisciplinary framework, because both their origins and 
their consequences relate to various aspects of social life: economic, social, 
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political, cultural, technological, etc. In this particular case, such a framework has 
been built mainly upon the economic and political perspectives of the same 
phenomenon, notwithstanding some broader sociological and technological aspects 
drawn upon at times. In addition, a critical research attitude has been taken, 
implying that institutions and social and power relations have neither been taken for 
granted nor analyzed within a static setting. So, the analysis has concerned itself 
with the origins of and changes in the phenomenon of the global capital market, 
maintaining the postulate that it is the social and political complex as a whole, which 
should be researched. 
As there is no single, widely-accepted definition of the global financial 
market-place, it is not possible to offer a concise interpretation of the global capital 
market. Instead, one has to rely on integrating the findings from various analytical 
dimensions, such as the market's origins, structures, segments, participants and/or 
its coverage. 
Modem financial markets have emerged as the main outcome of a "financial 
revolution" of the 1970s and the 1980s, although international financial transactions 
have been practised since ancient times. Today, financial markets do not just serve 
the "real economy" but lead a life of their own, sometimes quite separate from 
national and international economic trends. Nevertheless, they most often epitomise 
the very nature of dynamic processes at all levels of economic functioning 
- 
at the 
national, international and global levels. 
Traditionally, financial markets intermediate between dislocated supply and 
demand for financial assets, they connect different market participants, and bridge 
the time-gap between supply and demand. In this way, they provide the continuity 
of asset accumulation and allocation. One of the criteria for categorizing financial 
markets is the scope of their operations, so there are domestic, international, off- 
shore, multinational and global markets. The first two categories had dominated the 
most part of financial history: financial circulation had been successfully kept within 
state borders and under state governance. An ever-growing economic expansion in 
the latter part of the XXth century has broken many such restraints and even more 
it has transcended borders. Global financial flows have come to be pre-eminent, 
shaping and determining economic developments at all levels. Among various such 
financial flows, capital flows have proved to be of particular importance. 
The global capital (securities) market today presents a cluster of institutions, 
instruments and participants all related to allocation of capital simultaneously on 
different domestic, international, multinational and off-shore markets. As with most 
of the other modem financial markets, it features a huge volume and frequency of 
transactions with a high degree of concentration and centralization. It is also very 
flexible and responsive, and characterized by both competition over interest-rates 
and a non-price form of competition (e, g. competing by the quality or the range of 
products offered). It creates an environment conducive for financial innovation, but 
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also for speculation. Bearing in mind a high level of the world-wide integration of 
such flows, as well as the vital significance of adequate capital allocation for any 
level of economic operation, the systemic risk has been greatly elevated. This is one 
of the distinctive features of the modem, global securities market, particularly in 
comparison to the previous stages in the development of international finance. 
The global securities market came as a logical result of the financial and 
macro-economic inefficiencies of the capital flows on purely domestic and 
international markets. For example, balancing the needs for capital and for 
investment in size, time and place could not be adequately carried out exclusively 
within limits of domestic and international transactions. Keeping in mind a high 
level of world-wide economic interdependence, globalization of securities markets 
can indisputably contribute to a more realistic asset and risk valuation, in 
comparison to an assessment made by relying exclusively on domestic and 
international markets. Furthermore, the adjustment of market participants' portfolios 
to changing needs certainly requires access to different markets, as well as the use 
of financial techniques to combine various capital sources and instruments. 
Traditional domestic and international financial transactions, as well as the scope of 
traditional financial markets, cannot provide an adequate basis for cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. In short, globalization of financial flows has become a 
prerequisite for the market to continue performing its functions efficiently. The 
global capital market today allows, much more than all the other markets, market 
participants to raise or to invest long-term funds in an appropriate volume, under 
acceptable conditions and at the right time. 
Globalization of securities flows have been conducted along two major paths: 
the internationalization of domestic markets, and the proliferation of various off- 
shore (Euro) markets. A progressive internationalization of domestic markets has 
included, inter alia, the expansion of the foreign-securities sector, easier entry 
regulations, dismantling of institutional barriers in the market, creation of new 
instruments, etc. The rise of different off-shore markets has marked a new financial 
era. The imposition of capital controls in the US in the beginning of the 1960s 
actually led to the creation of the "Euro-dollar escape valve", which later paved the 
way for the other Euromarkets to emerge. In the absence of any kind of 
supranational regulatory authority, but also under the conditions of "competitive" 
deregulation by a few countries, such "stateless" markets began to flourish. 
Oversimplifying, global securities flows today relate to issuing and trading various 
foreign and Eurosecurities, combining in that way different international and 
extraterritorial transactions. 
However, the global capital market encompasses much more than certain 
quantifiable amounts of such securities. This new phenomenon embraces 
comprehensive integration of domestic securities markets, a remarkable 
diversification of various external markets, the emergence of new techniques and 
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instruments that are globally accepted and used, harmonious reforms of major stock 
exchanges, a progressive integration of emerging markets, an increase in the number 
of currencies of denomination (i. e. other than the dollar) and improvements in 
technological support. So, by its very nature, it is not a static phenomenon, but 
rather a process which integrates these developments at the global level. 
The structure of market participants is highly diversified, and includes large 
commercial and investment banks, institutional and private investors, financial 
houses of industrial corporations, governments and intergovernmental organizations. 
However, major investment banks are certainly the most active participants in the 
global intermediation process. Their transnational expansion is of a more recent 
origin, in comparison to the expansion of commercial or universal banks, but of no 
less reach and importance for the functioning of the world economy. 
Modem investment banks feature some distinctive characteristics that have 
greatly influenced the nature and structure of the global capital market. They 
integrate previously separated functions on the securities markets, they are heavily 
dependent on a high level of innovation and individualism, and they rely on their 
brand name and their reputation as the main competitive weapons. Investment banks 
have always been very flexible and "customer-oriented" financial institutions, where 
the customer's confidence and the bank's ethical code of conduct have been highly 
valued. Finally, they have always depended on the "real-time" information, which 
is crucial for guiding investment business decisions. Precisely on these grounds, 
advances in the telecommunication and computer industries have become the main 
infrastructural components of the market. So, as a result of their transnational 
expansion, such features have been, more or less, "projected" to the global 
securities market place. 
Nevertheless, this has not been the only factor to determine the features of 
the global market. As underscored, a new quality of the market derives from the 
integration of various domestic and international markets, each with its own 
peculiarities and traditions. A lack of confidence in banking and finance in the US, 
a long standing tradition of self-regulation in the UK, a strong government influence 
and tight links between industry and banking in Germany, as well as quite static and 
centralized structures in Japan 
- 
all these traditions, and many others, were mingled 
once capital flows had become globalized. 
This new quality can be viewed in two ways which are not mutually 
exclusive. On one hand, it can be perceived as a positive aspect of the market's 
development 
-a variety of institutions, attitudes and traditions contributes to 
expanding the range of choices. On the other hand, such a feature can be observed 
as increasing uncertainty, allowing excessive speculation and fraudulent practice, 
and creating conditions for arbitrage beyond basic economic reasons. From the Point 
of view, such a market definitely serves an ever-efficient allocation of capital on the 
world-wide basis. From the other point of view, that kind of global financial 
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"chaos" elevates the systemic risk beyond a "controllable" level, and in that way 
greatly diminishes benefits from the rise in efficiency. The existence of these two 
broad perspectives on the same phenomenon has generated another new, distinctive 
feature of the market: global financial flows have become politicized to an extent 
hardly ever before associated with any kind of financial transactions (with the 
exception of exchange rates). 
Financial market operations spanned the globe, significantly contributing to 
the growth of integration and interdependence of national economies. Nevertheless, 
it was not until the 1982 debt crisis that global financial transactions were perceived 
as a potential threat to the stability of both the global system and the individual, 
national economic systems. Since then, perceptions of global linkages, international 
responsibilities and actions have been undergoing radical change. National policy 
objectives have been re-assessed, as well as the ordering of national priorities. It has 
been realized that finance is no longer just the concern of domestic policy, and 
particularly not just under the domain of economic policy. International financial 
problems have increasingly come to be seen in the same terms as traditional 
international relations, i. e. foreign policy. Rising awareness of major industrialized 
countries that an innovative, global approach to international finance should be taken 
laid the ground for a new stage in international cooperation and policy formulation. 
However, such growing awareness has proved to be just a necessary condition, but 
not a sufficient condition, for formulating and implementing international policy. 
Differences that exist in the concretization of awareness, for example in relation to 
objectives, strategies and actual implementation measures, have contributed to the 
emergence of a world-wide political debate. 
Four particular episodes have been used to illustrate the rise of international 
concern in the field of global finance. In 1982 the world community, especially big 
creditors to developing countries, faced a crisis of a size, reach and complexity 
never experienced before. Many commercial banks, as the main creators of 
international liquidity at the time, had not been able to resist new profit-raising 
opportunities and had become deeply involved in sovereign lending. It was suddenly 
realized that a potential default of any of the banks would not be another bankruptcy 
case. Such an incidence would have severely endangered national financial structures 
and the international financial system as a whole. 
The evolution of responses to the debt crisis closely followed changes in 
perceptions about actors responsible for the crisis, as well as about ways and means 
available to manage the crisis. In the beginning, there were just commercial banks 
- 
creditors to developing countries 
- 
to assemble short-term emergency packages. 
Later, the multilateral financial institutions became involved, along with 
international non-governmental actors, the banks' home-country governments and 
particularly the debtor country governments. Alongside a greater reliance on market 
forces (e. g. in developing new techniques for debt-relief), all the involved actors 
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realized that the strategy should be a long-term and'comprehensive one. A consensus 
was reached upon the nature of the problem: the main causes of the crisis were of 
a structural, not temporary origin. It was perceived that the approach should focus 
more on economic conditions and performance, and not be limited to the "financial 
world". As the crisis pointed to a high level of global economic interdependence, 
the only form of a response to it could be multilateral action (though the West did 
not acknowledge this until 1985). Another important message was sent out by this 
episode: some of the basic financial market functions had to be re-examined, from 
the aspect of both national and international regulation. It became clear that 
government had acquired a "new" role of balancing a different type of national 
interests and goals, both at home and abroad. 
The 1987 stock market crash was another dramatic experience that changed 
many general perceptions of the global financial structure and of the securities 
market functioning. This episode could be considered as a "final drop" for all actors 
to realize that capital flows were not just international transactions, but that the 
global capital market had indeed emerged. Enormous wealth was lost during the 
crash, but so were some long-held beliefs about the market. It was discovered out 
that signals from the market can often be insufficient, confusing or just too late. It 
was discovered that financial diversification had not laid the grounds for risk 
reduction, sufficient for the conditions of global integration. Computerized securities 
transactions emerged as powerful and "efficient" links in transmitting market 
disturbances across the globe. So, these features of the global securities system, 
highly praised in times of a "bull" market, turned against the system itself. 
The crash explicitly underscored the high sensitivity of the market both to 
its economic and to its political environment. It became evident to what extent a 
lack of communication between major market participants, including the regulators 
as well, could induce a series of chain reactions. The crash also emphasised that 
such reactions were almost impossible to control, on both a national and a global 
level. Moreover, it highlighted a significant level of overall interdependence: the 
economic, trade and financial interdependence. Building and maintaining an 
adequate infrastructure for market operations (e. g. clearing and settlement 
mechanisms) came into focus. Even the imposition of certain market safeguards, it 
was realized, could be effective in the absence of a coordinative action to regulate 
and control different markets. 
So, the debt crisis and the 1987 stock market crash have provoked a re- 
examination of some of the basic functions of the financial market, namely 
allocation of funds and production of information. The Banco Ambrosiano, episode 
and the BCCI affair, among other similar incidents that were not reviewed, shed 
another light on the global financial market place. 
The BCCI collapse was the world's biggest banking failure in modem times, 
concerning not just the amount of losses but also the number of countries, 
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organizations and individuals involved. The bank's business evolved mainly in the 
field of international trade-finance, where the speculative and fraud skills of its 
management were combined with its "opaque" transnational structure. As the 
investigations revealed after its closure in 1991, BCCI was conducting a vast range 
of criminal activities, such as money laundering, illegal acquisitions, maintaining 
relations with drug cartels and terrorist organizations, bribery, falsification of 
records and the conduct of imprudent credit policy. Such a scale of "business 
diversification" was made possible by many factors, most important being related 
to a lack of cooperation among national regulators, and to a lack any comprehensive 
and consistent regulatory framework for such organizations. 
This incident launched some of the most thorough and substantial analyses 
of modem banking. Almost every aspect of international banking has come under 
scrutiny: banking structures and financial techniques, accounting practice, auditing 
and supervision, legal aspects, cooperation and communication among governments 
(and among departments of the same government), and, most notably, international 
regulation. It has been realized that a global approach, not just the inter-national 
approach, to modem banking should be developed. Such a strategy would have to 
encompass not only a great number of financial regulators, but also to include 
cooperation with the global banking community. It also should provide links with 
the regulators dealing with other issues such as terrorism and drugs. Most 
importantly, it should be based on a set of widely-accepted norms and rules that 
would clearly distribute rights and obligations among and between regulators and 
financial institutions. In such an environment many existing loopholes would be 
closed and the level of uncertainty would be significantly reduced. 
As noted, the underlying research aim has been to offer new, critical insights 
for understanding the rise, the structure and the processes of the global securities 
market. This can be done only if the particular phenomenon is located within a 
broader social and political context, so that the complexity of the whole and of its 
parts can be comprehended. The International Relations' approach to the global 
environment seems particularly useful in this respect. Such an approach includes 
analyses of political actors, structures and processes being developed within and 
between different sectors of the world polity, i. e. of the global environment. 
Regarding the basic assumptions and theoretical findings, four main approaches to 
the study of international relations can be identified. They are conventionally 
labelled as Realism, Structuralism, Functionalism and Globalism. Instead of 
summarizing these approaches, some of the arguments against the first three of them 
will be presented. These points will, at the same time, serve to justify the theoretical 
orientation taken in the analysis. 
The state (or more precisely, the government) is indisputably neither the only 
actor in international relations, nor a single, homogeneous political actor. It also 
does not en oy full autonomy in defining and pursuing "national objectives", most i 
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important of them being related to military security. The environment is not in total 
anarchy, and there are not just conflicts in traditional international diplomatic 
relations. The existence of non-governmental actors does not ultimately rest upon 
the power and the interests of states. In some situations, the contrary may apply: the 
power and interests of governments may rest upon the ability or inability to 
influence non-govemmental actors. 
From another stand-point, economic determinism is not the only factor to 
shape decisions and relations at all levels. There is not a general and ever-lasting 
unity of interests within the same classes in different countries. By the same token, 
interactions in international relations are not solely based on contradictory interests 
of different classes. 
Yet from another perspective, common welfare cannot be considered as a 
primary goal of international actors. Although state borders are easily overcome 
today, they stilt exist and present a lasting obstacle to the rise of a global, functional 
organization. Although cross-border cooperation is being developed in many fields 
and through many forms in international relations, conflicts still exist. 
Then, what does the real world of today look alike? Oversimplifying, it is 
a multicentric global structure, with numerous, differing participants, issues and 
processes that are very closely intertwined. It features complex interdependence due 
to: 1) an ever-growing importance of reciprocal effects among actors in international 
relations; 2) the existence of numerous and diversified channels among units and 
actors; 3) the absence of a fixed, hierarchical ordering of political questions; 4) a 
shift in the concept of power and the real basis of power, from the control over 
(military) resources to the control over economic resources, technology, information 
and analytical skills; 5) the emergence of various cross-border relations away from 
the control of governments, and the related proliferation of transnational actors; and 
6) the rise of transgovernmental relations between government agencies and 
departments from different countries. 
Having all these particularities in mind, the issue-based paradigm has been 
chosen as the only appropriate framework to analyze the inputs, the structures and 
the outputs from political processes at the global level. The concept of issues aims 
at surmounting: a) concrete, power-related simplifications of Realism; b) 
deterministic, polarizing simplifications on economic grounds, of Structuralism, and 
c) idealistic, conflict-ignoring simplifications of Functionalism. The issue-based 
approach to international relations emphasizes groups as political actors (versus 
states as major political actors) and the system of values (not power) as underlying 
grounds for political actions. So, a group of people enters a political process when 
it perceives certain questions as being relevant for the realisation of its goals and the 
values underlying them. They interact with other groups in order to mobilise support 
that would uphold their position in relation to the question. The contention among 
actors occurs over more or less concrete stakes, regarded as being instrumental for 
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achieving, protecting or promoting abstract values. Therefore, axiological links are 
the most important element in the process of grouping the stakes into issues, which 
are then further clustered into issue-dimensions. At the highest analytical level, there 
is a hyper-issue consisting of a set of such dimensions. 
Applied to this analysis, all political choices affecting the construction and 
maintenance of an market economy (as opposed to a socialist command economy) 
can be regarded as a hyper-issue. That particular ideological framework links the 
issues from various dimensions: efficiency (the value of wealth), stability (the value 
of order), openness (the value of freedom), and probably the development dimension 
(which combines the values of wealth and international equality). It is still a matter 
of theoretical dispute whether the last dimension is a separate one, or is already 
"included" in the other three dimensions, but the inclusion of the value of equality 
in North-South relations seems to make it a distinct dimension. Concerning global 
securities flows, the most critical issues include the ones of international control, 
liberalization of financial markets and market integrity. The issue of international 
v. national control consists of a number of stakes, such as the mode, scope and 
object of control. 
An issue comprises a set of political stakes linked by the value, while a 
policy contains a set of answers to a series of political questions which are 
functiona Ily related. Similarly, an issue-system presents a set of actors, a set of 
stakes (linked by the value) and a process of interaction among the actors about the 
stakes. When the actors contend over proposals for the simultaneous disposition of 
stakes from value-linked issues, there exists a wider issue-system. For example, a 
wider issue-system for maintaining stability of global economic flows includes the 
following issues: international v. national control, macroeconomic coordination v. 
competition, international lending (for balance-of-payments purposes), and money 
laundering. A wider issue-system for improving global economic efficiency consists 
of issues such as the market integrity, transfer of technology, trade v. direct 
investment, etc. These issues are perceived as being on the same issue-dimension, 
i. e. relevant for the realisation of values of order and security, in the first case, and 
relevant for the value of wealth in the second. 
When it comes to taking decisions on issues and stakes, functional, 
bargaining and actor linkages create policy-systems. So, a wider policy-system 
encompasses related policies, when the actors contend over proposals for 
simultaneous disposition of stakes from these policies. In financial markets the 
policy systems are mainly formed by ftinctional links rather than bargaining or actor 
linkages. For example, there is a wider policy-system for global capital flows, 
cutting across several wider issue-systems and including several policies such as: 
liberalization, international control and supervision, efficiency promotion of 
transnational operations, prevention of money laundering, etc. Stakes, like for 
example entry requirements, data reporting, standardisation of market procedures, 
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are interrelated to such an extent that their disposition must be negotiated within a 
broader context. This has to be done simultaneously even though the stakes belong 
to different issues, and even lie on the different issue-dimensions. Actors perceive 
certain stakes and issues (or groups of stakes and issues) as being related to certain 
values, whose satisfaction they aspire to protect or improve. However, perceptional 
concepts may differ from actual concepts of dealing with such issues, due to the 
existence of a variety of actors and possible linkages that can be created among 
issues. 
It has been widely accepted that the phenomenon of cross-border capital 
flows is not just a truly global problem but rather a part of an even wider 
phenomenon of a rising global market economy. However, it has not been possible 
to design a global mechanism to handle such flows. In the International Relations' 
language, it has not been possible to achieve a final disposition of stakes, and the 
last part of this conclusion will examine to what extent an interim allocation has 
been achieved. Two groups of reasons, inter alia, have accounted for this. Firstly, 
certain postulates (institutions in a broader sense) of the "classical" concept of the 
market economy have become increasingly inadequate. For example, the domain and 
mechanism of government economic policy, government economic "sovereignty", 
its autonomy and rational decision-making, and existing intergovernmental 
organizations in the sphere of money and banking have all failed to adapt adequately 
to the effects of globalisation. 
Secondly, the problem of globalized capital flows has proved to be rather 
complex in nature. It should be viewed as related to domestic and cross-border trade 
in both goods and services (and also the illegal trade in arms and drugs), interest 
and exchange rate policies, technological and industrial policies, environmental 
policy, etc. There is neither one single government nor an intergovernmental 
organization capable of creating an arrangement (a broad policy) for global capital 
flows. Upon these grounds, it can be concluded that the global capital market has 
"outgrown" the status of an economic problem and has evolved as a political one. 
A result has been the emergence of a wider policy-system, encompassing several 
functionally related policies, many different actors, a number of issues and stakes 
to be allocated. 
Following this research, the analysis has shifted to political actors and 
processes in order to offer answers to a set of questions: 1) which are the political 
actors most deeply involved in the debate over the global capital flows; 2) how do 
they perceive the issues, and what attitudes and routes to the agenda do they take; 
3) how do certain political stakes become grouped together and how do particular 
policy-systems emerge, and 4) what kind of relations and structures exists among 
these actors. 
The world of today features a great diversity and multiplicity of political 
actors. In this particular case, that diversity ranges from individual banks and local 
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banking associations, through various international organizations and associations, 
to universal organizations such as the United Nations. ' The actors have been 
categorised Oust for analytical purposes) into four groups: banks and dealers, 
international non-government organizations, national authorities and 
intergovernmental organizations. In spite of the analytical categorization, strict 
demarcation lines between them have proved useless and theoretically unjustifiable. 
Attitudes and postures of an actor cannot be ex ante defined, just according to its 
name, status or origin. The same applies for the values one may expect them to 
strive to enhance. It is not always the case that banks are solely interested in 
promoting freedom to operate, efficiency or the value of wealth. By the same token, 
government regulators may well consider the values of order and safety as 
subsidiary to over-all efficiency. 
The ranking of values that underlies political actions varies across actors and 
time. Although banks and their associations primarily accentuate values such as 
freedom and wealth, they indeed recognize that order must be maintained at all 
levels of functioning. National regulators and their "organizations" still 
predominantly stress the values of order and safety. Even so, they have come to 
accept the fact that the pursuit of these values is meaningless if it adversely effects 
over-all market functioning and efficiency. So, both "sides" have entered the 
political process bearing in mind that a compromise has to be reached at the 
intersection of their aspirations. 
There is a great diversity of actors, both within and among the groups. Two 
developments have to be underscored in this respect. Financial institutions of today 
have grown well beyond their "classical" intermediation functions. Banks have 
developed transnationally not just to be able to execute orders and underwrite 
securities worldwide 
- 
modern banks persistently (and successfully) endeavour to 
shape the environment by using the political, system. They often feature a high sense 
of political efficacy. Secondly, regulators have realized that the maintenance of close 
contacts with the business community is a prerequisite for efficient regulation. 
Moreover, contacts must be established and nurtured also with professional 
associations in other countries, as well as with international non-governmental 
organizations. 
The multiplicity of channels through which an actor can contend over 
political questions emphasizes an unacknowledged (but highly sophisticated) global 
network of communication and debate. The frequency with which most of the actors 
communicate (internally and externally) adds to this global market a new quality: 
a very lively, world-wide political interplay. As the market continuously advances, 
the issues come to rank higher and higher on the political agenda of many actors. 
The interplay of political forces have been centred around four issues: 
IA survey of major actors and their preferences is presented in the Appendix. 
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international control, capital rules, liberalization and market standards. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to conclude whether there is one global agenda, or these issues are 
placed on different international agendas. Due to very strong functional linkages 
between the issues, one would have expected that there would be a single, world- 
level agenda where most of the critical stakes in relation to capital flows are 
debated. Until the end of 1992, none of the issues has reached the final decision- 
making stage, and it is disputable whether they have entered even the ritualization 
phase. However, after a careftil and detailed comparison of the advance made on 
each of the issues, it is possible to summarize a group of basic beliefs that underlie 
these political processes. If this is taken as a body of principles and norms to govern 
actors' behaviour, one can assume that there are certain conditions for a broad 
framework for global capital flows to emerge. 
Basic values sought to be protected are wealth, order, freedom and 
development. National regulators, for example, usually perceive the global 
integration of capital flows as threatening the basic value of order; most banks see 
that phenomenon as opening new opportunities for an enhanced satisfaction of the 
values of freedom and equality; international governmental organizations consider 
it mainly as one of the alternatives for improving the overall economic efficiency 
(the value of wealth). It is possible to outline several basic principles, agreed upon 
by the great majority of the involved actors. 
Firstly, national authorities should fully cooperate in supervision of 
transnational banking. This can be further elaborated through a set of norms, such 
as: 1) no transnational activity should be allowed to escape supervision; 2) such 
supervision should be carried out on a consolidated basis, so as to provide control 
of the whole of a transnational bank; 3) cooperation among national authorities 
should be as extensive as permitted by the limits of national laws and public policy; 
4) international regulation should not impose excessive burden on market 
participants, and thus adversely affect market efficiency. 
Secondly, market stability is crucially influenced by the level of soundness 
of transnational banks. For the protection of the values of order and security, 
international regulation should develop a set of widely-accepted standards for 
assessing the financial strength of banks. Possible norms which should guide 
desirable behaviour may be: 1) financial institutions should maintain adequate capital 
against their operations; and 2) the adequacy of capital should correspond to 
different risks inherent in transnational financial operations. 
Thirdly, protectionism can greatly reduce overall economic benefits, so the 
national markets should be maintained open. This widely-accepted general 
orientation needs further clarification, and hence a set of norms, such as the 
following: 1) banks should have the freedom of establishment and operation; 2) 
there should be no discrimination between domestic and foreign banks; 3) countries 
should be allowed to limit the level of market openness under certain, well defined 
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conditions, and 4) the achieved level of global openness should not be decreased. 
Fourthly, efficiency of the market is primarily determined by adequate 
business conduct of transnational banks. So, in order to protect the value of wealth, 
the behaviour of all actors should be guided by the following norms: 1) in carrying 
out their financial operations, banks should comply with the highest ethical 
standards; 2) an adequate level of market transparency should be maintained; and 
3) investors should be granted appropriate protection from derogation of the two 
previous norms. 
If the findings from the second part of the analysis are integrated, one can 
consider them as the elements for sketching a "political portrayal" of the global 
capital market, as a complement to its "economic portrayal" presented in the first 
part. Let us now examine, step by step, the situation from the aspect of regime 
theory. 
As explained, the reach and the extent of the global integration of capital 
flows accentuate the need for coordination and cooperation. This is not just related 
to cooperation among national regulators, but also among and between all other 
actors on the scene. In this case, the prime motive has been a two-fold one. On one 
hand, there are common aversions, most notably a desire to prevent a particular 
outcome: the breakdown of the global system of capital flows. On the other hand, 
there are common interests, the most important being related to improvement in 
market efficiency. A new quality arises as a result of the fact that the need to 
cooperate has not been related to either of the two purposes, but to the both of them 
simultaneously. It can be concluded that the globalization of capital flows has 
created a collective situation requiring collective action to achieve joint gains and 
to avoid joint losses. Such a dual nature of the need to cooperate derives from 
extensive functional (and other) linkages between the issues concerned. 
Though a mere acknowledgement that a collective situation exists is indeed 
an important condition, it is exceptionally far from being practically sufficient. What 
has to bridge the distance between such a shared perception and a desired outcome 
is a more or less elaborated structure, or "rules of the game". This intervening 
structure should guide the behaviour in accordance with common beliefs, agreed 
standards and practices, thus reducing uncertainty and increasing the probability of 
a desired outcome. 
Concerning regime formation, one can (and should) here integrate economic, 
political and cognitive explanations. Economic changes that had greatly contributed 
to the need for a regime are: internationalization of domestic capital markets; 
proliferation of various external markets; technological advances; economic 
restructuring of industrialized, ex-socialist, as well as developing countries; and a 
growing sensitivity and interdependence of interest rate and exchange rate 
movements. It can be also argued that the power-basis has shifted from the control 
over resources to the control over outcomes. For example, the US government 
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indisputably controls the largest pool of economic, military and technological 
resources in the world. Even so, it has not been able to exercise a sufficient degree 
of control over the creation of a particular segment of the global financial market 
- 
the Eurodollar market. Actually, not a single actor (international or national, 
governmental or non-governmental) can exercise control over today's financial 
"outcomes", i. e. over the global integration of capital flows. This is exactly why 
there is a strong need for a regime to be designed. 
Situational mode explanations can add another perspective on this need: the 
actors indeed have to make choices between incompatible alternatives, each having 
both desirable and undesirable consequences. For example, the issue of liberalization 
v. protectionism of financial markets most clearly involves such alternatives. A 
government cannot expect the national economy to benefit, at the same time, from 
an increased competition and a controlled development of the financial sector. As 
actions of one actor can produce significant adverse effects upon the others, 
collective action seems to be the only acceptable form of response to the collective 
situation. 
In relation to regime purposes, it is evident that a global arrangement for 
capital flows would primarily aim at reducing risk and uncertainty. From the 
theoretical point of view, this comes as a primary purpose when there are serious 
disruptions (or inefficiencies) in basic functions that the market has to perform. As 
explained, if a market has to bridge various gaps between supply and demand (the 
intertemporal, the interlocative and the interpersonal gap), the flow of information 
and knowledge about the environmental determinants is absolutely crucial. For 
example, if the global securities market has to provide the best possible method of 
raising capital (or a combination of different, geographically dispersed sources), 
financial intermediaries have to be certain that national regulators would not 
suddenly restrict their operations in the markets concerned. The very same applies, 
for example, to the market integrity issue: market participants have to be confident 
that their counterparts would adhere to the same norms of business conduct if the 
transactions are to be completed successfully, i. e. if the market is to perform the 
function of closing the interpersonal gap. 
Throughout the literature, various conditions have been suggested as being 
necessary, adequate or sufficient for regime creation. In this particular case, it is 
obvious that there is a high degree of politicization, and policy making in one polity 
affects and is affected by that same processes in other polities. For example, the 
OECD policy towards restricting the use of the reciprocity principle has being 
seriously affected by the adoption of the Second EC Banking Directive. Therefore, 
collective action is needed to reach a disposition of stakes within the liberalization 
issue. Domestic policies are, on one hand, very closely linked to those of other 
polities (for example, changes in interest and/or exchange rates). On the other hand, 
not one of them could have achieved a sustainable level of command over the global 
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capital envirom-nent. That is an additional condition for regime creation. 
Furthermore, as there is a number of critical, important issues within the policy- 
domain, actors have come to realize that (in general) the benefits from a widely- 
agreed arrangement would be higher than the costs of surrending a certain degree 
of "absolutely" independent decision-making. 
However, particular modes through which this "surrender" will be carried 
out have not yet been framed. To put it differently, a set of concrete policy norms 
and an organization to implement them still wait to be agreed upon. Egoistic self- 
interest and a regime-conducive policy for most actors (not just governments) are 
present, as two among the basic variables to cause regime formation. Nevertheless, 
there is a clear lack of a widely accepted and shared knowledge in relation to 
particular aspects of the functioning of the global market. For example, the US 
regulators generally do not accept postulates of portfolio diversification theory, that 
have been praised both by countries with a liberal banking tradition and by non- 
governmental actors. Closely related to this, norms and principles indirectly linked 
to the issues (for example, those related to basic axioms of economic governance or 
of maintaining order) differ to an extent that any compromise would require weighty 
concessions on all sides. In addition, there is no practice or regular pattern of 
behaviour from past practice which can be turned to, as the phenomenon of the 
linking of world-wide capital is of a recent origin. 
In spite of that, significant progress has been achieved in relation to two 
stakes: the object of international control, and the ways such control should be 
performed. A set of widely-accepted standards have been agreed for assessing the 
financial soundness of transnational banks, mostly resembling the Basle capital rules, 
to which many countries adhere to. The pressure to meet the ru'les has had a number 
of effects. 
Figure 1: BIS Capital Ratio in 1993 
(reported by 339 banks) 
12.01%-20% 
above 20% 
beuow 8% 
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Many banks have turned to ingenious ways of raising new funds, for example 
by issuing undated preference shares that count for capital, or by using their 
customer base to cross-sell other products. The standards have focused on the need 
to maintain or improve profitability. Interests margins have been improved, 
particularly on international lending business. The top twenty US banks, for 
example, increased margins by 15 percent in the period from 1990 to 1992.35, 
Costs have been cut, either by cutting dividends and reducing the number of 
branches, or by merging with rivals. The 1993 survey of the top one thousand 
11311 banks, conducted by "The Banker 
, 
clearly pointed that the Basle capital 
standards have been followed by a great number of banks. More than one-third of 
the group reported the ratio, and of that only a small number has failed to meet the 
BIS capital ratio of 8 percent. Figure I gives more details about the soundness of 
the reporting banks. 
What has to be highlighted, however, is a different attitude taken by the most 
influential banks in relation to their capital strength. American banks have made the 
most successful efforts to boost the capital base and in that way regain the 
confidence of investors world-wide. Leading UK banks have been successful to a 
similar extent, while Japanese banks have just managed to cross the line of eight 
percent 
. 
31' Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the BIS standards have been 
accepted by those most important and most influential banks: all of the top 136 
banks have their capital/asset ratio above the required level. 
In addition to the capital requirements, transnational banks should be subject 
to a coordinated supervision of home and host countries, on a consolidated basis. 
However, in both cases, there is still plenty of room for derogation from these basic 
norms. National regulators can indeed design and apply rules stricter than those 
internationally agreed, and they can claim the right to withhold from cooperation 
with other countries on "public policy grounds", i. e. if certain national objectives 
from the sphere of the so-called "high politics" are in jeopardy. 
A certain degree of progress (from the theoretical standpoint) has also been 
accomplished in respect of institutionalization: several organizations have placed 
themselves at the very top of the political structure wherein bargaining occurs. Some 
of them are governmental and some non-governmental, some of them are national 
and some are international. Though a lack of a single institution to administer a 
regime is usually seen as an obstacle for its effective application, in this specific 
situation it may well be the opposite. A particular "mixture" of various types of 
political actors that dominate the debate (national securities regulators, banking and 
stock exchange associations, committees of international organizations, central 
bankers and international groups of regulators) highlights the complex nature of the 
phenomenon. It also underscores the complementary character of the two most 
critical objectives: efficiency and stability. While one can assume that a transnational 
(non-governmental) regime for global capital flows does already exist (for example, 
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within the framework of the International Securities Market Association), creation 
of an intergovernmental regime for such flows faces today two alternatives. On one 
hand, it can be designed as a rather loose arrangement to allow substantial 
discretionary powers of national regulators, thus failing to reduce overall uncertainty 
and systemic risk. On the other hand, the ongoing political bargaini ng over more 
concrete norms and rules could unduly prolong the process and even lead to a 
stalemate, which would definitely allow for an increase in regulatory competition, 
uncertainty and systemic risk. Having in mind a high degree of global economic 
interdependence, both alternatives seem deficient. Nevertheless, the composition of 
the most influential actors on the scene could point to a third alternative. 
As suggested in Chapter Five, world complexity can be viewed as consisting 
of two worlds: the intergovernmental world and the multi-centric world. It is the 
structure and processes of the latter that created the conditions for a transnational. 
regime for capital flows to emerge. The whole first part of this analysis can be 
understood as describing such a regime, i. e. the global capital market with its 
origins, organisation and mechanisms. Moreover, two particular institutions (the 
International Securities Market Association, ISMA, and the International Federation 
of Stock Exchanges) have established themselves as focal points for elaborating the 
rules and decision-making procedures in relation to conduct of capital transactions. 
What is most important is that, at least until now, the regime has proved to be 
operational. Let us now examine, in more detail, "rules of the game" created by 
ISMA. 
Although the International Securities Market Association was included in the 
survey of the main political actors (Chapter Six), few remarks on its scope and size 
are due here as well. It was founded in 1969, at the time of the Euromarkets' 
explosion. Since then it has grown to encompass more than nine hundred banks and 
securities houses. In 1991, a total turnover in secondary trading by ISMA members 
amounted to nine trillion US dollars (equivalentý 54 
. 
The successful functioning of 
this global arrangement for capital flows definitely derives from an elaborated 
structure of norms and rules created by ISMA. Bearing in mind regime theory, any 
arrangement has to be based on a certain body of principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures, in order to become operational. In the case of ISMA, 
these elements are clearly defined and structured in a consistent way, so that the 
basic values are protected. 
As described in Chapter Six, the basic values that guide all actions of the 
Association are freedom, wealth and order. Therefore, the basic principles can be 
defined as follows. Firstly, the key objective of any arrangement for global capital 
flows is the improvement of efficiency of economic system, be it a national system 
or the global economy. Secondly, an adequate degree of order must be maintained 
on the global capital market if such positive effects are to be generated. 
A set of norms has been developed on this basis. The global capital market 
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is to be kept transparent and liquid to the greatest possible extent. The Association 
and its members establish and maintain regular contacts with securities regulators, 
in order to exchange information and improve cooperation among all classes of 
regulators: self-regulatory organizations, statutory regulators, and intergovernmental 
statutory regulators (e. g. the EC Commission). Regulation of securities markets has 
to be designed so as to avoid averse effects on market efficiency, and it has to 
contribute towards a reduction of costs to the consumer (not vice versa). Moreover, 
it has to resemble the most important peculiarities of the global capital market, with 
regard to its different segments and levels of functioning. For example, rules for 
wholesale and retail investment banking, as well as for domestic, international and 
global banking, do not necessarily have to be the same. 
One of the most significant features of the ISMA regime is a comprehensive 
"package" of detailed rules for all aspects of its functioning, specifying members' 
rights and obligations. For example, members of the Association must comply with 
just and equitable principles of business, observe good market practice and apply the 
highest standards of professional integrity to all business dealings. The Association 
is open to banks, members of recognized stock exchanges and licensed securities 
dealers, which can become full members. In addition, organizations which are 
neither banks nor dealers may become associate members in the case they have an 
important role in the market and maintain close relations with ISMA. Associate 
members have no right to vote or to take part in elections, but nevertheless actively 
participate in discussions. 
Transactions in international securities (Euro-securities) are organized 
according to several groups of rules, each covering different phases of the business: 
matching of supply and demand, reporting of completed transactions, reporting of 
closing bid and offer prices, confirmation of trades, settlement procedures, and 
reporting a list of securities prepared for the following-week trading. The "core" 
members of the Association, the reporting dealers, have even wider obligations: they 
have to subscribe to TRAX, i. e. to the ISMA's computer network for matching 
transactions in securities"', and they have to make a two-way price for a 
determined "structure" of securities (with respect to the currency of denomination, 
the trading sizes and trading hours). 
Disciplinary rules cover all situations when there is an alleged or actual 
breach of the ISMA's statutes, by-laws and rules. Apart from the event when there 
is a breach of any rule, disciplinary actions may be taken and sanctions imposed if 
there is evidence about a member's misconduct causing substantial damage to the 
interests of the Association. In any case, misconduct is sanctioned by reprimands, 
fines, suspension or loss of membership. 
Concerning the key objectives of maintaining an efficient and orderly 
market, ISMA members do indeed have diverse obligations. At the same time, they 
have certain rights that enable them to exercise significant influence on the regime 
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structure and the market functioning. For example, the Market Practices Committee 
proposes and revises uniform market standards, but a body that actually formulates 
new rules and amends the existing ones is the Committee of Reporting Dealers. So, 
the members that are in fact the most responsible for market liquidity and 
transparency 
- 
reporting dealers 
- 
have the strongest impact in creating the regime 
rules. In addition to discussions on general meetings, members have the right to 
bring certain problems, directly related to a particular geographical region, to the 
agenda of a corresponding Regional Committee. Both perspectives, the functional 
and the geographical, are taken into consideration when the regime rules and 
procedures are creating or changing. For example, when the Board has to be elected 
"... the selection of candidates must reflect a balanced representation in the 
board of the geographic composition of the Association and the current 
importance in the international securities markets of particular regions or 
areas, and the various functions in the markets. "356 
In addition to the principles, norms and rules, appropriate decision-making 
procedures have been created, in relation to, for example, changing of the trading 
rules, conciliation and arbitrage, constitution of a disciplinary tribunal, etc. 
ISMA has joined a number of international quasi-non-govemmental 
organizations, in order to maintain close contacts with both regulators and other 
trading associations. So, ISMA could indeed be considered as an example of a 
global, non-governmental regime for capital flows. Nevertheless, this may not lead 
to a conclusion that it has been totally independent of the intergovernmental world. 
"Since whole systems and subsystems can be actors in both worlds 
- 
with 
states being drawn ever further into the multicentric world by an intensified 
interest in expanding their share of world markets and with other actors 
being drawn into the state-centric [intergovernmental] world by virtue of 
their physical presence on the territories of states 
- 
the overlap between the 
two worlds is inherent in the structure of the global system. "I 
The links between the two worlds and efforts (or needs) to resolve clashes 
between them may well indicate the future course of internati onal relations 
development. By mutual accommodation and acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
other world, conditions could be created for a global securities regime to emerge. 
A process through which such a special amalgamation of the transnational and an 
intergovernmental (inter-state) regime for capital flows would apparently resemble 
the Global Politics model. This is a challenge regime theory cannot escape facing. 
The ultimate aim of this an 
, 
alysis has not been to offer any definite 
explanations, but rather to suggest alternative research courses in both economics 
and politics. As in any other social research, the passage of time will reveal to what 
7 ROSENAU, J. N. (1990): "Turbulence in World Politics" (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press), p. 271-272. 
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extent such aspirations are justified in reality. However, several particular 
developments on the global economic scene have to be mentioned here, as they 
occurred after the empirical part of this research had been completed. 
During 1992 and the beginning of 1993, the global capital market witnessed 
certain changes with respect to its structure and functions. These changes have not 
been so dramatic as at particular times during the 1980s, but have nonetheless 
pointed to new developments which could significantly influence the market's future. 
Although a rapid growth of the world's derivative markets has begun in the latter 
part of 1989, they profoundly increased during 1992. All derivative instruments 
have gained in attractiveness, traded both on exchanges and over-the-counter. 317 
At the end of 1992, the value of on-exchange derivatives amounted to 4.5 trillion 
dollars, and the stock of over-the-counter derivatives was worth another 4.5 trillion 
dollars 
. 
358 Concerning the structure of traded instruments, interest-rate futures and 
interest-rate swaps dominate over other derivatives. One of the reasons accounting 
this is undoubtedly a lack of confidence in signals of economic recovery in 
industrialized countries. "' 
A new trading system for futures and options, Globex, was launched in June 
19921. As it is the international after-hours screen trading system, it is expected to 
attract new customers by reducing barriers like time-zone differentials and lack of 
familiarity with different markets. At present, Globex links trades on the Chicago 
Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the New York Exchanges and 
the Matif (Paris). The main instruments traded within this global network are futures 
and options on currencies, the Eurodollar contracts and 30-year Treasury and Libor 
contracts 
. 
3' Giving an investor the access to 60-70 percent of the world's futures 
trading, Globex will add to the already intensifying competition among European 
exchanges. 
In addition to derivatives, global equity issues have also begun to attract 
more attention. In 1992, for example, the total value of equities issued 
simultaneously in a number of markets was around 25 billion dollars, which was 
more than double the figure for 1988 
. 
161 Different factors have generated this 
expansion, including a push towards privatisation in many industrialized countries, 
a growing inability of domestic markets to meet financial needs of global companies, 
and a trend towards increasing portfolio diversification of large investors. What is 
most important is that American investors and investment banks have again come 
to dominate this market segment, reversing the trend of "buying-out America". " 
Moreover, there are not just large institutional investors that tap the global equity 
market. Giant transnational industrial companies have also discovered many benefits 
of global issues. For example, the world's largest consumer electronics producer, 
I Globex was included in the survey of computer networking in banking in 
Chapter Two, section five. 
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"Matsushita Electric Industrial", launched a global bond offering of one billion 
dollars in July 1992. The issue was the first such offering by a private company, 
launched on US and European markets simultaneously. '61 
Changes are also occurring in relation to the relative position of the main 
financial centres. In order to promote competitiveness of German markets, eight 
stock exchanges were brought under a single holding company "Deutsche Borse" in 
the beginning of 1993. Reserve requirements for German banks were cut and new 
short-term government securities introduced to strengthen the concept of 
"Finanzplatz Deutschland" 
. 
31 Nevertheless, the gap between London, on the one 
hand, and other European centres, on the other hand, has not been declining. It was 
estimated that the London exchange handles around 95 percent of all European 
cross-border share trading. 365 In response, bilateral and multilateral links have 
being developed among continental exchanges (e. g. between the Matif in Paris and 
the Deutsche Terminborse). At the other side of the world, Japanese financial 
markets have been slowly recovering from a disastrous beginning of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the stock market turnover in 1992 was only one-third of the turnover 
in 1987 or 1988.366 
Concerning the developments in regulatory sphere, not much progress has 
been achieved in the negotiations over the IOSCO capital standards for investment 
banks. After three years of negotiations, the gulf between the US SEC and other 
securities regulators is wider than ever. The US regulator wants an investment bank 
to maintain a high minimum capital level (in accordance with the domestic rules), 
while the SIB and the others prefer different standards that would encourage 
investment banks to use netting techniques to hedge their portfolios and reduce the 
risks. Regarding the supervision of financial conglomerates, IOSCO's standards 
were published in October 1992, allowing for the full spectrum of supervision 
techniques. In contrast to Basle standards, they do not propose any routine exchange 
of information between home and host regulators. 
The Uruguay Round of negotiation to extend the coverage of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was completed in December 199 3. Contrary to 
some predictions, it did not result in the creation of a global regime for services, 
though certain services (e. g. those related to trade aspects of intellectual property 
rights and direct investment) found their place in the draft agreement. However, the 
expected agreement on liberalization of financial services was not reached, and the 
appendix for financial services in the draft agreement was left empty. At the 
beginning of 1994, one can only speculate about reasons for which financial services 
were left out. Nevertheless, two possible causes come to mind. Firstly, as financial 
services (and the financial sectors, in general) today generate an immense and 
critical effect on the national economy, liberalization of them "strikes at the core of 
national systems of economic management and state decision-making" (G. Underhill, 
1993, p. 118). Once reached, such a general agreement on services would inevitably 
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contribute to a further internationalization of economic decision-making, i. e. it 
would require governments to "surrender" an additional degree of their "sovereign" 
economic management. Secondly, it would probably affect the relationship between 
governments and their "domestic" service sectors, especially in economies where the 
financial sector is heavily regulated. For example, US banks were the first to lobby 
for liberalization of financial services. Even so, they have realized that, under the 
current regulatory conditions in the US, a global agreement on liberalization would 
just fortify already-existing competitive advantages of foreign banks in the US. 367 
The rapid expansion of derivative markets has also generated new regulatory 
proposals from the Basle Committee. In addition to the development of techniques 
for assessing market risk, debt and equity derivatives, as well as currency futures 
and swaps, have been included in the framework. 161 It is expected that the 
Committee will issue a formal amendment to the 1988 Capital Accord, to be 
implemented from the beginning of 1997 at the earliest. Another important aspect 
of regulatory changes can be found in the Introduction to the 1993 proposal: 
"The very fact of this extraordinarily rapid pace of change underscores the 
Committee's belief that the time has come to solicit the views of market 
participants... The Committee is keen to develop an international agreement 
which would apply to all major market players. However, because the 
consultative process will, of necessity, be long and the phased 
implementation even longer, it is the Committee's judgement that its internal 
deliberation cannot proceed further without the benefits of market 
participants' reactions to the overall approach. ""' 
A closer touch with market participants and a greater reliance on market 
mechanisms were also highlighted by Mr Richard Breeden, chairman of the US 
SEC. In explaining why there is no safety net for the US securities industry, he put 
forward that 
"... market disciplines are stronger and more omnipresent than any number 
of rule-setting bureaucrats and bank examiners. Markets don't go to 
sleep. 11370 
Although SEC advocates high capital requirements for investment banks, Mr 
Breeden's statement clearly points to a significant digression from the "anxiety 
approach" (over-regulation in banking). On the other hand, the "confidence 
approach" has come under a challenge in the country of its origin 
- 
in the UK. In 
May 1993, the Securities and Investment Board was considering a new central, 
computer facility to centralize information about many different types of transactions 
in individual securities and derivatives, in order to combat fraud and market- 
manipulations. At the same time, Mr Andrew Large, the chairman of the Board, 
submitted a proposal for strengthening the SIB's role in setting standards of 
regulation 
. 
371 In spite of the long-standing confidence in banking in the UK, one 
of the self-regulatory organizations (the Securities and Futures Authority) has 
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recently banned a dealer indefinitely from the securities business for taking 
excessive risk and incurring a heavy loss for his firm. "' 
As pointed earlier, the creation of an intergovernmental regime for capital 
flows faces many obstacles and negotiations are slowly advancing. Meanwhile, some 
regulators have found it more efficient to take a gradual, "similarity of standards" 
approach to securities regulation (instead of striving for the full convergence). The 
most important example is the inauguration, in July 1991, of the Multi-Jurisdictional 
Disclosure System (MJDS) between the securities commissions in Toronto and 
Washington. Companies have been allowed to raise equity funds cross-border as 
373 long as they follow the disclosure standards in either of the countries. As a final 
disposition of stakes seems unattainable in the near future, this kind of development 
may offer a solution for the present stalemate. 
The purpose of including some of the most recent developments was to lay 
the grounds for offering an outline of future research. The dilemma "supervision or 
regulation" will definitely be the most critical issue in relation to the global 
economy, bringing to the surface some of the most significant contrasts in various 
types of orderly market economy. Directly related to this, the concept of 
consolidated financial supervision will, sooner or later, generate a hot political 
question of each country's supervisory credentials. In the case when both home and 
host regulators will have to be confident in regulatory competence of the other, it 
is unclear what will be the criteria to evaluate such capabilities. 
Regulation of derivative markets is another field where different ranking of 
values will be most clearly contrasted. On the one hand, it can be argued that such 
instruments have been designed to reduce risk, so, besides contributing to efficiency, 
they improve market stability. On the other hand, this development has been 
criticized as being too "detached" from both the real economy and the traditional 
market ftinctioning. From this aspect, markets have become less transparent and 
more difficult to supervise. So, even though they might contribute to efficiency, a 
threat they pose to the values of order and stability is seen as more dangerous. 
Finally, functional linkages in the policy-system for global capital flows will 
undoubtedly modify the existing issues and probably add some new ones. The trend 
towards closer economic integration, as exemplified by the transformation of EC 
into European Union and by the NAFTA Agreement, is not expected to foster 
significantly the coming of a truly global economy in a near future. However, a 
number of interim solutions reached in such regional integration processes can be 
understood as modifying, for example, the issue of liberalization. Instead of being 
within the realm of national economic policy, the level of market openness has 
increasingly been assessed from a new perspective: order vs efficiency of region as 
a whole. Other functional linkages in relation to, for example, market reforms in 
former socialist countries, international efforts to prevent money laundering or 
financial sanctions against Iraq and Yugoslavia, will also add to the political 
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complexity that surrounds the global capital market. 
As evident, it has always been difficult to speculate about the evolution of 
modem financial markets. This certainly applies to both economics and politics of 
the global capital market. Regime theory can indeed provide a useful concept for 
coping with such dynamics and complexity. Nevertheless, it must not resist changes 
within the concept itself, keeping in mind that walls between the intergovernmental 
world and the multi-centric world are falling down with every bond and equity 
issued. 
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